The institutional and political economy of Maastricht criteria by BERSET, SIMON
 Département d’économie politique 
Faculté des Sciences Economiques et Sociales 
Chaire de finances publiques et de gestion des finances publiques 
Bernard DAFFLON, professeur ordinaire 
 
 
School of Management 
Hannu LAURILA, Professor 
 
The institutional and political economy of 
Maastricht criteria 
 
Under the supervision of: 
Prof. Bernard Dafflon 
Chaire de finances publiques et de gestion des finances publiques 
Prof. Hannu Laurila 
School of Management 
Simon Berset 
 
Fribourg, 30th June 2013 
 
Ch. de Clos-Regots 28 simon.berset@gmail.com 
1630 Bulle +41 79 383 60 13 
 	  
II	  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................................ II	  
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ V	  
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................VI	  
ABSTRACT ..........................................................................................................................VII	  
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 1	  
PART I: Theory of budget constraint .................................................................................. 12	  
1	   The debate on fiscal discipline..................................................................................... 14	  
1.1	   Resource allocation ................................................................................................. 15	  
1.1.1	   Optimal size of public sector ............................................................................ 16	  
1.1.2	   Crowding out hypothesis .................................................................................. 20	  
1.1.3	   Ricardian equivalence hypothesis .................................................................... 22	  
1.1.4	   Arguments against the crowding out effect ...................................................... 24	  
1.2	   Income redistribution .............................................................................................. 25	  
1.2.1	   Intergenerational transfer ................................................................................ 26	  
1.2.2	   Intergovernmental transfer .............................................................................. 28	  
1.2.3	   Lerner’s model ................................................................................................. 29	  
1.3	   Macroeconomic stabilisation................................................................................... 30	  
1.3.1	   Functional public finance theory ..................................................................... 31	  
1.3.2	   Fiscal balance over the economic cycle........................................................... 31	  
1.3.3	   Automatic stabilisers ........................................................................................ 32	  
1.3.4	   Implementation of expansionary fiscal policy.................................................. 33	  
1.3.5	   Political issues in implementing expansionary fiscal policy............................ 34	  
1.3.6	   Expansionary fiscal policy in the context of federalism................................... 34	  
2	   The requirement of setting rules................................................................................. 37	  
2.1	   Advantages of setting binding rules ........................................................................ 38	  
2.1.1	   Fiscal rules as a limit to deficit bias ................................................................ 38	  
2.1.2	   Occurrence of moral hazard ............................................................................ 39	  
2.1.3	   The threat of the sanction reinforces the budgetary pressure.......................... 41	  
2.1.4	   Rules provide a benchmark for budget deliberations ...................................... 41	  
2.1.5	   Reputation ........................................................................................................ 42	  
 	  
III	  
2.2	   Disadvantages of setting binding rules.................................................................... 42	  
2.2.1	   The market discipline hypothesis ..................................................................... 42	  
2.2.2	   Rules induce nontransparent behaviours ......................................................... 43	  
2.2.3	   Risky reliance on forecasts............................................................................... 46	  
2.2.4	   Unenforceability of sanctions........................................................................... 47	  
2.2.5	   Rules reduce fiscal flexibility ........................................................................... 47	  
3	   Definition and role of fiscal institutions ..................................................................... 48	  
3.1	   Electoral rules.......................................................................................................... 51	  
3.2	   Budgetary institutions ............................................................................................. 53	  
3.2.1	   The formulation ................................................................................................ 54	  
3.2.2	   The approval .................................................................................................... 55	  
3.2.3	   The implementation .......................................................................................... 56	  
3.3	   Fiscal rules............................................................................................................... 57	  
3.4	   The Swiss special case ............................................................................................ 58	  
PART II: The institutional design of the European budget constraint............................. 61	  
4	   From soft to hard budget constraint .......................................................................... 63	  
4.1	   Some relevant fiscal concepts ................................................................................. 63	  
4.1.1	   The theorem of balanced budget ...................................................................... 64	  
4.1.2	   The “golden rule” revisited ............................................................................. 66	  
4.1.3	   The public accounting plan .............................................................................. 67	  
4.2	   The analytical framework........................................................................................ 73	  
4.2.1	   The criteria of an optimal fiscal rule ............................................................... 74	  
4.2.2	   Assessing the degree of strictness .................................................................... 75	  
5	   The institutional framework of Maastricht criteria.................................................. 80	  
5.1	   The ground principles and components of the Maastricht criteria.......................... 83	  
5.1.1	   The general design ........................................................................................... 84	  
5.1.2	   The coverage of the “government”.................................................................. 91	  
5.1.3	   The notion of public deficit and public debt..................................................... 99	  
5.1.4	   The reporting and monitoring rules ............................................................... 105	  
5.2	   The original Stability and Growth Pact................................................................. 107	  
5.2.1	   The preventive arm......................................................................................... 108	  
5.2.2	   The revised notion of excessive deficit ........................................................... 110	  
 	  
IV	  
5.2.3	   The corrective arm ......................................................................................... 111	  
5.3	   The revised Stability and Growth Pact.................................................................. 115	  
5.4	   The “Six-Pack”...................................................................................................... 120	  
5.4.1	   The European Semester.................................................................................. 123	  
5.4.2	   The last formal reform of the SGP ................................................................. 123	  
5.4.3	   Provisions against macroeconomic imbalances ............................................ 135	  
5.4.4	   Towards the standardisation of the national fiscal framework...................... 138	  
5.5	   The Treaty on stability, coordination and governance (TSCG) ............................ 141	  
5.6	   The “Two-Pack”.................................................................................................... 145	  
5.6.1	   Regulation No. 472/2013................................................................................ 145	  
5.6.2	   Regulation No. 473/2013................................................................................ 150	  
6	   Institutional assessment and review of Maastricht criteria ................................... 154	  
6.1	   The EU fiscal constraint in light of the optimal criteria........................................ 155	  
6.1.1	   Criteria of efficiency....................................................................................... 156	  
6.1.2	   Criteria of enforceability................................................................................ 159	  
6.2	   The degree of strictness of the EU fiscal constraint.............................................. 161	  
6.2.1	   Is the fiscal discipline requirement prescribed by the law?........................... 162	  
6.2.2	   What is the definition of the fiscal discipline? ............................................... 162	  
6.2.3	   What does the fiscal discipline requirement concern?................................... 164	  
6.2.4	   In case of violation, does the rule provide sanction mechanism?.................. 165	  
CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................... 168	  
APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................... 173	  
Appendix A: Investment expenditures in Switzerland by layer of government ........ 173	  
Appendix B: Sample of the EDP notification tables ..................................................... 174	  
Appendix C: Deficit-to-GDP ratios of the EMU member states.................................. 178	  
Appendix D: Debt-to-GDP ratios of the EMU member states..................................... 179	  
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 180	  
 
 	  
V	  
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1-1: Swiss investment expenditures by layer of government. ...................................... 35	  
Figure 3-1: Debt-to-GDP ratios of some OECD member states. ............................................. 49	  
Figure 4-1: The current and capital budget/account................................................................. 69	  
Figure 4-2: The public balance sheet. ...................................................................................... 72	  
Figure 4-3: Analytical grid of the strictness of budget constraints. ......................................... 79	  
Figure 5-1: The relevant legal sources of the European budget constraint. ............................. 81	  
Figure 5-2: The sequence of reforms. ...................................................................................... 82	  
Figure 5-3: The initial European fiscal constraint.................................................................... 88	  
Figure 5-4: Decision tree for allocation to the general government sector. ............................. 98	  
Figure 5-5: The ESA 95 current accounts. ............................................................................. 102	  
Figure 5-6: The ESA 95 capital account. ............................................................................... 103	  
Figure 5-7: The ESA 95 balance sheet................................................................................... 104	  
Figure 5-8: Time schedule of the correction mechanism. ...................................................... 114	  
Figure 5-9: Average deficit-to-GDP ratio of euro area-12..................................................... 117	  
Figure 5-10: The preventive arm to this day (1/2). ................................................................ 127	  
Figure 5-11: The preventive arm to this day (2/2). ................................................................ 130	  
Figure 5-12: The corrective arm to this day. .......................................................................... 134	  
Figure 5-13: The macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP). ............................................ 137	  
 
 	  
VI	  
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1-1: Main arguments for and against fiscal discipline. .................................................. 15	  
Table 1-2: Analysis of the financing methods of the public sector.......................................... 18	  
Table 4-1: The possible fiscal outcomes. ................................................................................. 77	  
Table 5-1: Votes per country in the Council. ........................................................................... 89	  
Table 5-2: The institutional sectors and sub-sectors in the ESA 95......................................... 94	  
Table 5-3: Main changes brought by the first reform in 2005. .............................................. 119	  
Table 5-4: The public deficit and debt ratios in the euro area, 2006-2011. ........................... 120	  
Table 5-5: Sample of the annual average growth rates of the Belgian Debt.......................... 132	  
Table 6-1: The criteria of an optimal fiscal rule..................................................................... 155	  
Table 6-2: The fiscal procedures and their focus. .................................................................. 165	  	  
 	  
VII	  
ABSTRACT 
Fourteen years after its “technical” start on 1st January 1999 and eleven years after the 
entrance into force of the “full” monetary union with the physical introduction of euro coins 
and banknotes on 1st January 2002, the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is 
facing the most severe crisis of its existence. Particularly affected, the public finance stance of 
some member states has become quite alarming, so that, it might jeopardize the whole 
monetary area. In that tense context, and in parallel to the several austerity programmes 
undertaken by, and/or imposed on, many governments, there have been serious calls for 
reforming the European Union’s (EU) restrictions framing the national fiscal policies. The 
doubts regarding the effectiveness of these supranational fiscal rules are however not new. 
Since they have been initially designed, the so-called Maastricht fiscal criteria have been 
indeed subject to a wide range of criticisms. Setting out from this premise, the present 
Master’s Thesis investigates the construction, as well as the functioning, of the EU instrument 
of fiscal discipline from a political and institutional perspective. Based on an economic 
theoretical framework, our research, after having specified the economic concept of “fiscal 
discipline”, provides a dynamic institutional reading of the EU legislative acts forming the 
fiscal constraint in force nowadays. More than just describing the provisions prescribed in 
these legal bases, our study carries a deeper analysis, which highlights the improvement made 
over the last twenty years, as well as the remaining shortcomings and inconsistencies 
contained within the European fiscal environment. 
 	  
 	  
1	  
INTRODUCTION 
Fourteen years after its “technical” start on 1st January 1999, date which was 
marked by the transfer of control from the national central banks of the eleven 
qualified countries to the new and centralized European Central Bank (ECB), and 
eleven years after the entrance into force of the “full” monetary union with the 
physical introduction of euro coins and banknotes on 1st January 2002, the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is facing the most severe crisis 
of its whole existence. Even though the single currency seems to have brought 
significant microeconomic gains for the members of the Eurozone over the years 
(Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2008: 2), the seriousness of the current so-called sovereign 
debt crisis may objectively be able to jeopardize the whole EMU. 
Began in October 2009, when Greece announced that its public deficit was in 
reality twice higher than previously reported, and followed by a succession of 
several austerity programmes all over the Eurozone1, the European crisis 
constitutes a crucial test for the future of the European monetary union and, to the 
extent, for the whole European construction. Although the euro area is customary 
of being under the fire of critics, it seems that the encountered difficulties have 
never been so deep than during these last months. For instance, tackling the issue 
of the risk of secession has become a conceivable scenario, not only for the mass 
media, seeking for alarming pictures, but also for serious academic observers2. 
More than just a cyclical problem, due to the tense economic situation and 
following upon the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, the troubles occurring 
among the EMU member states have confirmed the doubts expressed, already at 
the designing stage of the monetary union, by numerous economists, concerning 
the structural organisation and definition of the Eurozone. 
Aside from the original distrust regarding the capacity of the European countries, 
in terms of their individual characteristics, to form an optimal currency area 
(OCA) according to the theoretical contribution of Mundell (1961), a wide range 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Spain announced a first austerity program in January 2009, Portugal in March, Italy in July and 
Ireland benefited of a bailout package in exchange of austerity measures in November of the same 
year. 
2 See for instance the note provided by Feldstein (2008) describing the factors, which could lead to 
a potential break-up of the Eurozone. 
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of economists have questioned the institutional design of the monetary union, 
highlighting some strong inconsistencies and inefficiencies in its functioning, as 
well as its asymmetric architecture (Breuss, 2002: 586). This latter trend of 
opinions takes mainly its roots in what Rossi and Dafflon (2012) call the “original 
sin” of the Euroland or, in other words, the interaction of a centralized monetary 
policy with uncoordinated national fiscal policies (Herzog, 2004: 3). The obtained 
result of highly politicized decisions and conflicting national interests about 
monetary and fiscal policies (Feldstein, 1997: 30) seems indeed to have neglected 
the numerous academic researches highlighting the relevance of centralizing a 
significant part of the national budgets to the European level.  
During the Maastricht Summit in December 1991, the twelve member states of 
the newly called European Union (EU) made a crucial step forward in the history 
of European integration by scheduling the “second stage” implementation plan 
leading to the unique European currency. However, mainly for national 
sovereignty concerns, they opted for currency unification but rejected the idea of 
centralizing even partly their fiscal policy power3. Consequently, the 
establishment of a supranational monetary union in 1999 (the third stage) with the 
transfer of control from the national central banks of the qualified countries to the 
ECB marked the beginning of the interactions between sovereign countries, in 
terms of fiscal policy, and a single monetary authority managing the European 
monetary policy, a so-called “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy. Also referred as 
the “Brussels consensus4” (Bénassy-Quéré and Coeuré, 2010: 72), the strategy 
behind this distribution of competences is the following: the centralized monetary 
policy responds to the events having an impact on the Eurozone as a whole 
(symmetric shocks), whereas the national fiscal policies deal with the specific 
economic situations (asymmetric shocks). In order to grasp the consequences of 
this choice, the approach developed in the OCA theory, based on a cost-benefit 
analysis of a monetary union, offers a helpful framework. Concretely, this method 
consists in balancing the potential trade gains against macroeconomic losses 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For the 2007-2013 period, the budget of the European Union amounts to 1.045 per cent of the 
Union’s GDP, whereas the budgets of public sector correspond, on average, to 40 per cent of GDP 
(Bénassy-Quéré and Coeuré, 2010: 70). 
4 This expression alluding to the well-known “Washington consensus”, in the 1980s, between the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the U.S. Treasury Department. 
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(Feldstein, 1997: 16).  
By joining a monetary union, a country not only loses its national currency but 
also its sovereignty in terms of monetary policy. As a matter of fact, the transfer 
of this instrument of economic policy implies that the member states cannot 
operate individually any devaluation or revaluation of the currency, nor decide the 
supplied volume of money, neither set the short-term interest rate. Given that the 
ability for a nation to use these policy tools can be extremely useful, this shift of 
power constitutes the main cost side of a monetary union. Mundell (1961), in his 
seminal paper, illustrates for instance this cost by the adjustment problem that can 
occur in a single currency area, when facing an asymmetric shock in aggregate 
demand, possibly due to a specific sector specialization, to particular direction of 
national trade or to any social, as well as political event (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 
2008: 1). Through this example, we learn that international wage flexibility and 
mobility of labour serve as automatic mechanisms bringing back equilibrium and 
consequently, that the cost of the monetary union for its member states will be 
negatively correlated with the level of these two factors: the higher the wage 
flexibility and the mobility of labour, the lower the cost of the union. 
Furthermore, differences between member states among the union in terms of 
their preferences about inflation and unemployment, of their labour market 
institutions, of their legal systems or even of their growth rates represent other 
sources of disagreements (and of costs) on the way to formulate the centralized 
monetary policy5. More than just pointing out the costs related to the participation 
in such a union, the latter analysis provides interesting insights on the implications 
for the conduct of fiscal policy. 
Mundell’s example highlights indeed a direct link between monetary and fiscal 
policies. In case of an asymmetric demand shock within a monetary union, not 
only wage and labour flexibility would be required, but an insurance mechanism, 
allowing income transfers between the member states, would also be necessary in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 De Grauwe (2009) provides a detailed analysis of the OCA theory and analyses its policy 
implications. 
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order to limit the social pain in the country facing the demand downturn6. Thanks 
to these transfers, the adjustment is made easier and softens the demand shift. This 
insurance system can be organized either through a centralized budget, which 
offers the advantage of automatically redistributing income among the member 
states (interregional insurance system), or, without centralizing government 
budgets, through intergenerational transfers. Considering first the relative 
inhomogeneity of the European countries, which makes asymmetric shocks more 
likely (Feldstein, 1997: 22), and second, the option chosen by the European 
member states – namely keeping independent national budgets – it means, in 
short, that a member state, hit by a demand shock, would finance its deficit with 
external debt and consequently, its future generations would have to pay for the 
current negative economic situation. In the latter case, the OCA theory implies 
thus that “a substantial autonomy should be reserved for these national fiscal 
policies” (De Grauwe, 2009: 224) even though it acknowledges that centralizing a 
significant part of the national budgets would be more desirable. 
This conclusion, which recommends a high degree of flexibility and autonomy for 
individual national budgets in monetary union without budgetary centralization, 
has however to be tempered. Following such a strategy would completely neglect 
the potential issue of deficit sustainability and, quoting Buti et al. (2003: 100), 
“EMU without [fiscal] rules would be an interesting experiment, but a risky 
policy option”. Without entering for now into greater details, let us just remind 
that the accumulation of past deficits constraints the room of manoeuvre for future 
budgets. At a certain point, the use of fiscal policies to balance negative economic 
shocks is thus limited and requires running large primary budget surplus in the 
future. Therefore, the autonomy of the national fiscal policies is necessary in case 
of temporary shocks but, when facing a permanent negative shift of demand, and 
given the risk of unsustainable public finances, fundamental adjustments, for 
instance in terms of wages, are inevitable in order to offset the shock. 
In a monetary union, the risk of seeing the sovereign debt of a member state 
becoming unsustainable implies further concerns and can have negative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See for instance Von Hangen and Wyplosz (2008), who analyse and confront two systems of 
collective insurance, namely tax revenue sharing and unemployment revenue sharing. 
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consequences for the whole union. A first implication of the fiscal policy 
unsustainability of an individual country comes from the negative spillover effect, 
which is spread on the other participants in the union. Theoretically, a country 
recording sizeable deficits over the years, through its interventions on the capital 
market (in order to finance its deficits), contributes to increase the enforced 
interest rates at the level of the union. The spillover is then double: the increase in 
the interest rate leads, on the one hand, to a higher debt burden for each member 
state and, on the other hand, to a greater political pressure on the central bank for 
relaxing its monetary policy, corollary effect of the general higher level of 
indebtedness within the union (Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999: 546; von Hagen and 
Eichengreen, 1996: 134). These negative spillover effects represent therefore a 
clear risk for the member states of a monetary union and constitute a first 
argument for limiting the degree of autonomy for conducting the individual 
national fiscal policies. 
A second phenomenon, which has to be taken into account, when analysing the 
incidence of forming a monetary union on national fiscal policies, lies in the 
moral hazard issue. Traditionally, we consider that the interest rate, which the 
governments have to pay on their debts, results from the addition of the prices 
covering the risk of default as well as the risk of devaluation. Outside of a 
monetary union, the national level of indebtedness is directly correlated with the 
risk of currency devaluation. A growing stock of debt goes with an increase in the 
interest rate. Logically, if a country participates now in a monetary union, which 
means that this state cannot individually decide its monetary policy, it is not 
anymore its own degree of indebtedness that defines the risk of devaluation. The 
link between the national indebtedness and the interest rate on sovereign 
borrowing thus weakens. Furthermore, in a monetary union, the interest rate 
expressing the risk of default of a member state will most likely take into account 
the implicit guarantee of bail out. Unless the private capital market works 
efficiently and applies different interest rates in the union according to the 
individual national risks, highly indebted member state will benefit of lower 
interest rates than they would have outside of the union. In other words, because 
of the moral hazard, forming a monetary union reduces the incentives for national 
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governments to respect fiscal discipline and, here again, justifies less national 
sovereignty on the national fiscal policies. 
This short presentation of what we can learn, from the economic theory, about the 
consequences, in terms of fiscal policy, of a monetary union like the Eurozone, 
namely without any significant “federal” budget, reveals the difficult trade-off on 
the degree of autonomy to be given to the member states. On one hand, the loss of 
the monetary instrument at the national level implies that the fiscal tools are the 
only ones left in the hand of each government to tackle economic slowdowns (de 
Grauwe, 2009: 224). Under this approach, the theory calls for more national 
autonomy and fiscal policy flexibility. However, on the other hand, taking into 
account the existence of spillover effects and the moral hazard issue leads to a 
quite different conclusion. From the latter standpoint, the monetary union not only 
creates a direct link between the national fiscal stances of each country, but also 
tends to relax the fiscal discipline by introducing wrong incentives at the national 
level. National fiscal policies free of any constraint and open to these policy 
biases would be thus highly risky for the long-term sustainability of the monetary 
union (Buti et al., 2003: 100). The conclusion that we draw from these opposite 
theoretical insights is that a compromise has to be found. Confirming this 
viewpoint, Beetsma and Uhlig (1999: 561) show, through a stylised model 
investigating how a stability pact affects national debt policies, that governments, 
when forming a monetary union, are actually inclined to sign such a pact in order 
to “internalise the benefits of reducing the debt in terms of lower future inflation”. 
A recent empirical study, based on a panel of EU countries, tends to confirm the 
latter effect by demonstrating that the existence of fiscal rules seems to enhance 
economic growth (Afonso and Jalles, 2012: 5). 
Taking into account the arguments of both positions, the European member states 
agreed on the imposition of a budget constraint. Defined for the first time in the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), the design of the so-called Maastricht fiscal 
criteria has been indeed guided by the desire to reach an acceptable compromise 
between the two theoretical requirements. These budgetary rules – “comprising of 
reference values for deficits and debt to be achieved within a given time-span, a 
common accounting framework for computing public finance variables and a call 
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to adapt national procedure to the requirement of budgetary discipline” (European 
Commission, 1997: 47) – target to keep a certain room of manoeuvre for allowing 
the member states to run countercyclical fiscal policies and, at the same time, to 
limit the spillover effects and the moral hazard bias by setting limits on the annual 
deficits as well as on the size of the government debts. Another logic behind the 
criteria was, of course, to promote convergence between the future “euro time 
zone” members. Entered into force already on 1st November 1993, the criteria 
served, at first, as convergence conditions for participating in the monetary 
union7, despite the numerous shortcomings and painful impact that these 
requirements represent for these peripheral economies (Rossi, 2004: 968). 
Furthermore, once the Eurozone came fully into existence, this constraint on 
public finance has been reaffirmed and is called, since then, the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). This instrument, adopted at the Amsterdam Summit in June 
1997, was originally based on three legal acts: Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policy, Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure and Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth 
Pact (97/C 231/01). Despite the succeeding amendments in 2005 and 2011, the 
essence of the latter institutional arrangement still consists in observing closely 
the national fiscal deficits and sanctioning the countries with excessive ones. 
Moreover, the two criteria concerning the public finances of the member states 
have been maintained over the years. The European legislation limits the general 
government deficit-to-GDP ratio at 3 per cent and the general government debt-
to-GDP ratio at 60 per cent. If facing a fiscal stance beyond these reference 
values, a member state falls into the so-called “excessive deficit procedure”. 
Besides, the SGP stipulates, in its original version, that the member states should 
achieve and maintain a medium-term budgetary position “close to balance or in 
surplus”. In the successive amendments of the Pact, this requirement has been 
however slightly relaxed. 
Outwardly simple in their formulation, these binding rules do raise several issues 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 These are still nowadays necessary to be fulfilled by the new applicants to the Eurozone. 
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concerning their application as well as their enforcement in practice. Moreover, 
the following examples attest of the possibility to evaluate the European budget 
constraint under a wide range of approaches. For instance, Dafflon (1997) 
highlighted some concrete problems when it comes to imagine a hypothetical 
implementation of the Maastricht criteria in a federal state such as Switzerland8. 
Other lines of doubts are mentioned in the literature like the one taken by 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998: 69), who not only appeared to be quite 
pessimistic about the benefits of the SGP in terms of fiscal discipline, but also 
consider that this Pact may induce significant costs in “diverting political effort 
from more fundamental problems”. Noting the 2002-2003 enforcement 
difficulties encountered by the preventive arm of the SGP, Fatás et al. (2003: 8) 
attributed this failure to “a framework focusing on numerical values and lacking 
strong enforcement”. Some authors, among them Balassone and Franco (2000b) 
or Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004), stressed the problem of the public investments, 
which could suffer from the implementation of the SGP. Last but not least, de 
Haan et al. (2003: 3) questioned the degree of bindingness of this regulation, as 
well as the likelihood of the member states to stick to the legally non-binding 
rules contained in the Pact. Because of the many unclear definitions and 
unenforceable mechanisms, among other things, the European fiscal rules have 
always been subject to scepticism about the outcome that such limits can produce 
and, it is obvious that the present fiscal stance of many Eurozone member states 
tends to prove these sceptical observers right. 
Contrary to the critics formulated against the general features of the SGP, for 
instance on the level of the deficit and debt ceilings9, we wish to focus here on the 
way the European budget constraint is institutionally designed. In other words, we 
take mainly into account the institutional framework in which the criteria are 
applied and try to highlight the relevance and the difficulty, which has been for 
long neglected by the economists, of the transposition of economic concepts into 
legal texts. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Balassone and Franco (2000a) also tackle the issue of the compliance with the SGP in the context 
of fiscal federalism. 
9 See, for example, the study provided by Uctum and Wichens (2000), who deem the 3 per cent 
deficit ceiling inconsistent with the cyclical economic activity and the 60 per cent debt ceiling 
infeasible with initial high indebtedness. 
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Since 1940 and during the second half of the XXth Century, the mainstream 
economics, represented by the Neoclassical thinking, has indeed essentially 
ignored the impact of the institutions on the economic process (Chavance, 2007: 
4). The emergence of this paradigm is contemporary to the application of 
mathematical and statistical tools to all fields of sciences and, of course, 
Economics is no exception to this trend (Friboulet, 2009: 111). In the latter 
discipline, the influence of the general tendency is characterized by the 
formalization of the economic behaviours into mathematical models. In this 
context, the analysis of issues related to the budget policies became a matter of 
synthesizing the determinants of budgetary decisions into equations in order to 
easily grasp the logic behind them. For instance, the institutional framework is 
completely underestimated (if not ignored) to the benefit of strong hypothesis 
simplifying complex reality and behaviours (Novaresi, 2001: 1). Under this 
approach, the institutional environment, in which the decisions concerning public 
budget policies are made, is simply not relevant and is supposed to have no 
impact on the outcome of the budgetary process. 
Contributing to challenge this way of thinking, different empirical researches10 
showed in fact, that economic variables alone cannot fully explain why some 
countries have accumulated large and persistent deficits in the last twenty years 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995: 3). Given this observation, fiscal policy outcomes are 
found endogenous and obviously reflect “the interaction of different agents 
(policymakers, political parties, private sector) with possibly conflicting interests, 
rather than being chosen by a benevolent planner maximizing a social welfare 
function” (Milesi-Ferretti 1996: 1). Therefore, the environment, taken in its large 
meaning, may directly affect the budgetary process and consequently the quality 
of its performance. With the growing influence of the “new institutional 
economy” in the mid-1990s, the definition of the “rules of the game” plays, since 
then, a central role in the economic analysis. Parallel to this general trend, the 
political economy of fiscal institutions is no exception and “has emerged as a 
fascinating and lively field of academic research in the last decade” (von Hagen, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Kirchgässner (2001) provides for instance an empirical literature survey on fiscal institutions of 
the last three decades. 
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2005: 10), giving a relevant and practical insight into what impact fiscal rules 
have. 
Following this viewpoint, the thesis defended in our study is that, not only “fiscal 
institutions do matter” (Poterba, 1996: Abstract), but they also have a positive 
impact on fiscal discipline, if well-defined (Alesina and Perotti, 1999: 33). The 
target of the present Master’s Thesis is then twofold. Indeed, it firstly aims at 
providing a detailed description of the “rules of the game” of the budget constraint 
set at the European level. Secondly, on the basis of the picture of the Maastricht 
criteria we draw, we wish to assess the quality of the set of rules in terms of fiscal 
outcome and highlight the inefficiencies contained in this institutional 
environment.  
In order to reach this ambitious goal, our research is divided into two parts, 
containing each several chapters. Part I provides the economic theoretical 
background justifying the implementation of budget rules. Here, we theoretically 
tackle issues, such as budget discipline, government indebtedness or public sector 
size. An extra attention at the definition and the classification of “budget 
institutions” is also made. The logic guiding this whole opening part is the 
following: we start with the presentation of the pro and con arguments concerning 
budget discipline before looking at the reasons defending the transposition of the 
discipline into binding rules. 
Building the second part on the previously exposed theoretical basements, we 
concentrate then our attention on the European case, the heart of our research. 
After having set our analytical framework and clarified some relevant fiscal 
concepts, we present a detailed description of the institutional environment 
guiding the functioning of the European fiscal restriction on the basis of the 
several legal texts. Starting with the rules designed in Maastricht in 1992, which 
consist in limiting public deficits and debts, we also try to give a global overview 
of the different rules surrounding these ceilings, as well as of their evolution 
through time. Here, the monitoring and reporting rules, the methods of sanctions, 
the decision-making process and all other “rules of the game” are analysed. Given 
this institutional framework, the last chapter of Part II goes deeper into the 
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analysis of the Maastricht budget constraint and provides an assessment of this 
fiscal instrument. From this assessment, we notice the institutional inefficiencies 
and the resulting behaviours. 
A last introducing remark has to be mentioned before properly going to the heart 
of the matter. This study focuses its interest on the Maastricht criteria constraining 
the fiscal policies of the Eurozone member states. As previously noticed, this 
monetary union has been wished by its architects not to be accompanied by a 
significant centralized budget and, consequently to let a significant degree of 
national fiscal autonomy. In this context, it is important to keep in mind that the 
Maastricht budget constraint gives only a general budgetary framework, in which 
each government defines its own fiscal policy. Put differently, it means that 
budgetary institutions such as the budgetary process, the governance mechanisms, 
or the political system at the roots of the budgetary decisions are individually 
defined and therefore widely vary within the union. Furthermore, fiscal rules 
being in force at local and regional levels also strongly differ between states (Ter-
Minassian and Craig, 1997: 169) as well as between jurisdictions within nations 
enjoying a certain degree of liberty in the definition of the rules in federal 
countries (Dafflon, 2002: 13). Consequently, focusing on the institutional design 
of the Maastricht criteria does not imply that the national and subcentral 
budgetary institutions have no influence on the fiscal policy outcomes of the 
member states.	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PART I: Theory of budget constraint 
The first part defines the theoretical framework on which this Master’s Thesis is 
based. Reviewing the theoretical arguments about fiscal discipline, we try to 
highlight and clarify the different issues linked to the question of the public sector 
budget constraint. Given the several problems, we show the expected theoretical 
impact of imposing rules on government fiscal behaviour. 
Concretely, this part aspires to tackle three related issues and presents, for each of 
them, a theoretical analysis of their ins and outs. We begin with the complicated 
debate on fiscal discipline (Chapter 1). As pointed out by Novaresi (2001: 7), 
almost all scientific as well as political observers agree on the worth of the 
discipline taken in its large meaning. However, this general consensus does not 
remain when it comes to define precisely the concept of discipline and, to the 
extent, to arbitrate between the fundamental “trade-off between the elimination of 
a policy bias and the need to retain policy flexibility” (Milesi-Ferretti, 1996: 5). 
On one side of the debate, we find thus the partisans of a strict control of the fiscal 
balances (not necessarily on an annual basis) and, on the other side, arguments 
defending the relaxation of the constraints on deficits and debts. 
The second step of this theoretical chapter deals with the issue of the transposition 
of the principles of fiscal discipline into legally binding rules (Chapter 2). Based 
on the arguments developed in the previous chapter, we consider first the 
normative approach. The resulting question is the following: is there any 
theoretical justification for introducing rules in order to guarantee fiscal 
discipline? Moreover, in the debate on the necessity of setting binding regulations, 
a further perspective can be investigated. The latter viewpoint, rather than 
focusing on the requirement of rules, looks at the expected outcomes that such 
instruments are likely to bring. This field of research concentrates thus on the 
potential effectiveness of the constraints. Quoting Rossi and Dafflon (2002: 37), 
“whereas the theory of balanced budgets focuses on efficient resource allocation 
and fiscal justice arguments, the practice of budgetary equilibrium relies on a 
more sophisticated line of reasoning, in which public choice arguments take 
centre stage”. 
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Finally, Chapter 3 serves as a transition to the forthcoming descriptive analysis of 
the EMU budget constraint. Before proceeding to the institutional economy 
analysis of the European fiscal rules, we need indeed to define precisely the term 
“fiscal institution”. As stressed by Poterba (1996: 4), “budget rules” can refer to a 
wide range of fiscal institutions and therefore, a clear definition of them is 
required. More than just the exhaustive inventory of institutions, we also 
emphasise their theoretical role and their expected impact on the government 
fiscal outcomes. Taking into account all the institutions listed in the literature, we 
already restrict our domain of research by determining the relevant ones for this 
Master’s Thesis. In addition, this final theoretical chapter offers us a perfect 
opportunity to mention, in a last section, what we refer to as the “Swiss 
exception”. Switzerland, by providing popular initiative and referendum rights, 
constitutes indeed a special case in terms of its institutional environment and, for 
this reason, is worth to briefly present. 
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1 The debate on fiscal discipline 
For long, the debate on fiscal discipline has been focused on the requirement of a 
strict control of fiscal balances. In this configuration, the question opposed, on 
one side, the partisans of a rigorous fiscal balance, rejecting to have recourse to 
public indebtedness, and, on the other side, the authors relaxing the absolute 
necessity of achieving the balance and, therefore highlighting the utility of 
borrowing; the former taking inspiration mainly from the Classical School of 
Economics and more recently from the Public Choice approach, whereas the latter 
are generally referred as members of the Keynesian School. Later, the 
assimilation of the concept of “fiscal discipline” with the notion of “fiscal 
balance” has been questioned, considering this interpretation as too rigid. 
Following this conclusion, the present chapter acknowledges that the arguments 
defending fiscal discipline do not necessarily refer to a strict annual fiscal balance, 
as well as fighting for relaxing fiscal discipline does not imply systematic fiscal 
deficits. In other words, we think that the protagonists of the debate cannot 
anymore be classified as being for or against fiscal balance (for or against public 
indebtedness), but that the opposition takes now place on the stringency of 
control, which is required. In this context, fiscal discipline refers to the 
enforcement of strict controls, whereas relaxing it suggests in fact letting fiscally 
more room for manoeuvre to governments. 
Inspired by the logic developed in Novaresi’s Doctoral Dissertation (2001), this 
chapter exposes the debate on fiscal discipline and structures it according to 
Musgrave’s classification of functions devoted to the public sector11. Focussing 
successively on the resource allocation, income redistribution and macroeconomic 
stabilisation functions, we review, for each of them, the arguments of both, the 
partisans of greater budget discipline and the defenders of less rigorous controls. 
Contrary to Novaresi’s methodology, which dealt with the two opinions one after 
the other, we directly confront, in each section, the two opposed positions. 
In order to clearly schematize, according to the above-mentioned logic, our 
discussion on fiscal discipline, Table 1-1 proposes a classification of both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For a global presentation of these fiscal functions, see Musgrave and Musgrave (1984). 
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opposed arguments, which are mostly cited among the economic literature. These 
several points represent the ideas, which we expose in this first theoretical part. 
Table 1-1: Main arguments for and against fiscal discipline. 
  For fiscal discipline Against fiscal discipline 
Optimal size of public sector Ricardian equivalence hypothesis 
1.
1 
R
es
ou
rc
e 
al
lo
ca
tio
n 
Crowding out hypothesis Argument against the crowding out effect 
Intergenerational transfer 
Acknowledgement of the 
equivalence hypothesis  
(included in Section 1.1) 
1.
2 
In
co
m
e 
re
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n 
Intergovernmental transfer Lerner's model 
Implementation of expansionary 
fiscal policy Functional public finance theory 
Political difficulties in the 
implementation of expansionary 
fiscal policy 
Fiscal balance over the economic 
cycle 
1.
3 
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 
st
ab
ili
sa
tio
n 
Expansionary fiscal policy in the 
context of federalism Automatic stabilisers 
 
1.1 Resource allocation 
In order to maximize its welfare, the society has to use its endowment of scarce 
resources (labour, capital, technology, etc.) as efficiently as possible. Being 
allocated to the production function of public goods and services (managed by the 
public sector), part of these resources is not any more available for the private 
sector. The resulting equilibrium of this trade-off aims to reach what is commonly 
called the allocative efficiency and should lead to the optimal matching of the 
supply to the demand. Moreover, this function contains another aspect: the 
productive efficiency. Once the distribution of wealth between the private and the 
public economic activities is decided, the respective endowments have still to be 
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used efficiently, either maximizing the production with a given budget, or 
achieving the production goal at the lowest cost. 
In the context of the debate on fiscal discipline, the arguments of both conflicting 
sides mainly come within the framework of the allocative efficiency. On the one 
hand, the partisans for a stricter fiscal discipline underscore firstly, the virtue of 
discipline for optimally defining the size of public sector, i.e. the optimal public 
endowment, and secondly, the risk linked to public indebtedness to make private 
investment more expensive and thus less productive (crowding out hypothesis). 
On the contrary, some authors reject the latter effect and, based on the rationality 
of the economic agents, consider financing through borrowing as equivalent as 
through tax (Ricardian equivalence hypothesis). Let us develop further these 
several ideas. 
1.1.1 Optimal size of public sector 
The first argument, from the resource allocation standpoint, calling for more 
discipline because of its important implication on the behaviour of economic 
agents, deserves a special attention. 
In their textbook, Rosen and Gayer (2010: 474) make the following statement: 
“The discipline of a balanced budget may produce a more careful weighting of 
benefits and costs, thus preventing the public sector from growing beyond its 
optimal size”. Before investigating more closely the economic meaning of this 
argument, it seems relevant to formulate an introductory remark about the 
expression “optimal size”. The reader has indeed to note that it refers here to as 
the amount of resources, that the citizens are willing to allocate to public sector. 
Thus, this concept does not have the ambition to define a strict ideological public 
sector size in terms of the level of resources, which should be devoted to it. It 
rather emphasises the need of a decision-making process allowing rational 
decisions, namely taking into account not only the benefit of a given spending, but 
also its costs. In other words, the result, to which this process leads (large or 
limited public sector), is not the main question under consideration. From this 
perspective, the supporters of fiscal discipline stress the multiple advantages of 
financing public budget through tax instead of debt. We group these theoretical 
 	  
17	  
gains into three categories: (1) the modality of resource transfer, (2) the 
responsibility towards the public indebtedness and (3) the potential strategic 
behaviours. In the following paragraphs, we develop the main features of these 
arguments. 
As previously noted, the first advantage of fiscal discipline, as far as the definition 
of the optimal size of the public sector is concerned, lies in the modality of 
resource transfer from the private to the public sector. We distinguish three 
different reasons, giving weight to this argument. 
Firstly, any rational decision requires having access to the relevant information. In 
the case of spending decision, the price is a necessary indication, allowing the 
direct comparison between the benefit coming from the acquisition of a given 
good or service and its cost. In context of policy programmes, this link may not be 
obvious, especially when public services are financed by debts. On the contrary, 
and because it implies that each new investment is financed by taxes, fiscal 
discipline reinforces the link between the public programmes and their cost. In 
this sense, taxes play the crucial role of “fiscal prices” of collective goods and 
services (Dafflon and Beer-Toth, 2009: 355). For instance, in marginal terms, 
fiscal discipline allows linking a new public task with its financial impact on the 
budget. Consequently, the decision of undertaking a new project, or developing 
further an old one, can be made, knowing its financial implication for taxpayers. 
In the same vein, acknowledging the “ultimate inescapability of Budget 
Balance12” (Tollison and Wagner, 1987: 375), a government, when increasing its 
spending, can have recourse to four financial sources: taxes, user fees, financial 
transfers or government borrowing13. All imply a resource transfer form the 
private to the public sector, but according to different transmission modalities, 
creating distinctive behavioural effects among the economic agents (Dafflon, 
1998: 68). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The expression refers to the observation that government revenues are always, at least equal to 
its expenditures. 
13 The economic literature sometimes completes this list with another source of financing: the 
opportunity imputed to governments to implement an expansionary monetary policy. We 
deliberately exclude this method of financing since the member states of the EMU, by definition, 
have lost their sovereignty in terms of monetary policy. 
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In order to compare the impact that these several sources of government revenues 
may have on the decisions made by the agents, the economic literature suggests 
analysing them according to two criteria, answering to the following questions: 
- Is the considered financial transfer explicit or implicit? 
- Is this transfer simultaneous to the expenditure it serves to cover? (Dafflon, 
1998: 68-72). 
The reasoning behind this analytical framework is based on the fundamental 
conditions allowing making rational spending decision or, in other words, 
restraining fiscal illusion14. Table 1-2 presents the result of the analysis for the 
four sources of revenue. For instance, when a new public spending is financed 
through taxes, the resource transfer is considered explicit, i.e. the cost of the given 
expenditure is explicitly reflected in the increase in the amount of taxes. 
Moreover, this transfer is also simultaneous, which means that the payment and 
the benefit obtained through the new public programme occur at the same time 
period. By improving the coincidence of the decision-makers, the payers and the 
beneficiaries, taxes, and even more user fees, can play their role of fiscal prices. 
As a consequence, it reinforces the rationality of the spending decision. 
Table 1-2: Analysis of the financing methods of the public sector. 
Payment Methods of financing 
Explicit Simultaneous 
Financial 
coverage 
Taxes Yes Yes Hard budget constraint 
User fees Yes Yes The “user-pays” principle 
Financial transfers 
No: the 
members of 
other groups 
Yes The “user-pays” principle is relaxed 
Government borrowing Fiscal illusion No: future generation 
Soft budget 
constraint 
Source: Dafflon (1998: 72). 
In contrast, when a government budget records a deficit, meaning that part of its 
expenditures is covered by debt, the transfer becomes implicit and delayed. 
Thereby, the link between the cost of a given policy programme and its benefit is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Clearly illustrated by Buchanan and Wagner (2000 [1977]: 93-98), the theory of fiscal illusion 
states that the perception of the voters, as far as fiscal implications are concerned, is biased. It 
appears indeed that the benefits of public expenditure are typically overestimated, whereas their 
fiscal costs are underestimated. 
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broken (Novaresi, 2001: 16), which may create a fiscal illusion and thus a 
weakening in the rationality of the decision-making. 
Dafflon (1998: 72-73) develops one last argument, demonstrating the virtue of 
fiscal discipline in the manner of transferring resources from the private to the 
public sector. The economist highlights indeed the simplicity of the transfer rule 
provided by the fiscal discipline. Contrary to the potential alternatives, for 
example “the balance over the economic cycle” or “the opportunity cost of public 
spending”, fiscal discipline, meant here in its strictest sense, is not subject to 
forecasting or measurement difficulties. 
The second phenomena, which makes the achievement of the optimal size of the 
public sector more likely under fiscal discipline, lies on the notion of 
responsibility towards public indebtedness. Whereas each individual is fully and 
personally responsible for the debts he owns himself, the accountability of public 
indebtedness falls to the society as a whole. Moreover, “while full discounting 
may take place for those individuals who own income-earning assets, this 
reasoning cannot be extended to individuals who own no assets” (Buchanan, 
1958: 45). For the taxpayers, this lack of personal answerability makes 
government borrowing less costly than taxes (Novaresi, 2001: 17). Logically, the 
taxpayers are therefore willing to support public tasks financed by debt. 
Concretely, public borrowing means that a taxpayer, who would envisage leaving 
the jurisdiction in the future, could today benefit from public services without 
having to bear their costs. As a consequence of this incentive, it is predictable that 
the size of public sector would go beyond its optimal dimension. 
The last aspect of fiscal discipline, improving the achievement of the optimal size 
of the public sector, concerns the potential strategic behaviours adopted by the 
economic agents in the context of rent seeking. According to the school of Public 
Choice, the fiscal policy outcome results from the interaction of different groups 
(politicians, citizens, lobbies, or bureaucrats), defending their own interests. 
Thereby, each interest group tries to take advantage of the negotiation, in the 
sense of the theory of “the concentrated benefits and the dispersed costs”. Here, 
the harder the government budget constraint, the weaker the influence of these 
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rent-seekers. While relaxing the budget constraint allows the government 
answering the demand of any group, without reducing its financial endowment to 
the others, or increasing taxes (Novaresi, 2001: 18), fiscal discipline establishes a 
competition between the several rent-seekers and their spending wishes and 
constraints the government to set an order of priority. 
Likewise, taking into account Niskanen’s famous hypothesis about the utility 
function of the bureaucrats15, it appears that fiscal discipline, by making the 
several bureaus compete with each other during the budget formulation process, 
contributes to control more efficiently the growing tendency of the government 
budget. In a jurisdiction, where fiscal discipline prevails, namely bounded by a 
hard budget constraint, the bureaus (the agents) would be more willing to reveal 
their truth production function through the negotiation process with the executive 
(the principal). We conclude that fiscal discipline presents the advantage of 
limiting the withholding of information implied in the well-known principal-agent 
relationship. Confirming this last argument inspired by the public choice 
approach, Dafflon (1998: 74-75) considers that, because of the lack of a harder 
fiscal discipline, the conjunction of the political pressure coming from the 
bureaucrats and the multiple interest groups explains a major part of the recurrent 
deficits encountered in the developed countries since the 1950s. 
1.1.2 Crowding out hypothesis 
“The assumption that government borrowing reduces private investment plays a 
key role in the neoclassical analysis. It is referred to as the crowding out 
hypothesis – when the public sector draws on the pool of resources available for 
investment, private investment gets crowded out. Crowding out results from 
changes in the interest rate. When government increases its demand for credit, the 
interest rate, which is just the price of credit, goes up. But if the interest rate 
increases, private investment becomes more expensive and less of it is 
undertaken” (Rosen and Gayer, 2010: 469). According to this point of view, 
public borrowing creates a distortion in the resource allocation between the public 
and the private sector and consequently, slows the economic growth because of its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 According to this author, the utility function of bureaucrats is maximized with the maximisation 
of the budget allocated to their bureau or agency. 
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negative effect on investment16. Furthermore, Dafflon (1998: 73) points out that, 
not only the allocative efficiency, but also the productive efficiency of the public 
sector can be victim of the crowding out effect. Borrowing implies indeed the 
regular payment of interests and of amortisations of the debts, which are 
unproductive financial commitments, and consequently divert part of the 
resources allocated to the public sector17.  
However, as far as we consider this effect when conveyed by public spending, it 
has to be emphasised that the size of the crowding out still depends on the nature 
of the expenditures, which are financed through borrowing. The crowding out 
hypothesis becomes indeed less relevant if the deficit, covered by the debt, is 
allocated to public investment expenditure, rather than to current public 
consumption (Novaresi, 2001: 20). 
Despite the fact that, at first glance, this hypothesis seems to be relatively easy to 
test18, empirical studies show that the relationship between both variables is not as 
clear-cut as it looks because of the impact of other components on interest rates. 
For instance, Rosen and Gayer (2010: 469) observe that, during the economic 
slowdown encountered in 2008 and 2009, low interest rates (because of the fall of 
investments) went with increasing public deficit; in this case, the correlation, 
being not the causality, says in reality nothing about the concerned hypothesis. 
From these econometric difficulties, the authors, without entirely rejecting the 
negative effect of public deficit on private investment, conclude that its partisans 
could overestimate its size in terms of capital stock reduction. Confirming this 
scepticism regarding the positive correlation between the public deficit and the 
interest rate, Rossi and Dafflon (2012: 114) recently show the irrationality of the 
financial markets in this respect. Looking at the long-term interest rate paid by 
EMU member states from 2000 to 2011, it appears that these countries, in spite of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Presenting in greater details the different channels, through which this theoretical effect occurs, 
is not the main purpose of our Thesis. Therefore, let us just mention that the economic theory 
considers three mechanisms: through the interest rates, through the quantitative rationing on 
capital market and through the impact of public deficit on expected inflation (Greffe, 1994: 416-
418). 
17 As we further develop in Section 1.2, this phenomenon also contains a redistributive effect, 
namely between the current and the future governments. 
18 A positive and significant correlation between the interest rate and the public deficit would 
prove the occurrence of the effect. 
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recording quite different evolution of their public finances, face in reality the 
same interest rate until 2008. 
Now, we turn to the two main “allocative” arguments, advocating the necessity of 
relaxing fiscal discipline: the so-called Ricardian equivalence hypothesis and, 
based on this assumption, the response to the above-mentioned crowding out 
effect. 
1.1.3 Ricardian equivalence hypothesis 
The first argument supporting the relaxation of fiscal discipline is here firstly 
approached from the resource allocation perspective. Since it has important 
implications for the two other public sector functions (especially for the 
redistribution function) and for a matter of simplicity, we directly expose those in 
the present section. 
The Ricardian equivalence hypothesis concretely consists in considering that the 
financing by tax is actually equivalent, in terms of economic impact, as it is by 
loan. If so, and since incurring debt or raising taxes do not ultimately matter, the 
debate on fiscal discipline losses its sense and becomes meaningless. Although 
this argument has been introduced by David Ricardo (1951a: 244-249; 1951b: 
185-200) and therefore takes generally his name, the famous British economist 
was himself sceptical about the veracity of his hypothesis because of its strict 
dependence on its assumptions. Let us develop further the logic lying behind this 
argument as well as the conditions it requires. 
The Ricardian equivalence is built on one fundamental assumption: the rationality 
of the taxpayers19. Given the “ultimate inescapability of budget balance” that we 
mentioned previously and the postulation of rationality, Barro (1974), in his 
seminal paper, develops a model, in which the current generation is aware of the 
future costs (deferred taxes) implied by today’s government borrowing. As a 
consequence, when a jurisdiction incurs new debts, its taxpayers anticipate the 
forthcoming tax growth and increase the share of personal income they save. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Note that Ricardo already tempered the assumption of taxpayers’ rational expectation: “The 
people who pay the taxes never so estimate them, and therefore do not manage their private affairs 
accordingly” (Ricardo, 1951b: 186). 
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“Therefore, the substitution of a budget deficit for current taxes (or any other 
rearrangement of the timing of taxes) has no impact on the aggregate demand for 
goods. In this sense, budget deficits and taxation have equivalent effects on the 
economy” (Barro, 1989: 39). 
As mentioned previously, the acknowledgement of the Ricardian equivalence 
induces a further implication regarding intergeneration redistribution. Whereas 
some authors consider that indebtedness produces a transfer of burden between 
present and future generations (Section 1.2), following Ricardo’s hypothesis and 
the rational anticipation of the taxpayers leads however to the conclusion that 
“each generation consumes exactly the same amount as before the government 
borrowed” (Rosen and Gayer, 2010: 470). Consequently, fiscal discipline is not 
required. 
However, this formulation is not without raising some question marks challenging 
its allocative, as well as redistributive, implications. One of the objections has to 
do with the temporal horizon of the taxpayers, which is most likely shorter than 
the one of the public debt, and has thus an impact on their behaviours (Novaresi, 
2001: 31). In order to circumvent the issue, the author builds a model of 
“overlapping generations of persons with finite lives” (Buchanan, 1976: 337), 
making each individual “a part of an extended family that goes on indefinitely. In 
this setting, the households capitalize the entire array of expected future taxes, and 
thereby plan effectively with an infinite horizon” (Barro, 1989: 40). 
This provocative theorem, stating the irrelevance of fiscal policy, has not passed 
unnoticed among the economic literature and has been subject to a wide range of 
criticism attacking the large number and the strength of the underlying hypothesis 
necessary to validate the model20. Moreover, even if we accept the equivalence 
hypothesis between taxation and borrowing, the question of the choice between 
the two financial sources remains open. In fact, and as acknowledged later by 
Barro himself, a theory of public debt creation is still missing. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Novaresi (2001: 32) discusses the six conditions necessary to maintain the Ricardian 
equivalence (among them, the rational expectations, the efficiency of the capital market or the 
altruistic link between generations) and concludes that the required conjunction of all these 
unrealistic assumptions seriously limits the concrete scope of the theorem. See also Buchanan 
(1976), or Templeman (2007: 439). 
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1.1.4 Arguments against the crowding out effect 
As we have already mentioned, the crowding out hypothesis, because of the 
econometric difficulty of isolating its effect on the evolution of the interest rate, 
does not benefit from strong and clear-cut empirical evidences. Moreover, some 
economists have advanced different theoretical arguments questioning the 
existence of this effect, according to which public indebtedness would negatively 
influence the formation capital stock, and therefore calling for more discipline. 
Following Novaresi’s classification (2001: 34-35), we distinguish four main ways 
of criticism. 
The first argument, challenging the existence of a positive correlation between 
public deficit and interest rate, takes its roots in the equivalence hypothesis. In 
fact, if one admits the rationality of the economic agents, as the Ricardian 
equivalence defines it, any public deficit, i.e. any increase in public indebtedness, 
should be perceived by the taxpayers as an equivalent increase in the future taxes 
to be paid. According to this logic, and as we have developed it before, the 
following rational reaction of taxpayers would be to save enough money today in 
order to pay tomorrow the expected amount of extra taxes due for the new debt. 
As a result of the increase in the personal savings, the supply of capital, available 
for borrowing, remains unchanged. On the capital market, the supply decreases in 
the amount of money equal to the new public debt, but increases equivalently 
because of the new private savings. The interest rate, as well as the private 
investment, does not suffer from any negative impact. However, it is important to 
emphasise that this development lies on an implicit hypothesis regarding the 
capital market. The present argument indeed holds only if the interest rate offered 
on savings is equal to the one, which is charged to the borrowers. Relaxing this 
premise and, for instance, setting the plausible assumption that the interest rate on 
loans is in reality higher than on savings, the money saved by the rational 
taxpayers does not corresponds anymore to what is due to pay back the debt and 
its interests. 
Secondly, the impact of public borrowing seems to differ according to the purpose 
of the incurred debt. While financing current public consumption by debt could 
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probably lead to crowd out private investment, loan financing productive public 
investment, enhancing economic growth and capital accumulation, turns out to 
invalidate the hypothesis in question. This issue, dealing more specifically with 
redistributive concerns, is further developed in the next section. 
The two last arguments look more precisely at the situations in which public and 
private demands compete on credit market – essential condition for the validity of 
the crowding out hypothesis. Following the previous example of the recession of 
2008-2009, some authors consider that the effect can exist only when the 
economy fully employs its resources. During an economic slowdown, an increase 
of the debt incurred by the public sector does not imply a decrease of the supply 
available for the private agents. 
Finally, according to a last argument, the crowding out hypothesis holds as far as 
the public debt comes from domestic bondholders. On the contrary, if the capital, 
financing the public indebtedness of a given state, is levied on foreign credit 
market, the public demand for money does not compete anymore with the private 
demand. In this case, the crowding out hypothesis can logically be relaxed. 
1.2 Income redistribution 
The second public sector function deals with the maximisation of the social 
welfare and its distribution among the members of the society. Whereas the 
resource allocation efficiency implies a certain distribution of capital and income 
among the individuals of the group, there is no guaranty that the resulting 
outcome, although Pareto-efficient, does fulfil the criteria of justice or fairness 
defined by the given society. If the allocative equilibrium does not match these 
conditions, which, by the way, involve “considerations of social philosophy and 
value judgement” (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984: 12), the obtained social 
welfare is then under-optimal and can consequently be improved through a 
governmental intervention21. In addition, more than the unique issue of 
distribution among the different agents of a society, the optimal income 
redistribution contains also a “time dimension”, raising the question of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For instance, the government can provide subventions to certain types of private production, or 
modify private agents’ income through taxes or fiscal deductions. 
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“intergenerational equity”. As pointed out by Musgrave and Musgrave (1984: 99), 
under certain circumstances, “present generation benefits the future one”, for 
instance through the bequest of the accumulated stock of capital, whereas, in other 
cases, “exploitation of irreplaceable natural resources and destruction of the 
environment place a burden upon the future”. As far as public debt is concerned, 
it is the latter dimension that requires our attention, namely the distribution (or 
not) of the burden induced by government borrowing. This distributive approach 
of the public debt has led to numerous discussions and controversy among the 
economists; the key question lying on the “possible shiftability or nonshiftability 
of the debt burden in time” (Buchanan, 1958: 34). Logically, the partisans of 
fiscal discipline answer in the affirmative and see public indebtedness as an 
intergenerational, as well intergovernmental transfer of burden, while the 
opponents refute it, advocating firstly the equivalence theorem (previously 
discussed in Subsection 1.1.3) and secondly, the absence of intergenerational 
transfer when each generation is considered as a whole (Lerner’s model). 
1.2.1 Intergenerational transfer 
In order to investigate the economic sense of public debt from the redistributive 
perspective, Musgrave and Musgrave (1984: 691) recommend distinguishing two 
separated issues: the feasibility of burden transfer and its justification. Whereas 
the justification, under certain conditions, enjoys a broad consensus among the 
scientists, the feasibility or, more precisely, its occurrence is questioned.  
Regarding the justification of transferring the burden of the public debt, Musgrave 
(1959: 558-564) develops the so-called “pay-as-you-use” principle, which clearly 
shows when such transfers are economically appropriate; the criteria lying on the 
durability of the benefits provided by the public expenditures. In case of durable 
public goods, i.e. they produce benefits over several fiscal periods, the transfer of 
a part of the burden to the future recipients becomes desirable. Concretely, 
whereas current public spending does not justifies any burden transfer, public 
investments in durable goods, such as public infrastructures, does because of the 
objective of the coincidence of the payers with the beneficiaries. Each generation, 
who “consumes” a given public service, should pay for its own share. 
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Now we turn to the more debated issue of the real existence of the burden 
transfer. With his book treating the impact of government borrowing, Buchanan 
(1958), awarded by the Nobel Prize in 198622, appears as the modern economist 
who contributed the most to the rehabilitation of the classical opinion arguing that 
public debt induces redistributive effects on future generations (Novaresi, 2001: 
22-23). In order to defend his main proposition stating that the real burden of 
government borrowing is postponed to future generations, Buchanan (1958: 40) 
investigates the following simple question: “Who suffers if the public borrowing 
is unwise and the public expenditure wasteful” or, in other words, if the given 
loan-financed expenditure does not provide any durable benefit? As we discuss 
later, when developing the Lerner’s model, which comes from a Keynesian 
inspiration, the analytical approach taken by Buchanan, paying attention to the 
impact of the debt on individual utilities (sacrifices), rather than on 
macroeconomic variables23, differs from the latter, and leads to a quite different 
conclusion. 
Defining the notion of “future generations” as “any set of individuals living in any 
time period following that in which debt is created” (Buchanan, 1958: 35) and 
considering the above-mentioned wasteful public project financed by debt, the 
author successively examine the three groups (bondholder, the taxpayer in t0 and 
the future taxpayer), potentially bearers of the primary real burden of the 
government borrowing.  
As far as the bondholder and the taxpayer in t0 are concerned, the economist 
concludes that none of them does face any sacrifice. Indeed, “if an individual 
freely chooses to purchase a government bond, he is, presumably, moving to a 
preferred position in his utility surface by doing so” (Buchanan, 1958: 35). 
Moreover, this economic agent is thenceforth assured of obtaining a future 
income. Regarding the taxpayer in t0, the argument pointed out by Buchanan 
relies on the fact that, at this period of time, none of his fiscal contribution serves 
to pay for the wasteful public expenditure. Inevitably, the real burden of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This distinction awarded officially his seminal contributions to public choice theory. 
23 “In an individualistic society which governs itself through the use of democratic political forms, 
the idea of the “group” or the “whole” as a sentient being is contrary to the fundamental principle 
of social organisation” (Buchanan, 1958: 36). 
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public debt remains entirely to the future taxpayer. As a matter of fact, the latter is 
constrained to refund the bondholder and does not benefit from any public asset 
(since the considered expenditure was wasteful), which would compensate his 
monetary sacrifice. 
Two remarks should be added to this argument. Firstly, the conclusion obtained 
from this perspective does not contradict the fact that the transfer of the burden 
can be justified. Following Musgrave’s “pay-as-you-use” principle, if the 
concerned public expenditure produces benefits to several generations of 
taxpayers, the coincidence of circles of the payers and the beneficiaries calls 
actually for a transfer of the burden over the periods. The second remark also 
refers to the matching of two circles: the decision-makers and the payers. 
Buchanan’s example implies the potential divergence between the ones who 
decide the public programme, and the others who bear its cost. In conclusion, the 
indebtedness of any jurisdiction induces a loss in terms of autonomy of choice. In 
fact, on one hand, the yearly payment of the service of the past debts reduces its 
financial capacity of undertaking new policy programmes (loss of budgetary 
autonomy) and, on the other hand, public investment decided in the past may not 
correspond to the preferences of future generations (loss of decisional autonomy). 
1.2.2 Intergovernmental transfer 
As emphasised by Musgrave and Musgrave (1984: 689), “to service the debt, 
interest must be paid. Taxes raised to financed these payments impose a burden 
on the economy”. Put differently, it means that the public debt incurred today 
imply a financial constraint on tomorrow’s public budgets; this phenomena 
inducing a redistributive impact (Novaresi, 2001: 24). Extending this reasoning 
from a public choice point of view, Dafflon (1998: 73) observes that, if fiscal 
discipline is relaxed, a government could easily impair the financial resources of 
the succeeding one. Being constrained to use a large part of fiscal revenues to 
serve the existing debts, the forthcoming political decision-makers lose the power 
of undertaking new projects. 
Note however that this argument does not call for a complete prohibition of public 
debt. According to the partisans of fiscal discipline, the fundamental decision 
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criteria, which determines the source of financing, lies on the nature of the 
expenditure. Whereas current revenues must finance current consumption 
spending, according to the “pay-as-you-use” principle, public investments, when 
producing benefits over several fiscal periods, can be burdened by debts. 
1.2.3 Lerner’s model 
The position of the “new orthodoxy of the public debt”, as Buchanan (1958) 
names the fiscal discipline scepticism prevailing in the 1940s and 1950s, does not 
analyse the burden of the debt according to the same approach as the Classical 
Economics or the School of Public Choice. The focus of the authors, inspired by 
Keynes’ contributions, takes place on the macroeconomic aggregates, rather than 
on the microeconomic utility functions. Therefore, the argument we expose now 
does not provide a direct answer to Buchanan’s above-mentioned position24. 
Under the condition that the government borrows form the members of its own 
jurisdiction (a so-called internal debt25) and, looking at the burden of the debt in 
terms of resources that are withdrawn from the economy as a whole, Lerner 
observes that borrowing creates no burden on future generation (Rosen and 
Gayer, 2010: 466). From this purely monetary perspective, it is only at the initial 
period (when the debt is incurred) that the economy bears a real cost, which 
corresponds to the amount of resources (production factors) necessary to 
undertake the public expenditure. 
However, this model suffers from two major limitations. The first one consists in 
the fact that this reasoning is coherent only as far as internal debt is concerned. 
However, it appears that, in developed economies, the share of government 
borrowing financed from abroad is significant. For instance, Rosen and Gayer 
(2010: 466) report that, in 2009, foreign investors hold 54 per cent of the federal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 While exposing his analysis of the economic impact of government borrowing, Buchanan 
criticizes strongly the use of a macroeconomic approach to treat this issue. For him, such 
reasoning, i.e. focusing on “the national or community balance sheet rather than on individual or 
family balance sheets”, makes a fundamental mistake: “The effect [of public debt] in the national 
balance is operationally irrelevant. […] The nation or community is not a sentient being, and 
decisions are not made in any superindividual or organic way. Individuals and families are the 
entities whose balance sheets must be examined if the effects on social decisions are to be 
determined” (Buchanan, 1958: 41). 
25 On the opposite, the economic literature speaks of external debt when it is due to foreign 
creditors. 
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debt of the United States (US). In the case of external debts, the same analysis 
shows the existence of a real burden on future generation. 
The second objection, valid for external as well for as internal debts, lies on the 
burden on future generation that represents the payment of the interest. Musgrave 
and Musgrave (1984: 689) indeed point out that, even if “we own the debt to 
ourselves” (case of internal debt), the taxes raised by government to pay the 
interests places a burden on the economy. “Conceivably, [the burden] becomes so 
large as to pose a serious burden and disincentive problem, a factor, which is 
overlooked in the “we owe it to ourselves” proposition”. These two fundamental 
limits of the Lerner’s model further confirm the existence of a redistributive 
impact of the public debt. Besides, they reinforce the position of the partisans of 
fiscal discipline. 
1.3 Macroeconomic stabilisation 
The last public sector function concerns the intervention of the government in 
order to smooth the economic fluctuations; fiscal policy being here considered as 
an instrument of macroeconomic policy. The public sector contributes then to 
correct macroeconomic disequilibria, when the market forces are not able to solve 
them spontaneously. In this context, “fiscal policy must be designed to maintain 
or achieve the goals of high employment, a reasonable degree of price level 
stability, soundness of foreign accounts, and an acceptable rate of economic 
growth” (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984: 13). 
Up to the 1930s and before Keynes’ propositions, the fiscal economic research 
was mostly dedicated to the impact of budget policy on the two first public sector 
functions. With the Keynesian School, which focused on the aggregate demand 
and its link with the level of employment, budget policy turned out to be a 
strategic policy instrument, expected to be able to mitigate unemployment 
(Musgrave, 1985: 46). 
In these circumstances, it appears more accurate to begin, for once, with the 
presentation of the arguments calling for a relaxation of fiscal discipline, before 
turning to the several objections they have raised among the strictness enthusiasts. 
This construction justifies itself, particularly since, as far as the stabilisation 
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function is concerned, there is no strict argument supporting fiscal discipline 
(Novaresi, 2001: 26)26. However, the defenders of a more rigorous control of 
fiscal policy, focusing on how the Keynesian tools could be implemented 
concretely, underscore the multiple difficulties, which make these theories less 
effective in reality. 
Let us thus take a look at the three theories emphasising the necessity of giving 
enough room for manoeuvre to fiscal policies. All three drawing inspiration from 
the Keynesian approach, they have in common their acknowledgement of the 
requirement for the public sector to run anti-cyclical fiscal policy. However, they 
may differ on the degree of freedom they recommend to grant to the government. 
1.3.1 Functional public finance theory 
According to this theory, public finances serve a unique goal: to keep aggregate 
demand at the desired level, and that, regardless of the impact on public deficits 
and indebtedness. The proposition of functional finance is guided by the idea 
stating that, in period of economic turmoil, part of the resources (capital and 
labour) stays unemployed and, therefore, are attached to a low opportunity cost. 
For this reason, public expenditure can divert these resources from the private 
sector and, by doing so, contributes to help the economy return to a level of full 
employment27. From this perspective, balancing the budget remains completely 
ignored (Rosen and Gayer, 2010: 473). 
1.3.2 Fiscal balance over the economic cycle 
Whereas fiscal policy should still provide stimulus for the economy in situation of 
recession, this second Keynesian approach appears less extreme. Contrary to the 
functional public finance theory, the balance of fiscal policy is not entirely 
rejected. In fact, although the basic idea comes from the same line of thought, this 
theory considers that, once the economy, benefiting from the public boost 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Note however that, in a recent working paper, Afonso and Jalles (2012: 1), conducting an 
empirical study on the relevance of fiscal rules for economic growth, put into light the virtue of 
discipline for preventing “policymakers from exacerbating macroeconomic volatility, which is 
know to be detrimental to output growth”. 
27 Note however that, in a recent study, Alesina et al. (2002) develop a model, which provide 
evidence for the so-called “non-Keynesian” effects of public spending. Contrary to the Keynesian 
perception of government expenditures, these authors show a significant negative impact of public 
spending on economic growth, especially through the pressure it puts on labour market. 
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(financed by deficits), returns on a positive growth path, fiscal policy should then 
record fiscal surpluses. The balance is then achieved over the economic cycle by 
using these surpluses in order to compensate the debts incurred during the 
slowdown. 
It is thus interesting to note that, according to this viewpoint, expansionary fiscal 
policy is tolerated only when productive resources are not fully employed. In 
other words, nothing justifies public deficits in situations of economic prosperity. 
1.3.3 Automatic stabilisers 
Although it is also based on the belief that the fiscal policy contributes to smooth 
the economic cycles by reducing their volatility, this last theory distinguishes 
from the two preceding by highlighting the automatic ability of fiscal policy to 
perform well its stabilisation function, making any discretionary government 
intervention useless (Novaresi, 2001: 41). This proposition takes its root on the 
observation of the anti-cyclical aspect of several components of fiscal policy, 
meaning that it reacts automatically to the economic situation. For example, if we 
observe the fiscal revenue collected from income taxes, we easily understand its 
dependence on the level of prosperity achieved by the economy. In time of 
recession, the income of the economic agents, subject to taxation, globally 
decreases. Their tax bill consequently does the same. When the economy grows, 
the opposite occurs. This reasoning can also be applied to several public 
expenditures, which tend to grow during a slowdown and decrease otherwise. It is 
typically the case of social security programmes such as the unemployment 
insurance. Given these anti-cyclical components of fiscal policy, the theory of 
automatic stabilisers recommends therefore to constitute a so-called “rainy-day” 
fund with the surplus recorded during periods of economic prosperity; the latter 
allowing to compensate the fiscal unbalances undergone during economic 
slowdowns. 
Without considering the implementation difficulties of such policy yet, it is 
however enlightening to note that this argument strongly rely on the ability in 
forecasting the economic cycles. Unfortunately, it must be stated that, even 
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nowadays, economic cycles are rather retrospectively observed than successfully 
predicted. 
Having briefly developed the main arguments calling for a relaxation of fiscal 
discipline, let us have a look at what their opponents would retort in order to 
defend the high value they attach to fiscal discipline. 
1.3.4 Implementation of expansionary fiscal policy 
As already mentioned at the beginning of the present section, the arguments 
questioning the effectiveness of the Keynesian approach do not focus on the 
coherence of the reasoning. They rather point out the several difficulties 
encountered when it comes to concretely implement such policies. 
The first argument emphasises the “logistical” challenge of implementing 
expansionary fiscal policies. In fact, such investment programmes, supposed to 
boost the aggregate demand and therefore the economy, appear not so easy to 
undertake in an acceptable time period. In fact, the required time interval from the 
definition of the project, to its approbation, and its concrete implementation, may 
be extremely long. Therefore, the optimal functioning of Keynesian fiscal policy 
implies to possess reliable forecast on the economic trend in order to adequately 
anticipate the cycles. However, mainly because of statistical difficulties, such 
exercise is not as straightforward as it seems at first glance. 
In addition to the difficulty of matching stimulus programmes to the economic 
situation, it must be noted that public investment expenditures generally represent 
only a small part of the total amount of public spending. Since the major portion 
of the public budget serves to finance current expenditures, the room for 
manoeuvre left to the implementation of cyclical fiscal policies remains therefore 
quite thin. For instance, looking at the Swiss figures (purple line in Figure 1-1), it 
appears that the investment-to-total-expenditure ratio of the public sector 
(Confederation, cantons and municipalities) varies between 9 and 12 per cent 
only. 
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1.3.5 Political issues in implementing expansionary fiscal policy 
The second argument tackles the political feasibility of the Keynesian fiscal 
policy, especially the target of balancing the budget over the cycle, and justifies 
its doubts with considerations based on the approach of public choice. From this 
analytical framework, the present argument detects an asymmetry in the 
implementation of the Keynesian principles: “deficits will be created frequently 
but surpluses will materialize only rarely” (Buchanan and Wagner, 1978: 4). 
For the authors of the School of Public Choice, the government is not perceived as 
a benevolent social planner but rather, as a set of politicians having their own 
interests, among them, being re-elected. Because of this political competition, the 
behaviour of the politicians in office changes. For this reason, although these 
economists acknowledge the coherence of the Keynesian analysis as far as the 
politicians are benevolent agents, defending only the interest of the society, it 
appears that the fiscal policy outcome varies quite radically when the latter 
assumption is relaxed. Quoting Tempelman (2007: 442), “The tendency in 
elective democracy is for utility-maximizing politicians to borrow and spend 
rather than to tax and spend, and to spend much rather than little”. As a result, in a 
period of economic slowdown, the Keynesian recommendations would be easily 
implemented but, when the economy returns to prosperity, there is a low 
likelihood that the government either reduces its financial intervention, or increase 
the taxation. Given this asymmetric political behaviour, the debt, resulting from 
the deficits cumulated during the recession, has low chances to be paid back. 
“Politicians are more willing to spend than to tax” (Novaresi, 2001: 29). 
1.3.6 Expansionary fiscal policy in the context of federalism 
Last but not least, the Keynesian approach of fiscal policy raises finally the issue 
of its interpretation in the context of a federal decentralized government. As 
recommended by Musgrave and Musgrave (1985: 515-516), the “responsibility 
for stabilisation policy has to be at the national (central) level”. Two main reasons 
justify this statement: 
- Theoretically, decentralized levels of government can be modelled as small 
open economies. 
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- A strategic game occurs between these sub-central jurisdictions, leading 
consequently to strategic behaviours. 
In fact, like a small open economy, a decentralized layer of government, if 
conducting an expansionary fiscal policy, would take the risk of seeing its 
resources spread between the neighbouring jurisdictions because of the potential 
spillover effect. The resulting strategy, which a rational jurisdiction is likely to 
adopt, is simply to wait on the action of the others, hoping to take advantage from 
the spillovers coming from their investment programmes. 
However, as the stacked columns representing the investment expenditures of 
each Swiss layer of government in Figure 1-1 show, the volume of public 
investment is, at best, equally shared between the Confederation, the cantons and 
the municipalities. As a consequence, whereas the above-mentioned theoretical 
analysis would assign to central government the goal of maintaining the 
macroeconomic stability, it appears that, in reality, the macroeconomic fiscal tools 
are fairly shared with the decentralized levels of government. A similar analysis 
would most likely hold for a more centralized nation than Switzerland. 
Figure 1-1: Swiss investment expenditures by layer of government. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from data presented in Appendix A. 
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In conclusion of this first theoretical chapter, we realize that, on the basis of the 
advantages and disadvantages related to fiscal discipline, taken in its large 
meaning, a jurisdiction benefits from a certain room for manoeuvre in its 
interpretation of the concept; the degree of discipline being subject to varying 
understandings and definitions. Although nor the optimal level of constraint, 
neither the exact sense of it, is determined, it seems however obvious that a 
certain control over fiscal policy is required. 
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2 The requirement of setting rules 
As we learned from the discussion on its pros and cons exposed in the previous 
chapter, fiscal discipline may be interpreted in various ways and be subject to 
different degrees of severity. In fact, this debate did not elaborate much on the 
concrete economic sense to be given to fiscal discipline. As a matter of fact, fiscal 
discipline can be associated to several criteria of control according to how the 
concept is measured28. Concretely, the absence of a single definition allows 
governments and jurisdictions to enjoy a certain level of freedom in the meaning 
they attribute to fiscal discipline. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Novaresi (2001: 
66), their choice should be explicit and their objective clearly formulated. 
Having reached this stage, one theoretical issue remains to be discussed: the 
transposition, or not, of the chosen principle of fiscal discipline into legally 
binding rules and, in the extension, the potential effectiveness of such tools. 
Although this further step may seem redundant with Chapter 1 at first glance29, 
the question of using binding rules in order to achieve fiscal discipline, instead of 
simply announcing a given commitment, requires taking into account another line 
of reasoning, including mainly public choice considerations. Whereas we 
previously tackled essentially the question of the necessity of controlling fiscal 
deficits, the focus of the second debate takes thus place on the opportunity to 
transpose such target into legally binding rules. In other words, we intend to 
examine how a budget constraint written into the law is more credible and 
effective than an announcement of the same measure as a policy target. 
Neglecting the content of such legal constraints, the concept of “fiscal rules” is for 
the moment considered in its broad sense and defined as an institutional 
modification of the environment framing the fiscal decision-making30. Thereby, 
the two following sections investigate only the theoretical justification for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Novaresi (2001: 42-65) presents and discusses the three major concepts of fiscal discipline: the 
golden rule of public finance, the fiscal sustainability and the structural balance. Regarding the 
golden rule, see also Dafflon (2010: 3-6). 
29 On the basis of the debate on fiscal discipline (Chapter 1), the partisans of fiscal discipline are 
indeed expected to defend the commitment to fiscal rules, while the opponents emphasise the 
uselessness of such constraints. 
30 The economic literature distinguishes several classes of fiscal rules, which are differentiated 
according to their specific nature. This matter is further developed in the next chapter. 
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adopting, or imposing31, fiscal rules in order to ensure the respect of the 
discipline, to which a jurisdiction is committed. To this end, we firstly expose the 
arguments stressing the virtue of setting rules, as well as the shortcomings related 
to the government non-binding commitments. Afterwards, we logically present 
the disadvantages and the risks linked to the implementation of fiscal rules. 
2.1 Advantages of setting binding rules 
Why is a legally binding budget constraint more desirable than a simple 
announced commitment to fiscal discipline? The economic literature provides 
several answers to this question. We summarize here the main arguments 
intending to prove the advantages brought by the implementation of such legal 
restrictions. Whereas the two first groups of arguments highlight the existence of 
several mechanisms, which lead fiscal policy to deviate from discipline and 
justifie to set rules, the three following ones emphasise more some advantages 
offered by such constraints. 
2.1.1 Fiscal rules as a limit to deficit bias 
The first rationale for implementing fiscal rules takes its roots in the positive 
analysis of the democratic political institutions originally developed by the 
authors of the School of Public Choice. For them, the fiscal policy outcome does 
not result from the decision of a social-welfare-maximizing planner, but rather 
from a political process, which shows obvious bias towards deficit (Drazen, 2002: 
5). Arguing indeed that, “in a democracy, political competition is not unlike 
market competition”, Buchanan and Wagner (1978: 87-88) consider that 
“politicians compete among themselves for the support of the electorate, and 
[that] they do so by offering policies and programs which they feel will get them 
elected or reelected”. Put differently, the hypothesis of opportunistic policymakers 
substitute the theoretical view, according to which governments are benevolent 
economic agents and thus deprived of self-interest. Hence, if the budgetary 
choices appear to be truly influenced by political variables, then an intervention at 
the institutional level, i.e. the implementation of binding rules, would serve as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 A jurisdiction can either adopt spontaneously and voluntarily a fiscal rule for itself or, be 
constrained by an upper level of government; for instance, the regional to the local, or the 
supranational to the national level as it is the case for the member states of the EMU. 
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constraint on policymakers and would contribute to reduce or, in the best case, 
eliminate the tendency towards budget deficits (Alesina and Perotti, 1995: 24). 
Buchanan and Wagner (2000 [1977]: 125) summarize the consequence of this 
political feature by arguing that the “budgets cannot be left adrift in the sea of 
democratic politics”. 
Acknowledging this assumption about politicians’ behaviour, the economic theory 
distinguishes two main sources of deficit bias: the principal-agent relationship 
between voters (the principals) and the policymakers (the agents), and the so-
called “common pool” problem of public finance. While the former phenomena is 
due to an asymmetry of information between the “contracting parties”, leaving 
policymakers the opportunity to extract rents, the latter issue “arises when 
politicians can spend money from a general tax fund on targeted public policies” 
(von Hagen, 2005: 2), which leads the group who benefits from them (and the 
politicians representing it) to increase their demand for such spending 
programmes. The occurrence of both situations puts thus into lights the incentives, 
which governments are facing, towards excessive levels of public expenditure 
and, in fine, towards public deficit. In this context, the implementation of budget 
constraints, consisting in reinforcing fiscal transparency and depoliticizing 
budgetary decisions, is expected to prevent such deviation in terms of fiscal policy 
outcome (Kopits, 2001: 8). 
2.1.2 Occurrence of moral hazard 
In economics, moral hazard refers to the lack of incentive for economic agents to 
adopt responsible behaviour; this phenomena inducing an undesirable risk transfer 
from the “irresponsible” agent to another one. As far as fiscal discipline is 
concerned, the economic literature identifies two sources of moral hazard 
resulting from two different types of relationships. Moral hazard may indeed 
occur between the member states of a union32, as well as between the successive 
governments of a given jurisdiction. In the latter case, we speak of intertemporal 
moral hazard (Novaresi, 2001: 68). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 It concerns both the relationships between the decentralized jurisdictions within a federal state, 
and between the autonomous member states of monetary union such as the European EMU. 
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As already mentioned in the Introduction, the participation in a monetary union, 
like the European EMU, may lead the member states to adopt opportunistic fiscal 
behaviour, which can be modelled as a typical “free rider” problem: although 
sustainable public finance is in the interest of the union as a whole, an individual 
member state may have the incentive to behave otherwise. This opportunistic 
behaviour is further strengthened by the link of solidarity implied in the 
participation in the monetary union. The several European rescue plans addressed 
to Greece, Spain, or Portugal during these last years, offers an obvious proof of 
the underlying solidarity among the EMU participants. In order to avoid such 
situations, constraining individual countries’ fiscal policy allows reducing this 
negative incentive, as well as limiting the risk of having recourse to this bond of 
solidarity between the member states. 
However, as von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996: 134) did, it is interesting to note 
that fiscal restrictions are not prevailing in most monetary unions. Such legal 
clauses are indeed the exception rather than the rule33. 
The other source of moral hazard comes from the intertemporality of fiscal policy. 
Here, the moral hazard problem occurs between the government in t and the one 
in t+1. Fiscal reforms being politically costly, the government in t does not have 
the incentive to undertake them but rather prefers to delay them (Drazen, 2002: 8). 
Moreover, this temporal link can be used by the current government in order to 
constraint their successor (Fatàs et al., 2003: 28). The room for manoeuver, in 
terms of fiscal policy, allocated to the future government would therefore be 
reduced. The public indebtedness, through its impact on the future policy choices 
due to the payment of the service of the debt, becomes potentially a useful tool 
allowing constraining the successive governments (Milesi-Ferretti, 1996: 3). Here 
again, the implementation of legally binding budget constraints, applicable 
independently of the time period, offers the advantage of limiting the 
intertemporal moral hazard phenomena and consequently, reduces the risk of 
delaying necessary fiscal reforms, as well as the impact of the government in t on 
the fiscal policy in t+1. More generally, Poterba (1996: 9) highlights that “if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Primarily based on this observation, the authors suggest that the European budget constraint is 
redundant. 
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society exhibits dynamically inconsistent preferences with respect to fiscal policy, 
always preferring a larger budget deficit in the current period than it would have 
been agreed to in previous, then budget rules may provide a mechanism for 
constraining the discretion of future budget deliberators.” 
2.1.3 The threat of the sanction reinforces the budgetary pressure 
One major difference between a non-binding commitment and a legal restriction 
lies in the fact that a law provides penalties34 (explicit cost) in case of non-
compliance. Quoting Drazen (2002: 12), “laws enhance credibility to the extent 
that they raise the cost and lower the benefit from deviating from a given policy”. 
As a consequence, the temptation of deviating from the chosen fiscal path is 
reduced. In addition, such mechanism may also influence the budget deliberation 
through the pressure for budget compromise it puts on the decision makers 
(Poterba, 1996: 29); the latter risking politically painful sanctions in case of 
gridlock in the negotiations. The existence of legally binding rules is thus more 
likely to produce its targeted effect than the simple announcement of a given 
fiscal stance. 
2.1.4 Rules provide a benchmark for budget deliberations 
Because it restraints fiscal illusion by making explicit the financial implication of 
any public spending decision, we argue in Section 1.1 that fiscal discipline 
contributes to facilitate the achievement of the optimal size of public sector. 
Similarly, transposing fiscal discipline into legally binding budget rules 
constitutes a further improvement in terms of budget deliberations. In fact, the 
implementation of a clear budget constraint provides a benchmark, making the 
assessment of any budget proposal easier. So, the fiscal rule serves as an objective 
standard, which clarifies the terms of fiscal policy debate (Poterba, 1996: 28-29); 
each proposal being evaluated according to its degree of compliance with the 
constraint. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The next chapter shows that it exists a wide range of possible sanctions, which have a varying 
impact on fiscal behaviour. For now, we do not distinguish the possible systems of penalties. 
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2.1.5 Reputation 
Some economists advance one last argument defending the advantage gained by 
fiscal rules over announced commitments to discipline. This argument is related 
to the signal that such formal commitment represents and, more precisely the 
information it conveys (Drazen, 2002: 17). 
Under incomplete information, policymakers’ reputation depends on observed 
past actions. From this perspective, anything, which contributes to show the 
respect to the committed fiscal discipline, may strengthen the reputation. In this 
sense, the implementation of fiscal rules, by increasing the public’s awareness of 
deviations from fiscal responsibility, more than constraining policymakers, 
provides a further signal of their commitment and preferences, makes them more 
credible, and therefore, improves their reputation35. Hence, the adoption of legally 
binding constraints has to be interpreted as one of those actions, which allow 
building a reputation of fiscal responsible government. 
2.2 Disadvantages of setting binding rules 
We turn now to the arguments questioning the necessity to translate the principle 
of fiscal discipline into formal legislation. We distinguish different types of 
reasons why some economists have expressed doubts about such legal constraints. 
For some, assuming the efficiency of credit market mechanisms, the adoption of 
rules is considered as useless. For others, the fixation of rigid restrictions would 
be counter-productive, since it encourages strategic behaviours, such as creative 
accounting, in order to circumvent the rule. Finally, the literature still mentions 
some difficulties linked to the implementation of fiscal rules, for instance when it 
comes to enforce the sanctions prescribed by the law. 
2.2.1 The market discipline hypothesis 
Unlike the arguments advanced by the School of Public Choice and preconizing 
the adoption of fiscal rules, their opponents believe in the capacity of the credit 
market mechanisms to frame the policymakers’ fiscal decisions. The idea behind 
this argument relies on the efficiency of the credit market. According to this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 For a more detailed insight on this issue, see for instance Drazen (2002: 17-19). 
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viewpoint, “default premia and credit constraints can play a more positive role in 
disciplining irresponsible, sovereign borrowers” (Bayoumi et al., 1995: 1046). 
Acknowledging the so-called market discipline hypothesis, fiscal rules represent 
an unnecessary institutional instrument, which moreover imposes needless 
bureaucratic requirements (Kopits, 2001: 7). 
Assuming that the four conditions described by Lane (1993: 53) are fulfilled, i.e. 
open capital market, perfect information on the borrower’s existing liabilities, no 
bailout opportunity, and coherent borrower’s behaviour with market signals36, the 
capital markets would be able to automatically regulate government borrowing. 
The lenders indeed adapt the interest rate charged according to the borrowers’ 
degree of solvency: the higher the sovereign indebtedness, the lower the solvency, 
and logically, the higher the interest rate. This mechanism would therefore 
provide a clear incentive to avoid excessive level of debts and serves as an 
automatic fiscal regulation. 
However, the stringency, as well as the number, of assumptions implied in the 
market discipline hypothesis tends to invalidate, or at least weaken, the 
functioning of this market mechanism (Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997: 163-164). 
Looking at the recent history of the Eurozone, Rossi and Dafflon (2012) further 
discredit the market discipline hypothesis by providing empirical evidence of its 
malfunctioning. Between 2000 and 2008, although the public finances of the 
EMU member states were taking different paths (significant variations in the 
evolutions of the public deficits and debts), the authors surprisingly observe that 
their respective long-term interest rates on sovereign debt do not reveal such 
diverging evolutions. It appears thus that the market discipline mechanism did not 
work. 
2.2.2 Rules induce nontransparent behaviours 
Whereas their partisans see in the adoption of legal rules the best channel 
allowing limiting the fiscal illusion and the deficit bias related to fiscal policies, 
numerous authors emphasise the several undesirable incentives due to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 In his paper, Lane (1993) lists the necessary conditions, under which the market discipline 
hypothesis is valid, and explores their implications. 
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implementation of a budget constraint. Indeed, this second argument, questioning 
the potential effectiveness of binding fiscal restraints, points out the political 
behaviours that such constraints are likely to produce. As a consequence, some 
economists consider that, instead of insuring the politicians’ fiscal responsibility, 
fiscal rules enhance the temptation to adopt opportunistic behaviour, and may thus 
produce the opposite effect. 
In fact, the reasoning behind this scepticism does not specifically concern fiscal 
rules but, more largely, any “rules-based” approach. As acknowledged even by 
the strongest supporters of the legally binding constraints, “any rule (law, 
constraint), once put in place, will necessarily provide incentives for violation, 
either openly or covertly” (Buchanan, 1997: 130). In other words, this statement 
means that, instead of constraining the behaviour of the economic agents who are 
subject to the restriction, the rules, by their nature, favour the adoption of various 
strategies allowing circumventing them. Generally speaking, this kind of 
behaviours is associated with a reduction of transparency in the manner of 
achieving the legal requirements. Fiscal rules are no exception to this 
phenomenon and, as far they are concerned, budgetary transparency is at the core 
of the issue (Forte, 2001: 258). Consequently, the question of the compliance with 
the fiscal rule involves on the one hand the general degree of transparency of the 
public budget and, on the other hand, the methods through which policymakers 
are able to elude the budget constraint; the latter being usually referred as the 
“creative accounting” practices37. 
As we saw before when exposing the general debate on fiscal discipline and more 
precisely the modality of resource transfer from the private to the public sector 
(Section 1.1), the lack of transparency, either in the fiscal choices or in the 
budgetary process, can give rise to voter’s confusion (fiscal illusion). Because it 
grants governments a strategic advantage, this ambiguity weakens the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 In their empirical study testing the hypothesis, according to which European governments use 
creative accounting methods in order to circumvent fiscal rules, von Hagen and Wolff (2006) find 
significant evidences confirming the link between fiscal restrictions and nontransparent accounting 
behaviours. 
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policymakers’ incentive to be fiscally responsible38. Similarly, with the 
implementation of a legally binding constraint – for instance a rule fixing a given 
numerical fiscal target – politicians are encouraged to develop suitable accounting 
methods, designed to show an apparent compliance with the law, although the 
fiscal target is in reality not reached (Kopits, 2001: 7; Drazen, 2002: 13). For 
example, when facing a deficit ceiling, a government could “cook its books” 
through a reclassification of its current spending in capital spending. Regarding a 
debt limitation, keeping public activities or items “out” of the public sector budget 
would easily “hide” part of public indebtedness. Such cosmetic accounting 
tricks39 indeed modify the official fiscal figures, although they do not improve, 
nor change, the real public fiscal position. 
Acknowledging the existence and the regular use of such nontransparent 
accounting behaviours40, several economists, like Milesi-Ferretti (1996: 2) or Ter-
Minassian and Craig (1997: 166-167), emphasise the relevance for fiscal rules to 
be firstly, supported by clearly defined accounting standards and secondly, 
directly addressed to the above-mentioned negative incentives. Meanwhile, to be 
effective, fiscal constraints have still to be sufficiently simple in order to minimize 
the risk of opportunistic interpretations. As highlighted by Alesina and Perotti 
(1999: 27), “complicated rules and regulations provide fertile ground for 
nontransparent budget procedures”. 
In conclusion, we easily understand the great importance of the issue of creative 
accounting and the necessity to provide adequate answers to it; the risk being to 
end up with unenforced and thus useless fiscal rules. Surprisingly, the economic 
literature remains relatively discrete and unconvincing when it comes to find 
solutions to these accounting tricks41. However, Novaresi (2001: 73) recently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 On the basis of this theoretical development, Alesina and Perotti (1999: 25) further point out 
that “politicians have little incentive to produce simple, clear and transparent budgets”. For these 
authors, the high complexity of the budgets of modern economies is only partly due to intricate 
policy programs. Indeed, this characteristic of public budgets seems rather uncalled-for and serves 
more policymakers’ agenda. 
39 For other examples, see Schultze (1995: 326) or Ter-Minassian and Craig (1996: 166). 
40 Dafflon and Rossi (1999) provide, for instance, a survey of the accounting fudges, which have 
been used by the candidate countries for the EMU at the qualifying stage. 
41 Buchanan (1997: 130) simply admits that “no law could pass perfect enforcement” but argue 
that it does not necessarily imply that it would fail in imposing a certain degree of constraint. 
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mentioned a more persuasive argument, which defends that creative accounting 
methods are no fatality. Observing that accounting fudges are possible as far as 
the institutional framework allows them, a sound adaptation of the latter could 
certainly bound such nontransparent behaviours42. 
2.2.3 Risky reliance on forecasts 
Looking at the usual fiscal rules in force nowadays, some economists realized that 
their definitions and functioning rely, under several aspects, on forecasts. 
Typically, the fiscal rules built on a budget constraint, which consists in balancing 
the total outlays with the total receipts, concern, by definition, the forecasted 
outlays and forecasted receipts. Logically, the estimations of these aggregates 
require making a forecast about the future economic performance. Unfortunately, 
such exercise is not without implying risks.  
Firstly, like any forecast, the expected fiscal revenues, as well as the expected 
public spending, contain a certain degree of uncertainty. Secondly, it is far from 
sure that different forecasters would perfectly agree on their respective 
estimations. When facing a variety of diverging forecasts, how would the 
policymakers decide the relevant base, on which the budget is defined? 
Obviously, in order to easily respect the budget constraint, the governments would 
have the incentive of opting for the forecasts overestimating future public 
revenues and underestimating future public expenditures (Rosen and Gayer, 2010: 
132). The ex ante budget rule, based on forecasts, could then be satisfied, without 
really caring about the ex post compliance. More dangerous than the inherent risk 
of making forecasts under uncertainty, such ex ante rules may induce speculation. 
The questionable growth forecasts, on which the countries base their expected 
spending and revenues, represent the typical example, in which the borderline 
between uncertainty and speculation is regularly crossed. 
However, as we further develop later, the issue of the reliance on forecasts may be 
efficiently addressed if the rules are designed so as to enforce sanctions on the 
account, rather than on the budget figures. In this case, under-assessments of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The update of the European system of accounts 1979 (ESA 79) to the ESA 95 goes to that 
direction. 
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spending and/or over-optimistic estimations of revenues do not allow escaping the 
penalties since the latters are decided according to the realized, and not the 
estimated, fiscal figures. 
2.2.4 Unenforceability of sanctions 
Although the partisans of fiscal rules consider that the existence of penalty 
mechanisms constitutes an improvement over announced fiscal commitments 
(Subsection 2.1.1), the opponents underscore, on the contrary, the lack of 
efficiency related to such sanctions. Based on the US, as well as the European 
experiences, the latter authors indeed point out how rarely these measures, though 
provided in the law, were taken. For the US case, Rosen and Gayer (2010: 132) 
confirmed this statement by noticing that, as far the Congressional spending caps 
was concerned, “when the consequences of complying with the law seemed worse 
than ignoring the law, the law was ignored”. 
As a strong partisan of fiscal regulations, Buchanan rejects this argument. He 
indeed considers that the danger to abandon sanctions can easily be avoided with 
the enforcement of “automatic triggers”, which would enter into force 
independently of any decision-making (Tempelman, 2007: 446). Concretely, it 
would mean that, once the threshold provided in the rule is exceeded, correction 
measures, like tax increases or expenditure cuts, would automatically be 
implemented. 
2.2.5 Rules reduce fiscal flexibility  
As we saw in the last chapter, some authors, inspired by the Keynesian approach, 
consider fiscal policy as an instrument of macroeconomic stabilisation. From this 
perspective, the adoption of strict rules would logically constitute a restriction in 
the fiscal flexibility of policymakers, and therefore, in their ability to restore 
macroeconomic equilibrium when required. 
Noticing that past experiences showed the limit of this hypothesis (especially 
through the empirical evidences for the deficit bias), Buchanan (1997: 129) 
simply responds to this argument by emphasising that reducing politician’s 
flexibility is precisely the point of such budget rules. 
 	  
48	  
3 Definition and role of fiscal institutions 
After having exposed, on the one hand, the debate on fiscal discipline (Chapter 1) 
and, on the other hand, the ins and outs of the implementation of legally binding 
fiscal rules, optimally ensuring fiscal responsibility (Chapter 2), the third and last 
theoretical chapter takes a deeper look at the meaning and the content of the term 
“fiscal institutions”. Before describing and analysing the institutional design of 
the European fiscal regulation in Part II, it is indeed not pointless to define more 
precisely the concept of “budget rules”, to which we have referred in its broad 
sense until now. 
As we emphasised in the Introduction, the economic research showed for long 
little consideration in the study of institutions and the way they could potentially 
affect agents’ behaviour as well as policy outcomes. In fact, they were viewed as 
simple “veils” with minor influence on economic activities. Naturally, many 
public finance economists have also followed this general trend and neglected 
thus the role of fiscal institutions. 
However, simultaneously to the general regain of interest in the late 1980s for 
institutional economics (Chavance, 2007: 4-5), a recent observation on historical 
fiscal outcomes triggered scholars’ attention. Looking at the evolution of fiscal 
stance across nations, a new and significant tendency is noticeable (Figure 3-1). 
We perceive indeed clear differences in the size and the persistence of budget 
deficits among OECD countries. Although these nations record a relatively 
similar level of economic development, their tracks of indebtedness vary; some of 
them taking a rising path (in the graph: Belgium, Italy, Netherlands), whereas the 
stock of debts of some others staying relatively stable through time (France, 
United Kingdom, United States). Since this unprecedented phenomenon mainly 
concerned relatively similar countries in terms of their economic development, 
some researchers, such as Alesina and Perotti (1995: 2-3), concluded that 
economic variables alone could not explain these differences. Searching for other 
parameters that would potentially clarify these diverging fiscal paths, they decided 
to investigate further the role of institutions (electoral rules, party structure, 
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budget laws, degree of decentralization, political stability, etc.), which, contrary to 
the OECD economic features, tend to vary across the concerned countries.  
Figure 3-1: Debt-to-GDP ratios of some OECD member states. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from data of OECD (2012). 
Historically, the concept of “institution” has been interpreted according to various 
definitions provided by different schools of thought. Depending on the periods, 
institutions have been successively portrayed as collectively decided formal 
organizations, as informal rules and orders (language, moral, culture, etc.), or still 
as the “rules of the game” formally and informally constraining economic agents’ 
actions43. With the emergence in the 1990s of the so-called new institutional 
economics, the literature has reached a certain consensus about the sense to be 
given to this notion (Chavance, 2007: 59). North (1991: 97), one of the most 
prominent authors of this movement, defines thus the institutions as “the humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction [and] 
consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)”. The 
wide range of facets contained in this definition not only reflects the complexity 
of the institutional analysis, but also suggests that the economic issues can be 
analysed under multiple institutional levels.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 For a complete and clear synthesis of the different institutional approaches, see Chavance (2007: 
104-105). 
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Of course, this conceptual difficulty is similarly present in fiscal matters and 
constitutes an important inconvenience for the economic research since the term 
“fiscal institution” can refer to numerous institutions of different nature. For 
instance, a quick review of the literature, which investigates the link between 
institutional aspects of fiscal policy and the evolution of the public sector fiscal 
stance, demonstrates obviously the absence of a clear-cut agreement on the 
concrete definition to be given to the term “fiscal institution”, as well as the 
certain ambiguity when dealing with this notion. Despite that two studies may 
speak about “budget rules”, it is indeed not guaranteed that both refer to the exact 
same fiscal institution. Moreover, Poterba (1996:4) confirms that “the wide 
variation in budget rules makes it difficult to draw any uniform conclusions about 
the effect of such rules on policy outcomes”. Consequently, in order to clarify this 
notion and avoid any possible confusion, we proceed to the following 
classification of the institutions expected to influence fiscal policy. On the basis of 
the economic literature, we distinguish thus (1) the different electoral rules, (2) 
the budgetary institutions (or procedural rules) and finally, (3) the fiscal rules 
(also referred as numerical fiscal targets). Although some authors, such as Alesina 
and Perotti (1999: 15), Drazen (2002: 1), or Novaresi (2001:3), proceed to other 
classifications, which generally make a distinction only between the regulations 
governing the successive stages of budget process and the rules providing limits 
on fiscal variables. For the sake of completeness, we opt for considering the 
electoral institutions as well.	  The three first sections of the present chapter survey 
each of these classes and provide some theoretical insights about their link with 
fiscal policy outcomes. 
Finally, given the above-mentioned definition of the term “institution” provided 
by North and, looking at the institutional Swiss environment, it must be noted that 
this country presents a quite unique particularity by specifying the popular 
initiative and referendum rights at each level of government44. Since these 
democratic instruments imply that all political decisions may potentially be 
subject to voters’ agreement, they constitute a strengthening of the popular control 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Although each canton and municipality provides such rights, the concrete arrangements and 
modalities of implementation may however differ across the latters. 
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over the jurisdictions and their politicians, which obviously influence their 
behaviour and, potentially, the fiscal policy outcomes. Therefore, the last section 
exposes briefly the concrete scope of this control competency, as well as its 
expected impact on fiscal policy. 
3.1 Electoral rules 
Although the rules framing political competition are usually referred as “electoral 
institutions” instead of “fiscal institutions”, the economic literature, dealing with 
fiscal policy issues, regularly points out the underlying link between the electoral 
systems and the public sector fiscal situation. Without leading directly the budget 
process or the definition of numerical fiscal targets, it appears indeed that the 
characteristics of electoral rules may indeed influence spending decisions and, in 
the extension of that, the risk of running deficits. For this reason, we deem 
relevant to explain briefly this relationship and its implications for the 
achievement of fiscal discipline. 
To begin with, what do electoral systems mean? According to Blais (1988: 100), 
who basically rephrases the definition provided by Douglas Rae in his seminal 
book45, “electoral systems are defined as those rules which govern the process by 
which preferences are articulated as votes and by which these votes are translated 
into the election of decision-makers”. This definition implies the existence of 
various way of reaching this fundamental objective, namely translating votes into 
seats. Whereas the classification of the different existing electoral systems has not 
get to any strong and stable consensus among authors46, the latters however agree 
on the three essential criteria, which allow an appropriate characterization of the 
existing systems. These are (1) the ballot structure, (2) the constituency structure 
and (3) the formula. Without entering into greater details, let us simply assume 
that the ballot structure concerns the object of the vote (voting for individuals 
versus voting for a party-list), the constituency structure refers to the district 
magnitude (the number of seats allocated to each district) and finally the formula 
defines the rule, according to which the votes are translated into seats (plurality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 In the field of comparative electoral systems, Rae’s contribution, entitled “The Political 
Consequences of Electoral Laws” and published in 1967, was a resounding scholar success, which 
marked a breakthrough in this research area (Lijphart, 1990: 481). 
46 For a detailed discussion on the classification issue, see Blais (1988). 
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versus proportionality). From a public finance viewpoint, the different possible 
combinations of these characteristics may have an important impact on the types 
of fiscal policies that the governments implement and, more generally on 
politicians’ fiscal behaviour. The theory of political economy considers that this 
influence can be expressed through two channels. 
The electoral framework can firstly modify the degree of political competition and 
accountability. Thereby, given the hypothesis stating that “voters use elections to 
hold politicians accountable for past performance” (von Hagen, 2005: 4) – the so-
called retrospective-voting paradigm – the electoral system influences directly 
politicians’ behaviour. As far as fiscal policy is concerned, if the voters are 
perfectly informed (strict political accountability) and have to choose between 
numerous candidates (strong competition), then, the incumbents, who seek to be 
re-elected, face little incentive to extract rents while being in office. 
Consequently, this suggests that, under these conditions, fiscal discipline is more 
likely to be respected. Looking now back at the above-mentioned criteria, which 
characterize electoral systems, we easily understand that a candidate ballot, in a 
small district in terms of seats, governed by the plurality rule (also called “winner-
takes-all”) would maximize personal accountability at the expense of a weaker 
political competition (because of the higher entrance barrier for challengers due to 
the necessity of getting the majority of the votes). On the opposite, a party list 
system, implemented with a large district magnitude, and a proportional 
representation would make personal accountability less clear but strengthen 
political competition (von Hagen, 2005: 5). 
Inspired by the same central hypothesis, Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002: 610) 
demonstrate that the electoral rules have also an influence in the nature of public 
spending favoured by politicians in office. The idea is the following: if, for the 
voters, the elections can serve as a way to sanction incumbent’s behaviours, they 
may also operate in order to reward the politicians with preferences for 
government spending decisions going in the direction of the electorate. Therefore, 
politicians may maximize differently their re-election chances according to the 
electoral formula. For instance, in a majoritarian system (each constituency elects 
one deputy), representatives would logically be more prone to provide local 
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public goods, which benefit mostly their district. In contrast, in a proportional 
system (more than one deputy per constituency), political parties, who represent 
different social groups equally distributed across the whole country, would prefer 
government spending on transfers to expenditures on public goods. 
On the basis of this first theoretical transmission channel, von Hagen (2005: 5) 
considers that there are two main implications to be learned for the study of public 
finances. On the one part, electoral systems can reinforce representatives’ 
accountability, which should allow minimizing public spending. On the other part, 
the nature of government expenditure programmes also depends on the electoral 
rules into force. For instance, “proportional representation should lead to higher 
shares of broad-based welfare programs and general public goods in public 
spending than plurality rule”. 
Apart form the influence of electoral institutions on the size and the nature of 
public expenditures, Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997) find empirical evidences 
suggesting the existence of a second impact of electoral systems. This time, the 
electoral institutional framework matters because of the effect it has on the type of 
budgetary institutions that a government has at its disposal, which is due to the 
kind of government in place; namely a one-party government (common outcome 
under a plurality system) or a multi-party government (proportional 
representation). While, in the former case, the formulation of the budget requires 
the approval of a strong finance minister, in the latter one, fiscal targets are 
negotiated among parties, making the monitoring at this stage more difficult and, 
in fine, the existence of greater fiscal deficit more likely. 
3.2 Budgetary institutions 
“Without any restrictions on procedures, without any structure and rules, Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem implies that a legislature would never produce a budget but 
only legislative chaos” (Alesina and Perotti, 1999: 17-18). Since they are defined 
as “all the rules and regulations according to which budgets are drafted, approved, 
and implemented” (Alesina and Perotti, 1995: 21), budgetary institutions may 
thus provide an adequate answer the well-known Arrow’s theorem. Moreover, 
this definition suggests the succession of, at least three relevant phases in the 
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budget process: (1) the formulation of a budget proposal, (2) its approval, and 
finally (3) its concrete implementation. Note that some authors add a fourth step, 
which consists in the ex-post accountability phase47. Leaving aside the latter, in 
the present section, we concentrate our attention on the three main stages and 
more precisely on the different actors they successively involve. Given the 
significant differences in the way budget are drafted, discussed, approved and 
finally implemented (Poterba, 1996: 44), we try to highlight the fundamental 
features governing these three steps48. All together, these procedural rules, by 
which fiscal decisions are made and executed, form the budgetary institutions. 
3.2.1 The formulation 
In this first stage of the budget process, the executive branch of government is in 
charge of the formulation of budget proposal. In order to complete this specific 
task, a consensus has to be reached among the members of the executive, who 
may defend opposite interests. This political exercise can be modelled as a 
bargaining between two main categories of agents: on one hand, the prime 
minister and/or the finance minister and, on the other hand, the so-called 
“spending” ministers. While the latters try to maximize the share of global budget, 
which will be allocated to their department and let at their disposal, the prime 
minister and the finance minister, being more prone to take into account the costs 
of the additional expenditures, in terms of taxation, tend to be more fiscally 
responsible (Milesi-Ferretti, 1996: 8-9). In consequence, depending on who 
benefits from a dominant position, the negotiation could tip the scales in favour of 
more or less fiscal discipline. 
Looking at what determines these strategic interactions and, more fundamentally, 
gives the advantage in the bargaining, von Hagen (2005: 6), among other authors, 
points out the relevance of the degree of centralization in the decision-making 
process. He indeed argues that a more centralized budget process provides a 
dominant role to the finance minister, whereas a more fragmented or “collegial” 
process favours the interests of the spending ministers, which induces a deficit 
bias. More generally, Alesina and Perotti (1995: 26) consider that “procedures 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See, for instance, von Hagen (2005: 7). 
48 For further explanations about these three stages, see Milesi-Ferretti (1996: 7-17). 
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that make a Prime Minister [or a finance minister] strong are those that limit the 
veto power of spending ministers” are more likely to counter the deficit bias. 
3.2.2 The approval 
Once the draft budget being formulated by the executive, it has still to be 
approved by the legislative. At this stage, Milesi-Ferretti (1996: 12) enhances two 
fundamental aspects, which may potentially affect the final fiscal outcome 
towards reinforcement or, on the contrary, towards the relaxation of discipline. 
Firstly, the author points out that, according to the institutional framework, the 
scope of the legislative amendments can vary significantly, which induces 
different behaviours among members of the parliament (MPs). Similarly to the 
previously mentioned spending ministers within the executive for their 
department, it is in the interest of the MPs to favour policy programmes targeted 
to their constituency. Therefore, if the MPs can add new expenditures to, or cut 
revenue sources from the budget proposal, they would most likely fight, through 
amendments, for some adjustments of the budget benefiting their constituency. In 
order to ensure fiscal discipline, a limitation of the scope of amendments seems 
required. 
The second aspect mentioned by the Italian economist deals with the strategic 
relation between the government and the parliament when it comes to concretely 
approve the proposal formulated by the former. Here, two phenomena are 
conceivable. Firstly, the executive may design its budget plan, so that its 
likelihood of being approved by the legislative is high. In this case, the fiscal 
outcome strongly depends on the existence of a deficit bias at the parliament 
level. Additionally, the affiliation of the MPs may also play a role in the support 
of the draft budget. As a matter of fact, MPs representing the party(ies) being in 
office at the executive branch would certainly accept the proposal and, by doing 
so, offer a relative dominant position to the government in the negotiation 
process. Note that this mechanism is especially important since the theoretical 
literature usually consider that “institutional arrangements that favour the 
executive in conflicts arising with the parliament are considered more conducive 
to fiscal discipline” (Fabrizio and Mody, 2006: 701).  
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Related to the latter issue, the voting procedure at the parliament stage can also 
contribute to limit budget deficit. For instance, a sequence of vote, which imposes 
first to discussion on the overall size of the spending and then a debate on its 
particular content, has serious chances to lead to more fiscal responsibility 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995: 26). 
3.2.3 The implementation 
After having reached an agreement on a budget law, the next and ultimate step 
consists in its actual implementation. As far as fiscal discipline is concerned, the 
role of budgetary institutions, during this final phase, resides in safeguarding the 
adequate application of the fiscal choices formulated by the government and 
approved by the parliament. In other words, the key issue here lies in the degree 
of strictness in the realisation of the budget law. Complementary to the question 
of how binding is the budget plan, the design of the processes of adjustments to 
unanticipated overspendings or overestimated fiscal revenues does also play a 
central role and constitutes the second important aspect of the implementation 
stage (Fabrizio and Mody, 2006: 702). 
Regarding the degree of commitment to the budgeted spending, the relevant 
institutional characteristic dwells on the modalities required to diverge from the 
budgeted expenditures, as well as on the propensity of using such tools. We can 
indeed imagine different and variously restrictive rules regulating the process for 
adopting ex post budgetary modifications, going from the requirement of the 
simple approval of the finance minister to the necessity of providing a legal basis 
for any substantive budget revision. The more binding the initial budget law, the 
harder the budget constraint on spending centers and, consequently, the more 
credible the commitment to fiscal discipline. 
In the same line of thought, a limitation in the ability of spending ministers to 
modify the budget during the fiscal year, to redefine the distribution of resources 
between the different budget chapters or even, to constitute budget reserve for 
forthcoming years, clearly contribute to reinforce fiscal discipline. Moreover, it is 
important to underscore that, without such restriction, not only the success of the 
budget implementation would be jeopardized, but the relevance of the preceding 
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budgetary phases would also be weaken, since they do not imply strict fiscal 
commitments (Milesi-Ferretti, 1996: 15). 
3.3 Fiscal rules 
Last but not least, fiscal institutions thirdly include the so-called “numerical 
constraints”, also referred as “legislative quantitative fiscal limits”. Generally 
speaking, this final group of fiscal institutions can be defined as all “the laws that 
prescribe numerical targets on the budget” (Alesina and Perotti, 1999: 15), which 
therefore suggests that this kind of constraints can be imposed on different 
budgetary aggregates according to different modalities. For instance, the 
Eurozone member states opted for public debt and deficit ceilings, whereas many 
states of the US and provinces in Canada set limits on the growth of taxes and 
public expenditures (von Hagen, 2005: 3). Since we already raised most of the 
theoretical issues regarding the utility (prevent the risk of bailout in a monetary 
union and enhance the control over public spending and taxation), as well as the 
danger (circumvent the authorized ceiling) related to the implementation of 
constitutional fiscal rules in the previous chapter, let us just introduce some 
practical concerns, against which we will come up in the second part. 
Besides picking one or another fiscal aggregate, the setting of numerical 
constraints requires indeed operating several choices of definition and answering 
the following questions: How is the boarder of the public sector defined? Has the 
rule to be considered ex ante (at the phase of the budget formulation) or ex post 
(at the end of the fiscal year)? Although these issues may not seem complicated to 
solve, they nonetheless involve significant implications in government fiscal 
behaviour and further, in the stance of public finances. As we show in the next 
chapter, the “coverage” of the fiscal rule, as well as its sequence of 
implementation, seriously counts when it comes to assess the degree of fiscal 
discipline a given institutional framework leads to. These concerns are more 
precisely addressed later, when assessing the European budget constraint. 
Another issue, which is worth to highlight, concerns the difficult debate on the 
exogeneity of fiscal institutions and of fiscal rules, more specifically. Although 
empirical evidence shows a correlation between the stringency of fiscal rules and 
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fiscal outcomes, some economists have challenged the interpretation of this 
observation. Assuming that the actual design of fiscal rules is the result of voters’ 
and/or politicians’ preferences, it would be then possible to consider that, rather 
than formal fiscal rules, preferences of the society constitute, ultimately, the main 
factor explaining fiscal policy outcome. This alternative viewpoint implies thus a 
shift from the approach of fiscal discipline to fiscal responsibility and, as a 
consequence, leads to the question of which of these two approaches comes first. 
In other words, if strict fiscal rules are more likely to be implemented in “debt-
averse” jurisdictions, we could conclude that fiscal discipline is due to fiscal 
responsibility, which is the original determinant of fiscal outcome. If so, the 
empirical studies, tending to confirm the link between the fiscal constraints and 
fiscal performance, could, in reality, reflect the impact of the voters’ preferences 
alone, or eventually combined with the institutional environment49. However, the 
complicated task of building an accurate index of fiscal preferences makes the 
investigation in this field of research difficult and any clear-cut answer uncertain. 
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Dafflon and Pujol (2001: 56-57), a better 
understanding of fiscal preferences could help grasping more precisely the 
specific effect of fiscal institutions, as well as explaining the outcome differences 
of similar fiscal constraints, in different jurisdictions. 
3.4 The Swiss special case 
As a final section of this third theoretical chapter, we wish to briefly describe the 
specificities of the institutional environment of Switzerland. Besides the above-
mentioned institutions, the democratic framework of this country provides 
supplementary institutions that constitute further mechanisms constraining fiscal 
policy decisions. For this reason, Switzerland may be considered as a special case, 
in terms of its institutional settings. 
In the so-called Swiss direct democracy system, citizens enjoy a great level of 
participation in the political, as well as economic, decision-making process. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Using an index of regional fiscal conservatism as a measure of the Swiss citizens’ fiscal 
preferences, Dafflon and Pujol (2001) find out that the latter has indeed an impact on the stance of 
the public finances. The calculation of their index being dependant on the democratic Swiss 
framework, their study could not be replicated in other contexts. 
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addition to the right to elect their representatives at each layer of government50, 
the Swiss voters can directly express their preferences through two further 
democratic instruments, which again exist in all central, regional and local 
jurisdictions:  the referendums and the popular initiatives. 
The right of referendum consists in the approbation (or not), through a popular 
vote, of legislative or constitutional acts. The referendum may be mandatory or 
optional according to the type of acts it concerns. At the central level, the 
amendments to the Federal Constitution, the accession to organizations for 
collective security or to supranational communities and some emergency federal 
acts must be subject to voters’ approval (Art. 140 Swiss Cst.). For other federal 
acts or certain international treaties, a referendum can be organized if at least 
50’000 citizens or eight cantons require it (Art. 141 Swiss Cst). Most of the 26 
cantonal constitutions also make the distinction between mandatory and optional 
referendums. The criteria however differ from one region to the other51. For 
instance, in the canton of Fribourg, the referendum is compulsory for any 
constitutional modification and for any public expenditure decision superior to 1 
per cent of the total functional spending of the preceding fiscal year. Optional 
referendums, concerning new laws or public expenditure decisions superior to ¼ 
per cent of the total functional spending of the preceding fiscal year, may take 
place at the demand of either 6’000 citizens (Art. 46 Fribourg Cst.) or ¼ of the 
regional deputies (Art. 99 Fribourg Cst.). 
The second democratic mechanism, the popular initiative, offers the opportunity 
to the citizens to propose constitutional or legislative modifications, which are 
then subject to voter’s approval. At the federal level, a constitutional initiative 
requires 100’000 signatures (Art. 138 Swiss Cst.); at regional level, such 
regulations also exist but vary widely. In the case of Fribourg, 6’000 signatures 
are necessary in order to propose any constitutional change or the “adoption, 
modification or abrogation of a law” (Art. 41 Fribourg Cst.). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The central government executive power, the Federal Council, is an exception to the rule. Its 
seven members are elected by the United Federal Assembly (the National Council together with 
the Council of States). 
51 Novaresi (2001: 147) provides a complete synthesis of each cantonal definition of the rights of 
referendum. 
 	  
60	  
Generally speaking, these additional democratic mechanisms imply that almost all 
public decisions may be subject to popular vote and reinforce the control 
competency of the citizens, which, consequently, has a direct impact on fiscal 
policy decision-making. In fact, the referendum and initiative system not only 
improves the popular control over budgets, but also limits the potential rent-
seeking behaviours of politicians or bureaucrats (Dafflon, 2007: 125). Moreover, 
in the budgetary process (Section 3.2), the existence of such democratic 
instruments, especially the referendum, can be used as a threat. Indeed, both in the 
formulation and approval phases, the members of the government and of the 
parliament have to take carefully into account voter’s preferences because, in case 
of disagreement, they may have to face the popular sanction through the 
organisation of a referendum. For instance, this threat of referendum constitutes a 
powerful instrument in order to limit the propensity of the public sector to growth. 
Finally, the Swiss direct democracy has an influence not only on the behaviour of 
its political elite, but also on the one of its citizens/taxpayers. Because voters are 
free to accept or reject the implementation of new public services, they are 
brought to weight their pros and cons. Concretely, they simply compare the 
estimated financial cost of a public project, i.e. the additional taxes, with the 
expected benefit. This link between the spending decision and the taxpayers 
logically favours the responsibility of those. Furthermore, this argument confirms 
the idea developed in the previous subsection, according to which fiscal 
institutions are designed by voters’ fiscal preferences. 
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PART II: The institutional design of the European budget 
constraint 
The second part constitutes the heart of this Master’s Thesis. After having, on one 
hand, clarified the theoretical debate on fiscal discipline, as well as on the issue of 
setting legally binding rules and, on the other hand, defined the relevant fiscal 
institutions, we come now to the detailed description of the institutional design of 
the Maastricht fiscal criteria and, to the extent, to its assessment. In order to reach 
this target, the following part is divided into three main chapters. 
As a start, we need to specify the analytical grid that we use to estimate the 
effectiveness of the rules set in the Maastricht Treaty and reaffirmed in the more 
recent Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its successive amendments. Because 
“fiscal discipline is not a simple question of having or not rules limiting deficits 
and debt” (Dafflon, 2010: 2), we must define sharper criteria allowing to 
determine precisely the degree of fiscal discipline involved by any given budget 
constraint. Based on the elements learned in the preceding theoretical discussion, 
we try to highlight the several crucial elements, which an optimal fiscal rule 
should contain. In fine, this exercise leads us to present an assessment method, 
based on a sequence of questions, which successively address the key issues. First 
developed by Dafflon (1996: 240-243), this method has been implemented in 
different contexts and used mainly with comparative purpose52. Nevertheless, 
when applied to any single case, it offers not only a global critical view on the 
potential effectiveness of any fiscal rule but, it also points out the main features, 
which a budget constraint should contain in order to bring a concrete 
improvement in terms of fiscal policy. For this reason, it constitutes a helpful 
analytical framework for our study. 
We focus then more precisely on the Maastricht criteria, to which the Eurozone 
member states – and for a part of the requirements, all EU members – commit 
themselves. The target is here to provide a detailed description of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Novaresi (2001) studied and compared the fiscal discipline of the Swiss cantons. Dafflon (2002) 
used it for a comparison at the local level in ten European countries (9 EU member states + 
Switzerland). Later, Swianiewicz (2004) did the same for seven countries of the former Eastern 
Europe. 
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institutional design. Starting from the several law articles, concerning the 
European budget constraint and initially mentioned in the Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU, or the so-called Maastricht Treaty) and the Protocol on the excessive 
deficit procedure, annexed to this same Treaty, we will successively review all the 
relevant legal sources including the European System of National and Regional 
Accounts (ESA 95) and the different Council Regulations, which have influenced, 
and ultimately shaped, the institutional environment of the budget criteria over the 
time. This exercise helps us to clarify some central issues, such as the 
measurement of the deficit, the definition of the public sector, or the sanction 
mechanism, which all have significant policy implications (Blejer and Cheasty, 
1991: 1675). 
Finally, the last chapter of Part II is dedicated to the review and the assessment of 
the European budget constraint in force nowadays. It analyses the description 
exposed in Chapter 5 in the light of the method explained at the beginning of this 
second part. From our standpoint, this way of proceeding offers two main 
advantages. Firstly, through the essential properties of any fiscal rule developed 
along Chapter 4, we are able to evaluate, on the basis of a clear analytical grid, the 
strictness of the European instrument of fiscal discipline. Secondly, the method 
helps to highlight the weaknesses implied in the architecture of the rules and, 
consequently, the eventual contra-incentives they may create or the opportunistic 
behaviours they tend to favour. 
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4 From soft to hard budget constraint 
The primary purpose of the present Master’s Thesis lies in the assessment of the 
European budget constraint. In order to reach our target, it is useful to begin with 
a description of the analytical framework, which allows us to determine the 
strictness of the Maastricht criteria. In other words, we wish to establish the 
relevant criteria that makes a budget constraint “soft” or “hard”, i.e. more of less 
efficient and enforceable. 
Concretely, we need first to identify the fundamental aspects, which render a 
fiscal rule, so to say, “optimal”. Moreover, since the effectiveness of a budget 
constraint depends on several parameters, the exercise does not only require an 
individual analysis of those, but ultimately an overall assessment of the 
institutional framework as a whole. The presentation of Dafflon’s methodology 
goes thus in that direction. Based on a sequence of questions that successively 
tackle the different aspects and components of such institutional arrangement, 
such as the content of the constrained fiscal aggregates, the time allowed to meet 
the criteria, or even the nature of the potential sanctions, the method aims at 
providing an overview of the quality of the concerned fiscal rule. 
Before specifying our “analytical benchmark” and ultimately describing our 
assessment grid, next section clarifies some central fiscal concepts, which may 
have a significant influence on the outcome produced by any fiscal restriction. For 
instance, we investigate the notions of deficit and debt from an accounting 
perspective. 
4.1 Some relevant fiscal concepts 
The first necessary step in order to organise our analytical framework consists in 
specifying the economic meaning, as well as bookkeeping definitions, of some 
central public finance concepts. Straightforward at the first glance, notions such as 
“investment”, “amortisation”, “deficit” or “debt”, may hide some definitional 
ambiguities and, at the end of the day, be sources of great confusion. As a matter 
of fact, in its attempt to compare the local budget constraints among European 
countries, Dafflon (2002: 5) counts no less than six distinct definitions of the 
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concept of “debt servicing”. It is therefore crucial to clarify explicitly the public 
finance terminology, on which we build our institutional assessment.  
For this purpose, the present section obeys the following logic. Inspired by the 
lessons of the theoretical debate on fiscal discipline (Chapter 1), we begin with 
the exposition of the so-called theorem of balanced budget, which states the four 
principles governing the management of public indebtedness. Then, on the basis 
of this guideline, we formalize the necessary conditions, for the public sector, for 
having recourse to borrowing. This reasoning, funded on four equations, is 
referred as the “golden rule” revisited. Finally, we present a standard public 
accounting framework, which allows us to clarify some fiscal concepts, such as 
the different measures of public deficit. 
4.1.1 The theorem of balanced budget 
Looking successively at the numerous arguments in favour and against fiscal 
discipline, Chapter 1 shows all the complexity of an issue, which cannot be 
tackled with a “ready-made” solution. The challenge consists in reaching a 
compromise between the two opposed positions, namely enforce certain rules 
governing borrowing decisions, which simultaneously let some room for 
manoeuvre to governments. Dafflon (1995: 161-162; 1998: 78-79) provides a 
subtle arrangement, which is articulated into four principles and conciliates both 
goals. The entitled “theorem of balanced budget” enunciates thus the guidelines of 
an adequate public sector fiscal equilibrium. This theorem contains the following 
recommendations: 
- One must distinguish the current budget from the investment budget. 
- The current budget, which includes the interest payment and the financial 
amortisation, must be balanced. 
- Only investment expenditure may be financed by borrowing. 
- The net surplus results only from the current budget. 
In addition to its many advantages, this set of rules implies interesting corollaries 
that require further reasoning and therefore, give its weight to the theorem. For 
now, we just briefly mentioned them without entering into greater details. 
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First of all, given the separation between current and investment budget, also 
referred as the capital budget, it is required to precisely define each type of 
accounting entries in order to avoid any potential strategic behaviour. This 
bookkeeping distinction further highlights the interesting link existing between 
investments and current budget, namely the future current expenditures and 
revenues implied by today’s investments. For this reason, the theorem implicitly 
calls for taking into account the impact of capital expenditures on the current 
budget. Besides, since borrowing should exclusively serve to finance investments, 
investment and loan management policies have to be clearly defined and strictly 
followed. Then, considering the definition of the fiscal balance stated in the 
theorem, the implementation of an amortisation policy, based on the lifespan of 
the assets subject to the amortisation, constitutes another corollary consequence. 
Finally, the investment decisions depending on the capacity of the net surplus to 
bear the new future current charges, an additional distinction between recurrent 
and irregular fiscal resources should be made in order to avoid misguided choices. 
Moreover, the use of the net surplus as an investment criterion may incite the 
public sector considering the self-financing of certain public tasks through user 
fees. As explained in the opening chapter (see Subsection 1.1.1), this public 
financing method, contrary to others, implies an explicit and simultaneous 
payment, as well as an ideal financial coverage guided by the “user-pays” 
principle. 
On the side of the advantages provided by the theorem, one must firstly 
underscore that the respect of these principles allows combining, on the one hand, 
a fiduciary control of the current account with, on the other hand, a managerial 
control over the investment programmes. Furthermore, the direct relation between 
the expenditures and the revenues, wanted by the theorem, simplifies the 
monetary evaluation of the public goods and services produced by the public 
sector. Last but not least, the required amortisation policy leads to a distribution of 
the investment costs between the generations over time, as desired by Musgrave’s 
“pay-as-you-use” principle (Subsection 1.2.1). 
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4.1.2 The “golden rule” revisited 
Translated into equations, the theorem of the balanced budget leads to the so-
called “golden rule” revisited53. Developed by Dafflon and Beer-Thòth (2009: 
361-363), this set of formulas aspires to emphasise the ins and outs of the theorem 
and its corollary implications. Within the framework set in the previous 
subsection – the distinction between current and capital budget and explicit 
definitions of the concepts of “investment”, “amortisation” and “debt service” – 
the golden rule revisited reaffirms the guiding principles of the theorem. It 
stipulates indeed that only current revenues cover current expenses, that 
investment expenditure only may justify to have recourse to borrowing, and that 
servicing the debt is considered as a current cost and, therefore, must be paid out 
of the current revenues.  
Formally, this set of principles can be easily expressed by four equations. With T, 
the total current public revenue and G, the total current public expenditure, the 
budget balance requirement is achieved if the former is equal to the latter, i.e. T = 
G. Taking into account the second principle of the theorem, the first necessary 
condition in order to contract a new debt lies on the existence of a certain current 
surplus, S, able to bear debt servicing (Equation 4.1). 
T −G = S  (4.1) 
In other respects, an additional investment, ΔI , may be financed through various 
sources. As a matter of simplicity, let us assume that ΔI 	  can be covered by a new 
loan, ΔB , or other resources, F (taxes, transfer revenues, etc.). Equation 4.2 
expresses this situation. 
ΔI = ΔB+F  (4.2) 
Consequently, in order to determine the maximal size of the additional 
investment, ΔI , one must still define the maximal amount that can be borrowed; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The “golden rule” revisited takes its roots in the “golden rule” as described by School of Public 
Choice (Buchanan and Wagner, 1978). In its initial formulation, the golden rule did not distinguish 
the current budget from the capital one, which proved too restrictive in order to undertake 
investment expenditures. It is thus “revisited” in the sense that, it introduces the latter distinction 
and links it with Musgrave’s “pay-as-you-use” principle. The explanation of the rule is due to 
Dafflon (1995: 161-162); its formalization to Dafflon and Beer-Thòth (2009: 361-363). 
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ΔB  depending on the surplus, S, at the disposal of the jurisdiction. Therefore, 
following the principles of the theorem, the surplus (before undertaking the new 
project) has to be large enough in order to bear the future financial implications of 
the new project. Besides the service of the new debt, this calculation requires 
taking into account several other parameters regarding, on one hand, the asset (the 
maintenance costs and the investment subsidies) and, on the other hand, the public 
good or service provided by the latter (the operating costs and revenues). Equation 
4.3 specifies this measurement as: 
ΔB = S − (M +E)− (R+O)[ ]i+ d  (4.3), 
where M stands for the annual maintenance costs related to the new investment; 
E, the annual current costs of the public service that the new investment offers; R, 
the revenues earned from the service offered by the investment (user-fees for 
instance); O, the operating grants received; d, the depreciation rate of the 
investment (depending on its lifespan); and i, the interest rate. 
Compiling the equations 4.2 and 4.3, we are now able to determine the investment 
capacity of the jurisdiction (Equation 4.4). 
ΔI = S − (M +E)− (R+O)[ ]i+ d +F  (4.4) 
Outwardly simple, the reasoning lying behind the golden rule revisited constitutes 
an interesting starting point for a deeper reflection about the meaning to be given 
to the fiscal balance and, more generally, to the concept of fiscal discipline. 
4.1.3 The public accounting plan 
One last technical aspect is necessary in the understanding of any fiscal rule: the 
public accounting framework (or plan). Although the latter does not tell anything 
about the severity of the fiscal discipline in force, it is however meaningful to 
grasp its practical articulation, not only in terms of bookkeeping methods, but also 
in terms of expenditure decision-making. In other words, while the theorem of the 
balanced budget was the applied translation of the theoretical debate and the 
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“golden rule” revisited its formalization, the public accounting plan may 
constitute, to some extend, its tangible implementation. 
Rather than describing the bookkeeping methodology, our point is here to 
emphasise the public accounting specificities as well as the accounting elements 
regarding the fiscal balance. Knowing that statistics on public finance are directly 
extracted from the figures published in the public accounts, it is interesting to 
provide some definitions from an accounting perspective. For example, whereas 
the term deficit may be simply described as “the excess of expenditures over 
revenues during a period of time” (Rosen and Gayer, 2010: 461), a full 
understanding of the meaning of this fiscal figure, for instance in the context of 
the European excessive deficit procedure, requires a deeper reflection about the 
accounting aggregates that have to be computed. Because it is coherent with the 
principles of the above-mentioned theorem under many aspects, let us consider 
the example of the Swiss public sector accounting plan54, schematized in Figure 
4-1 and Figure 4-2. 
Likewise the bookkeeping of private entities, the fundamental purpose of public 
accountancy consists in reporting systematically the annual financial flows and 
keeping track of the assets and liabilities. Thence, as it is organized in the private 
sector, the public accounting plan should distinctively record the annual monetary 
and accounting flows, as well as provide a realistic image of the “stocks” of assets 
and liabilities of the concerned entities. The Swiss plan is no exception and 
comprises indeed the expense and revenue accounts, grouped within the 
equivalent of the profit and loss account in the private companies, the current 
account (Figure 4-1), and balance sheet items (the “stocks”), logically gathered in 
the balance sheet (Figure 4-2). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Only the economic classification is discussed here, i.e. the functional classification is left aside. 
 	  
69	  
Figure 4-1: The current and capital budget/account. 
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Having a look at Figure 4-1, we directly notice the main characteristic of this 
accounting framework, namely the explicit separation between the current and the 
capital budget/account55. The current account collects together all the monetary 
book entries, which reflect the cash receipts or payments, and the purely 
accounting entries (formally referred as expenses and revenues) such as the 
creation of reserves and provisions, or the internal charging. Similarly to the 
balance of the profit and loss account for a private company, the balance of the 
current budget indicates the annual variation of the equity capital: a deficit 
decreases the latter, whereas a surplus increases it. 
The existence of the capital account, and in consequence, of the administrative 
account, constitutes thus the main difference between the public and private 
accounting method. In a standard private accounting plan, investments are directly 
mentioned, at their net value, in the assets side of the balance sheet. For a matter 
of spending control over the undertaken investment programmes, the accounting 
framework of the public sector should however make accessible their gross value. 
In order to provide this information, the investment expenditures and receipts are 
firstly entered into the capital account. The advantage of this way of recording 
investments entries is twofold. On the one hand, it allows putting easily in parallel 
the realized expenditures and receipts of each investment and comparing them 
with the investment programme previously decided by the legislative. On the 
other hand, the net capital outlay, i.e. the final balance of the capital account, 
represents the part of the annual investments, which the jurisdiction has to bear. 
Carrying forward the latter balance into the administrative account, and 
comparing it with the balance of the current account, the jurisdiction can, at last, 
determine its needs in financial liabilities, referred as the “net total borrowing” in 
Figure 4-1. 
More than helping in the understanding of the public accounting methodology, 
Figure 4-1 presents a good opportunity for clarifying the definition of fiscal 
balance, from the accounting approach. Following the precepts of the theorem of 
the balance budget, the current account is subject to the balance requirement. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The issue of the distinction between the budget and the account is further illustrated in the next 
section. At this point, in order to simplify, we use only the term “account”. 
 	  
71	  
condition has, however, to be specified. Indeed, the balance should be achieved 
taking into account the effective current expenses, including the interest payment 
and the depreciation, and the effective current revenues. Note that purely 
bookkeeping entries, such as the ones related to the reserves and provisions, or the 
internal charging are excluded from the calculation56. According to this definition 
of the concept of fiscal balance, the monetary operations concerning investments 
are not subject to a strict balance requirement. Capital expenditures are rather 
constrained by the borrowing capacity of the public – itself determined by the 
current account surplus – as demonstrated in the “golden rule” revisited.  
Another concept of fiscal balance is often mentioned in the economic literature, as 
well as in the media: the primary balance. Defined in the glossary of statistical 
terms, gathered by the OECD, as the “government net borrowing or net lending 
excluding interest payments on consolidated government liabilities57”, we 
understand that the primary balance consists in the difference between the current 
and capital receipts and the current and capital expenditures, where the interest 
payment and effective amortisation are excluded. The notion of primary balance, 
and more particularly the primary deficit, is further addressed in the forthcoming 
chapters, since it is at core of the Maastricht deficit criteria. 
Closely related to the issue of fiscal balance, the notion of public indebtedness, 
i.e. “the sum of all past deficits” (Rosen and Gayer, 2010: 461), can also be 
approach from an accounting perspective. Investigating the accounting notion of 
public debt necessitates turning to the public balance sheet (Figure 4-2), whose 
the value rests mainly on the information it contains concerning the measure of 
public indebtedness. In fact, regarding strictly its functioning, in terms of 
accounting method, this document presents less interest than the current and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 One must note that the Swiss public accounting plan presents a major flaw when it comes to 
distinguish bookkeeping from monetary entries. In fact, in order to operate the distinction, one 
must be aware that expenses and expenditures (revenues and receipts) cannot be directly pointed 
from the categories of presented in Figure 4-1. For instance, the category “financial 
expenses”(numbered 34) contains, as expected, expenditures like interest payment (340), but also 
bookkeeping entries, like value adjustments on investments (344). Similarly, “extraordinary 
expenses” (38) contains as many monetary flows (380 extraordinary personnel charges, 383 
additional depreciation) as accounting flows (389 net expenses for reserves). The above-
mentioned calculation appears thus more complicated. 
57 Definition available at: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/. 
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capital accounts58 and, in consequence, we rather concentrate our attention on the 
measurement of the accounting aggregate, which is at stake. 
Figure 4-2: The public balance sheet. 
 
Alternatively to the sum of all past deficits, the public debt may be described as 
all external liabilities of the government and public sector agencies59. Neglecting 
for now the complicated issue of the delimitation of the public sector (and thus of 
its liabilities), let us focus on the “economic content” of the term liabilities. When 
stated so (which is the case most of the time), the public debt actually refers to the 
gross public indebtedness. In the public balance sheet, this measure corresponds 
thus at the liabilities (20), of which we subtract, on one hand, the accounting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 For an overview of the specificities of the public balance sheet, see Dafflon (1998: 98-109). 
59 One must note that this definition refers to the “sovereign debt”, which must be distinguished 
from the “public debt”. Whereas the former takes into account only the liabilities due to private 
economic agents (outside the public sector), the latter takes additionally in its calculation the 
liabilities due to other public agents. 
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entries (204 accrued expenses and deferred income, 205 and 208 short- and long-
term provisions, 209 restricted funds), as well as the current liabilities (200), 
which, like its names says, concern current affairs. Widely used, this measurement 
of the public indebtedness offers the advantage, on one part, of being quite easily 
computed (the required fiscal figures are usually available) and also, of resulting 
in a value, whose link with the interest payment is direct and comprehensible 
(Dafflon, 1998: 171). 
Besides the value of the gross debt, we can logically calculate the net public 
indebtedness by taking into account part of the left side of the balance sheet. The 
net public debt is thus obtained by deducting, from the gross debt, the financial 
assets, which could be sold and used to reimbursed part of the external liabilities. 
Similarly as we have done when calculating the gross debt, the latter criterion 
imposes us to subtract some irrelevant accounting entries. So, the administrative 
assets (14) have to be removed. Given that this aggregate represents assets, which 
are essential for providing public goods and services, they are considered are 
“inalienable”. The non-administrative tangible fixed assets (108) are also 
excluded. To be included in the calculation of the net indebtedness, these assets 
should be evaluated at their market value (not at their accounting residual value, 
like they are in the balance sheet). Next to the difficult task of estimating the 
market worth of an tangible good, the government should further adapt this 
approximation to market variations over time, which represents an additional 
significant technical inconvenience. Finally, following the same logic as for the 
computation of the gross debt, all balance sheet items related to current affairs 
such as some entries of the category 100 (for instance 1000 cash deposit or 1001 
post deposit), as well as the accounting entries (104), should not be taken into 
account. 
4.2 The analytical framework 
In addition to a clear understanding of the above-mentioned accounting concepts, 
assessing any fiscal rule requires defining a “benchmark” for comparison. In other 
words, more than describing the content of the Maastricht criteria, we need to 
determine first the main features of a hypothetical ideal budget constraint, towards 
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which we may thereafter evaluated the concerned institutional arrangement. We 
present here two complementary sets of criteria. The first one, dealing with more 
general principles, helps to grasp, in its board sense, what defines an optimal 
fiscal rule. For its part, the second defines a scale allowing ranking the analysed 
fiscal rule from soft (the absence of real constraint) to hard (a strict constraint) 
fiscal constraint. 
4.2.1 The criteria of an optimal fiscal rule 
Confronted to the question of the criteria of an optimal rule and inspired by the 
properties mentioned by Kopits and Symansky (1998: 18-19)60, Fatàs et al. (2003: 
62-65) point out the necessity of distinguishing two dimensions: the efficiency and 
the enforceability. While the former aspect refers to the fact of meeting the given 
objectives at the minimum costs and without implying side effects on the 
economy, we understand easily that the latter means that the rule can be 
effectively imposed on the targeted policymakers and their decisions. For each of 
these two dimensions, the respect of some further principles is obviously required. 
As far as the achievement of the efficiency target is concerned, one must pay 
attention at four central principles. 
Firstly, the chosen rule must be consistent with its stated goals. As revealed by the 
theoretical debate, fiscal discipline may be desired and justified for several 
reasons, such as reaching sustainable public finances, avoiding spillover effects in 
a monetary union or, canalizing politicians’ rent-seeking behaviours. Logically, 
different targeted problems may necessitate distinct rules. In other terms, the 
question, which has to be answered, is the following: Given the phenomena (or 
behaviour) that we wish to avoid, what should our fiscal rule concretely restrict? 
For instance, depending on the goal, a limit on the public deficit may be preferred 
than one on the public debt. Secondly, an efficient fiscal rule needs to be credible. 
Regardless the goals that are stated in the rule, a credible fiscal constraint implies, 
on one hand, a clear and effective sanction mechanism, so that the violation of the 
rule does not constitute a conceivable alternative strategy for decision-makers. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 According to these authors, a fiscal rule should be well-defined, transparent, simple, flexible, 
adequate, enforceable, consistent and efficient in order to be labelled “ideal”. For a discussion 
about this benchmark, see Creel (2003). 
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Moreover, this principle also involves that any deviation to the rule may be 
observable and verifiable in a transparent way. Thirdly, the efficiency of a fiscal 
rule requires, to some extent, being adaptable to changing circumstances. 
Although the issue of the optimal degree of flexibility remains unsolved, the 
relevance of this property is however widely acknowledged. Last but not least, the 
efficiency of the fiscal rule ultimately depends on its clarity and transparency. 
Here, a good decision rule could be: “a simple rule is always preferable to a more 
complex one” (Fatàs et al., 2003: 63). 
Turning now to the second dimension, namely the enforceability of the fiscal rule, 
some principles must also be followed. First of all, in its formulation, the fiscal 
rule must precisely specify the chosen constraint, its process of implementation 
and the sanction mechanism if the latter is transgressed (well-defined). 
Furthermore, the rules and their enforcement modalities should not be subject to 
amendments, otherwise the temptation of adapting them, in order to achieve the 
compliance, risks to render the constraint meaningless (“bindingness”). Finally, 
an ideal fiscal rule must contain two additional characteristics regarding its 
monitoring. First, as we develop in the next subsection, monitoring compliance 
should optimally intervene ex post, on the basis of the realized accounts, rather 
then ex ante, on the basis of the budget (timing of the monitoring compliance). 
Secondly, this task should be assigned to an independent body, whose functioning 
is transparent and the decisions enforced without allowing the opportunity of 
being cancelled by a third institutional body (independence of the body in charge 
of the monitoring compliance). 
4.2.2 Assessing the degree of strictness 
Now that the fundamental principles, which an optimal fiscal rule must follow, 
have been emphasised, we can address the issue of ranking the existing fiscal 
rules and, more specifically evaluate their degree of strictness. In order to do so 
for the Maastricht budget constraint, we use a well-proven methodology 
consisting in answering a series of seven questions, which ultimately allow 
determining the severity of the concerned fiscal rule. Initially developed by 
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Dafflon (1996: 240-243), this sequence of questions61 has been, since then, 
applied successfully in several different contexts but never to the so-called 
Maastricht criteria. 
Figure 4-3 summarizes the seven questions to be addressed, as well as the six 
possible grades of strictness, going from “no constraint” (path 1) to “strict budget 
discipline” (path 6). Let us review, from the beginning (at the top of Figure 4-3), 
the seven issues to be successively tackled and their related problems. 
1. Is any sort of balance budget or fiscal discipline requirement prescribed by 
the law or the constitution? 
2. If the law, or the constitution, provides such disposition, does it concern the 
budget, the account or both? 
This distinction between what is planed (and, consequently, depends on 
assumptions) and what is realised is indeed of great importance. To illustrate our 
point, let us consider Table 4-1, which presents the nine possible fiscal outcomes. 
Except outcomes 1, 2, 4 and 5, which respect fiscal discipline, the others are, on 
the contrary, sources of problems. Regarding outcomes 7 and 8, the budget 
forecast is too pessimistic and records a deficit, which should activate a process of 
correction. Looking at the account, the deficit of the budget either appears to be a 
false alert, or proves that the corrections have been effective. In outcomes 3 and 6, 
the budget is in surplus, respectively in balance, and so, is conform to the fiscal 
constraint. Nevertheless, the account shows a deficit, which should trigger 
sanctions. Through the two types of situations, we understand the necessity to 
implement differentiated mechanisms of sanction. Logically, outcomes 7 and 8 
cannot be solved in the same way than outcomes 3 and 6. For its part, outcome 9 
means that the corrections implemented on the budget have not been successful. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 In its original formulation, the method refers to six fundamental questions. We choose here to 
divide the second one into two distinct steps. 
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Table 4-1: The possible fiscal outcomes. 
   Account 
    Surplus Balanced Deficit 
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Source: Dafflon (2010: 13). 
Apart from the need of distinct measures of corrections, Table 4-1 shows the great 
limit of an ex ante fiscal rule in its attempt of guarantying fiscal discipline. 
3. What is the definition of the fiscal discipline? Does it involve the balance of 
the public budget/account as a whole, i.e. the current and capital 
budget/account together, or exclusively the current one? 
4. Are the amortization expenses included in the accounting balance, which is 
subject to fiscal discipline? If so, how is the amortization rates defined? Do 
they coincide with the debt repayment? 
5. In which timeframe should the fiscal criteria be achieved? 
The strictest rule would set a balance requirement on an annual basis. 
Alternatively, we can imagine a fiscal constraint, which either takes into account 
the average balance over a given number of fiscal years, or prescribes a deadline 
for meeting the criteria. In the latter cases, the fiscal rule grants more 
intertemporal flexibility in fiscal policy at the expense of potential strategic 
behaviour and ultimately, softer fiscal constraint. 
6. If the criteria should not be achieved on an annual basis, but rather in a 
medium term, how is this time horizon defined? 
In line with the previous question, the issue here consists in determining if the 
definition of the “medium term” is adequate. This definition should indeed 
contain the length of the timeframe, its beginning and, in order to limit politicians’ 
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strategic behaviours, the “medium term” should match the duration of the political 
term. Regarding the last definitional property, one has to adopt a standard public 
choice approach in order to understand its importance. Imagine that the 
compliance with the fiscal rule should be achieved within five years, while the 
political term lasts for four years. Assuming that both start simultaneously, it is 
likely that the politicians in office until t4 would let the difficult task of promoting 
fiscal discipline to the next political term. The same reasoning works also if the 
beginning of both periods does not coincide. 
7. In case of violation, does the rule provide sanction mechanism? 
More than the existence of a sanction mechanism, the real issue remains its 
effectiveness and its enforceability. Furthermore, the penalties prescribed by the 
rule must be designed so as to create the desired incentives, namely the respect of 
fiscal discipline. 
Looking now at the arrival positions of the different path, we understand that 
either the lack of clear definition of the medium term, or the absence of effective 
sanction and penalty mechanism, seriously weakens the scope of the constraint 
and may potentially make it ineffective. Besides, in a recent international 
symposium, Dafflon (2012) switches path 4 and 5, considering that a rule, 
defining correctly the targeted medium-term balance and providing sanctions in 
case of violation, may produce better fiscal outcome than an annual constraint 
without any real risk of sanction. 
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Figure 4-3: Analytical grid of the strictness of budget constraints. 
 
Source: Dafflon (1996: 240). 
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5 The institutional framework of Maastricht criteria 
Since their first evocation in 1991 during the Maastricht Summit until now, the 
European instruments devoted to fiscal discipline and, more generally, the 
institutional fiscal environment, in which they are implemented, have known 
several modifications of varying depth. Influenced by political and/or economic 
circumstances, these evolutions have taken different forms. Thereby, the existing 
legal bases have been sometimes amended and, in some other cases, been 
completed with additional legal provisions. Therefore, the resulting institutional 
framework consists not only in a succession of amendments, but also in a 
construction of overlapping legal acts of different nature. Table 5-1 gives a global 
overview of this institutional assembly by listing all the related legal sources and 
their amendments62. The present chapter attempts thus to clarify this intricate 
institutional arrangement by investigating each of the associated pieces of law in 
force nowadays. 
Before getting to the heart of the matter, one must first understand the essential 
articulation of the European legal texts. Looking again at Figure 5-1, we note 
indeed that “Regulations” and “Directives” border on “Treaties” and “Protocols”. 
In fact, the European legal framework makes the distinction between the primary 
law, i.e. the founding treaties, as well as the protocols annexed to them, and the 
derived law, comprising regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and 
opinions, as listed in Art. 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) (Dutheil de la Rochère, 2010: 80). Although both primary and 
derived law are legal acts, they may imply major differences in their modality of 
implementation at the national level. For instance, whereas a regulation is 
“binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States”, a directive 
establishes a common aim for all member states without specifying its form in the 
national legislation. A recommendation or an opinion has no binding force (Art. 
288 TFEU). Since the description of the European fiscal constraint requires going 
through several sources of both primary and derived law, this hierarchisation of 
the EU legal acts has to be kept in mind. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The legal bases presented in Figure 5-1 are placed on the time axis according to their publication 
date and not when they entered into force. 
 	  
81	  
Figure 5-1: The relevant legal sources of the European budget constraint. 
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Although the European fiscal environment is the result of a continuous succession 
of adjustments since 1992, several main steps have marked this evolution. Figure 
5-2 schematizes these cornerstones, going from the mentioning of the ground 
principles in the Maastricht Treaty, to the most recent discussion around the so-
called “Two-Pack”, which has been published in the Official Journal of European 
the Union in May 2013. 
Figure 5-2: The sequence of reforms. 
 
Finally, looking at Figure 5-2, one last remark has to be formulated regarding the 
distinction between the institutional fiscal arrangement in force at the Union’s 
level (the upper part of the schema) and its translation into the national 
legislations (the bottom part). In fact, the focus of the present Master’s Thesis, i.e. 
the European fiscal constraint, provides “only” a supranational framework, which 
let to the member states a certain room for manoeuvre in terms of implementation. 
As a consequence, the individual national interpretation would need further 
investigations. This issue goes however beyond the scope of our study and is 
therefore not addressed here. 
The forthcoming description of the European fiscal instrument follows the 
sequences of Figure 5-2. We begin with the presentation of the guiding principles 
that have appeared in the Maastricht Treaty and have initially conditioned the 
participation in the EMU (Section 5.1). Then, we turn to the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) and its main amendment, which took place in 2005 (Section 5.2 and 
5.3). Section 5.4 analyses the content of the so-called “Six-Pack”, which takes its 
name from the five regulations (three additional and two amendments) and one 
directive that it counts. Entered into force on 1st January 2013, the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), whose fiscal part is commonly 
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referred as the “Fiscal Compact” is exposed in a fourth section, whereas the most 
recent “Two-Pack” regulation is described in a concluding section. 
5.1 The ground principles and components of the Maastricht criteria 
The Maastricht Treaty, entered into force on 1st January 1995 and officially 
named the Treaty on European Union, marked formally the starting point leading 
to the creation of the EMU in 1999. In fact, this Treaty not only scheduled the 
stages for monetary integration but also set the requirements for joining the EMU. 
Among the latter conditions, we find the two criteria regarding the member states’ 
public finances, which are at the root of the current European budget constraint. 
Although the successive amendments that the Maastricht Treaty has known over 
the years63, the rules defining the main institutional framework, which aims at 
limiting the national fiscal policies, are still present in the Consolidated Treaties, 
established in 2007 in Lisbon and entered into force in December 2009. Identical 
in their formulation, these articles have however been renumbered. We wish thus 
to draw the reader’s attention on the fact that the following analysis refers to the 
most recent numbering64. Apart from the new numbering, note that the Treaty of 
Lisbon also introduced formally the Eurogroup – a configuration of the Council, 
where only the ministers of the Eurozone are represented – and slightly changed 
the voting rules within the Council of the European Union (usually referred to as 
the Council). 
The legal expression of the fiscal Maastricht criteria takes place under Title VIII 
of the TFEU, entitled “Economic and Monetary Policy” and, more precisely, in its 
Chapter 1 dedicated to the economic policy. For its part, Protocol No. 12, annexed 
to the Treaties, specifies the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and some notions 
mentioned in the TFEU. When it was introduced, the EDP was further completed 
with a Council Regulation (No. 3605/93), which settles its modality of application 
regarding particularly the duty of the member states to report their fiscal figures. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, the Nice Treaty in 2003 and finally the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 
have successively amended the original Maastricht Treaty (dates of their entry into force). 
64 The Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union provides tables of equivalence between the old and new numbering of both 
Treaties. However, no guideline has been officially defined regarding the manner to refer to the 
pre and post reform Treaty articles. Consequently, and for a matter of simplicity, we use only the 
last numbering, in force in the Lisbon Treaty. 
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Over the years, this Regulation has been amended at several occasions (see the 
third line from the bottom in Figure 5-1). Whereas some of the successive 
amendments remained minor and consisted only in some renumbering or 
references or articles (No. 475/2000, No. 351/2002, No. 679/2010), some others 
introduced modifications of greater relevance (No. 2103/2005, No. 479/2009). 
Therefore, one must note that the present section analyses the legal bases 
currently in force, without necessarily retracing the modifications that have been 
established in the past. In clear, the legal bases that constitute, today, the “plinth” 
of the European fiscal rule, are the TFEU, the Protocol No.12, and the Council 
Regulation No. 479/2009, as well as its last partial amendment (Council 
Regulation No. 679/2010). 
In order to extract the main features of the initial Maastricht criteria, which, more 
than any other following legal bases, give its taste to the European fiscal 
constraint, the section is divided into four subsections. After having exposed the 
guiding principles of this fiscal instrument and its general functioning, the next 
subsections aim at putting into light three specific issues. Thereby, we study 
successively the definition of the public sector, the notions of public deficit and 
debt, and finally the rules governing the reporting and monitoring of the national 
fiscal figures. 
5.1.1 The general design 
Our description of the general design of the European fiscal constraint is guided 
by the following logic: the setting of a target, a precise definition of the conditions 
to be fulfilled for achieving the latter (as well as the tolerated exceptions), and the 
description of the sanction mechanism in case non-compliance. 
As far as the fiscal target is concerned, the TFEU does not provide a clear and 
unique answer. According to Art. 119(3), which defines four guiding principles 
for the EU economic and monetary policy, the central objective of the European 
fiscal policy consists in the achievement of “sound public finances”. To provide 
the means to achieve this particular goal, Art. 126 draws the broad outlines of the 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) and exposes the core principles of the 
European fiscal constraint. First of all, the latter article specifies the interpretation 
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to be given the above-mentioned goal of “sound public finances”. Para. 1 states 
indeed that, “member states shall avoid excessive government deficits”. In other 
words, the public finances of the member states may be labelled as “sound”, not 
when they are in balance, but as far as their fiscal balance does not record an 
“excessive deficit” – quite a nuance and a departure from the “golden rule” of 
public finances. Given this fiscal target, the requirement of setting some criteria is 
obvious. In order to determine the soundness of the public finance stance of its 
member states, the EU must state, at least, what makes a public deficit excessive 
or not. 
The second paragraph of the same article not only answers the question of the 
relevant criteria for differentiating an excessive from an acceptable public deficit, 
but also introduces another necessary condition of sound public finances. By 
doing that, the TFEU slightly modifies the concept of fiscal discipline that was 
implied in its initial fiscal objective. Art. 126(2) expresses indeed that, in addition 
to “the budgetary situation” (the deficit), “the stock of government debt” should 
also be monitored. Accordingly, the compliance with budgetary discipline shall be 
measured on the basis of the two following criteria: 
- The ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic 
product; 
- The ratio of government debt to gross domestic product. 
Both criteria are subject to a respective reference value specified in Protocol No. 
12. Art. 1 of the Protocol sets indeed the reference value for the deficit-to-GDP 
ratio at 3 per cent, and the one for the debt-to-GDP ratio at 60 per cent. The idea 
is that, beyond these reference values, a mechanism of corrections and, in fine, of 
sanctions, should be triggered. However, the TFEU provides “exit doors” to the 
respect of the rules. In clear, under some conditions, the reference values could be 
exceeded, i.e. the member states are allowed to infringe the rules, without 
initiating the procedure of sanctions. Regarding the deficit criteria, two conditions 
for derogating from the rule are envisaged. Firstly, an exceeding deficit ratio may 
be indeed tolerated, if the successive yearly ratios have “declined substantially 
and continuously” and have come “close to the reference value”, or secondly, if 
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the violation remains “exceptional and temporary” with a value remaining “close 
to the reference value”. For the indebtedness criteria, only one situation may 
justify a debt-to-GDP ratio above the limit. Such cases are indeed tolerated under 
the condition that the concerned value is “sufficiently diminishing and 
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace”. 
The European Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”), the 
initiator of legislative proposals and executive arms of the EU, is in charge of 
monitoring the compliance of the fiscal stance of the member states with the 
criteria (Art. 126(2)). This mandate implies that, when the deficit and/or the debt 
ratio of a member state happen to exceed the reference values, or risks to do so, 
the Commission must prepare a report. After being subject to the opinion of the 
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)65 (Art. 126(4)), the report of the 
Commission is transmitted to the concerned member state, as well as to the 
Council. Based on the document of the Commission and the potential further 
observations provided by the member state itself, the Council must adjudicate on 
the existence of a situation of an excessive deficit (Art. 126(6)). Put differently, 
the Council must confirm the assessment of the Commission before taking any 
measures of correction. 
Once the situation of an excessive deficit is proven and confirmed, the Council 
opens a procedure of fiscal correction, which should bring the fiscal stance of the 
targeted member state to an acceptable level. In order to make the correction 
effective, the Council has different instruments at its disposal. On one hand, the 
Council must present solutions to the issue; on the other hand, it may use several 
means of pressure, supposed to encourage the member state to tackle promptly its 
fiscal problem. Concretely, the Council gives its advices to the member state 
through a recommendation. The latter document, possibly inspired by a 
preparatory work of the Commission, should sketch solutions allowing to bring 
this situation to an end, within an appropriate period of time. At this point, the 
Council’s recommendation shall remain confidential (Art. 126(7)). Providing that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The EFC gathers senior officials from national administrations and central banks, the ECB and 
the Commission. Its aim consists in promoting policy coordination among the Member States by 
providing opinions to the Commission and the Council. 
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the member state follows the Council’s proposal and undertakes the appropriate 
actions in order to improve its fiscal situation, the latter document is not made 
public. On the contrary, if the response of the member is unsatisfactory and its 
action ineffective, the Council may attempt to put further pressure on the 
concerned government by deciding to publish its recommendation (Art. 126(8)). 
Similarly, if the concerned government persists not responding to the Council’s 
request, it may be constraint to “submit reports in accordance with a specific 
timetable” (Art. 126(9)). 
At this point, if the correction procedure has not born fruit, i.e. the member state 
fails to comply with the measures of deficit reduction recommended by the 
Council, Art. 126(11) provides the EU decision-making body with several tools of 
sanction. The TFEU lists indeed four measures expected to intensify the pressure 
put on the member state:  
- The Council may impose additional conditions on the issuing of bonds and 
securities of the concerned member state.  
- The Council may intercede with the European Investment Bank and advice it 
to reconsider its lending policy towards this government. 
- The Council may require a non-interest-bearing deposit with the EU from the 
member state. This amount is returned to its owner once the Council deems 
that fiscal discipline is achieved. 
- Ultimately, the Council may impose non-refundable fines. 
When the member state has, “in the view of the Council”, corrected its excessive 
deficit, the Council has to abrogate the above-mentioned measures. Moreover, if 
the case of non-compliance with the fiscal criteria has been made public, the 
Council must state publicly the end of the procedure. Figure 5-3 sums up the 
complete procedure described in the TFEU. 
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Figure 5-3: The initial European fiscal constraint. 
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As our reading of Art. 126 made clear, the Council of the European Union serves 
as the main decision-making body: it decides whether an excessive deficit exists, 
it chooses to make its recommendations public, it may constraint the member 
states to take measures for deficit reduction and, ultimately, it has the power of 
imposing sanctions, as well as abrogating them. Therefore, it makes sense to focus 
shortly on its composition and voting procedure.  
The Council is “the voice of the EU member states” (European Commission, 
2012: 14) and is thus composed by one minister from each government (15 in 
1995, 25 in 2004 and 27 since 2007), which benefit from a decision power 
depending on the size of its population (Table 5-1). 
Table 5-1: Votes per country in the Council. 
 
Source: European Commission (2012: 16). 
The Council may take different configurations depending on the subjects being 
discussed. For instance, when addressing issues concerning education, the 
Council gathers the national ministers of education. Similarly, the “specialized” 
ministers discuss economic and monetary matters and, among those, the fiscal 
issues. In the latter case, the Council is referred to as the “Ecofin Council” 
(Economic and Financial Affairs) and gathers the economics and finance 
ministers of the 27 member states, regardless whether they participate or not in 
the monetary union. This last point is not without creating some problems since 
participating and non-participating member states do not stand under the same 
fiscal constraint, nor face the same risks66. Aware of the issue, a “subset” of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Since 2011 and the adhesion of Estonia to the EMU, only 17 out of 27 EU member states have 
the common currency. 
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Ecofin Council, bringing together exclusively the economics and finance 
ministers of the euro area, has been established: the Eurogroup. Informal at its 
beginning67, its role and its competences have however increased over the years 
until it obtained a legal basis in the Lisbon Treaty. Thereby, Protocol No. 14, 
annexed to the consolidated Treaties, confirmed the informal nature of these 
meetings, where the participating member states “discuss questions related to the 
specific responsibilities they share with regard to the single currency”. In addition 
to this Protocol, the Lisbon Treaty introduced further “provisions specific to 
member states whose currency is the euro” (Art. 136 to 138 TFEU), which 
constituted a significant evolution in the decision-making process within the 
Eurozone. Art. 136 stipulates indeed that, as far as the procedure described in Art. 
126 (the EDP) concerns participating member states, “only members of the 
Council representing member states whose currency in the euro shall take part in 
the vote” (Art. 136(2))68. The decisions are made at the qualified majority, which 
is defined as “at least 55 per cent of the member of the Council representing the 
participating member states, comprising at least 65 per cent of the population of 
these states” (Art. 238(3)(a)). Compared to the initial provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty, according to which the Council as whole takes part in the decision specific 
to the participating countries, such issues are now addressed, still formally within 
the Ecofin Council, but taking only into account the votes of the concerned 
countries. 
Note finally that, as a rule, a member state (participating or not) concerned by the 
procedure described in Art. 126 is excluded from the Council’s vote. This rules 
applies for the confirmation of the excessive deficit (Para. 6) and all the following 
measures decided by the Council (Art. 126(13)). Concretely, it means that, when 
the Council has to decide whether it imposes or not a sanction to a non-compliant 
country, the latter member state does not take part to the vote. 
Until now, our description of the European fiscal constraint, based essentially on 
the founding Treaty, let many aspects of the rule open to various interpretations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The Eurogroup met informally for the first time in June 1998. 
68 Art. 126(14), which is related to the competence of amending and setting the principles of 
implementation, is an exception to the rule. 
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In fact, the reader of the articles dedicated to fiscal discipline in the TFEU may 
find some components of the procedure quite ambiguous. To name only a few 
examples, we note that the issues of the coverage of the criteria, the exact 
definitions of the constrained fiscal aggregates, or the concrete meaning of the 
exceptions justifying the non-compliance, are not clearly addressed. Furthermore, 
it is not clear whether the two criteria, the deficit-to-GDP ratio and the debt-to-
GDP ratio, have the same weight in the appreciation of the Commission, the EFC 
and, ultimately, the Council. 
In order to investigate further these several points (in so far they are actually 
tackled), the next subsections analyse the legal bases surrounding the articles of 
the Treaty, namely the Protocol No. 12 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure and 
the Council Regulation No. 479/2009 on the application of the Protocol and its 
last partial amendment (No. 679/2010). Complementary to these legal sources, the 
European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 95)69 needs also to be 
studied, since it provides the accounting framework in force at the European level. 
5.1.2 The coverage of the “government” 
As stated in the TFEU, the ratio of the government deficit, respectively of the 
government debt, to GDP shall not exceed a reference value. In order to deeply 
understand the consequences of these two criteria on the public finances, it is 
necessary to specify the European definition given to the term “government”. 
Straightforward in appearance, the issue deserves however to be seriously tackled. 
Indeed, paying attention to the latter proves to be crucial for, at least from our 
point of view, two reasons. On the one hand, the measure of the “government” is 
at the core of the Maastricht fiscal constraint. Whether for the deficit or the debt 
criteria, before computing the latter accounting aggregates, we need to determine 
first the institutional units, which have to be taken into account in the calculation. 
In consequence, defining what “belongs” to the public sector, or not, represents an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 When the Maastricht criteria have been established, the European System of Integrated 
Economic Accounts (ESA) was still in force. It has, however, been replaced in 1996 by the ESA 
95. Moreover, a number of changes have been introduced to this version since then, in the form of 
legal amendments In consequence, the legal bases, surrounding the European fiscal constraint and 
related to its accounting interpretation, have been amended accordingly. For a matter of simplicity, 
we refer directly to the updated version, which is available at: 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/esa95/esa95-new.htm. 
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essential preliminary step. On the other hand, as important as it is in the context of 
the European fiscal rule, the determination of the scope of the public sector 
remains a difficult exercise subject to methodological variations70. Given that, 
nowadays, the state is engaged in numerous activities, which are undertaken 
according to various modalities, it becomes sometimes complicated to draw a 
clear line between the public and the private sector. In fact, we observe not only 
that the public sector occasionally produces market goods and services as a 
private firm would do, but also that the non-market goods and services are not 
exclusively provided by the public sector. The well-known system “public-private 
partnership” (PPP) exemplifies perfectly the latter case and, more generally, the 
difficulty of distinguishing the public from the private sector. As a matter of fact, 
depending on where the limit is set, the “size” of the government considerably 
varies. At this point, we can already note that this “gray area” may potentially be 
used as a strategic tool: the exclusion from the perimeter of the public sector of 
some tasks contributes mechanically to relax the constraint. 
Reviewing the three legal bases of the Maastricht criteria (the TFEU, the Protocol 
No. 12 and the Council Regulation No. 479/2009), the first reference to the 
“European definition” of the public sector takes place in Art. 2 of the Protocol. 
The latter makes the following statement:  
“Government” means general government, that is central government, regional 
or local government and social security funds, to the exclusion of commercial 
operations, as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts. 
Council Regulation No. 479/2009 (Art. 1(2)) confirms this definition and 
complements it only with the references of the concerned institutional units, as 
well as with more details regarding the treatment of commercial operation: 
“Government” means the sector of “general government “ (S.13), that is “central 
government” (S.1311), “state government” (S.13.12), “local government” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Dafflon (2013: 3-12) presents and assesses three methods that allow defining the public sector. 
The scope of the public sector may be thus delimited (1) by the enumeration of the institutional 
units constituting the public sector, (2) by the decision-making process and (3) by the property of 
the production factors. More precisely in reference to the canon of public finance, one may define 
it by the definition of “public goods”, a commodity that nonrival and nonexcludable in 
consumption (Rosen and Gayer, 2010: 54-56). 
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(S.13.13) and “social security funds” (S.1314), to the exclusion of commercial 
operations, as defined in ESA 95. 
The exclusion of commercial operations means that the sector of “general 
government” (S.13) comprises only institutional units producing non-market 
services as their main activity. 
Despite learning that the term “government” refers to a consolidated measure of 
all three levels of governments plus social security funds, but minus the units 
producing mainly commercial operations, both definitions remain empty of 
greater details and, instead, simply refer to the ESA 95. A deeper analysis of the 
latter document is therefore required. 
The ESA 95 lies on a logic initially developed by the IMF in the mid-1980s, 
which led first to the development of the international System of National 
Accounts (SNA 93) implemented worldwide and published jointly by the 
European Commission, the IMF, the OECD, the UN and the WB. Basically, it 
consists in a global statistical system, which divides each national economy into 
six institutional sectors. These sectors may be further subdivided into sub-sectors. 
Table 5-1 presents the exhaustive list of the sectors and sub-sectors defined by the 
ESA 95. Besides the public sector, i.e. the general government (S.13, framed in 
red in Table 5-2), the ESA 95 distinguishes the non-financial corporations (S.11), 
the financial corporations (S.12), the households (S.14), the non-profit institutions 
serving households (S.15) and the so-called “rest of the world” (S.2). 
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Table 5-2: The institutional sectors and sub-sectors in the ESA 95. 
 
Source: ESA 95 (http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/esa95/en/een00069.htm). 
In this context, the public sector is defined by the enumeration of the institutional 
units constituting it. According to Para. 2.68, which provides a first general 
definition of the “general government”, two kinds of institutional units, belonging 
to S.13, must be distinguished: 
-  “All institutional units principally engaged in the redistribution of national 
income and wealth” 
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- “The other non-market producers71 whose output is intended for individual 
and collective consumption, and mainly financed by compulsory payments 
made by units belonging to other sectors” 
The following paragraph of the ESA 95 (2.69) goes further and lists the 
institutional units, which belong to the two above-mentioned types of units. The 
general government is thus constituted by: 
- “General government entities (excluding public producers organised as public 
corporations or, by virtue of special legislation, recognised as independent 
legal entities, or quasi-corporations, when any of these are classified in the 
non-financial or financial sectors) which administer and finance a group of 
activities, principally providing non-market goods and services, intended for 
the benefit of the community; 
- non-profit institutions recognised as independent legal entities which are 
other non-market producers and which are controlled and mainly financed by 
general government; 
- autonomous pension funds72.” 
In respect with these definitions, the general government can be divided into four 
sub-sectors. The ESA 95 distinguishes thus the central government (S.1311), the 
state government (S.1312), the local government (S.1313) and the social security 
funds (S.1314). S.1311, S.1312 and S.1313 include, at their respective level – 
central, regional and local – all administrative departments and other public 
agencies. These sub-sectors also include all non-profit institutions which are 
controlled and mainly financed by each layer of government and whose 
competence extends over its political territory. On the contrary, the administration 
of social security funds is excluded from the latter sub-sectors but appears in 
S.1314, its own category. This fourth sub-sector includes thus “all central, state 
and local institutional units whose principal activity is to provide social benefits” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Para 3.26 specifies further the term “other non-market producers” and defines it as: “local KAUs 
(kind-of-activity unit) or institutional units whose major part of output is provided free or at not 
economically significant prices.” 
72 Note that the inclusion of autonomous pension funds to the general government is conditional. 
The minimum requirements are similar to the ones defining the inclusion of social security funds 
to the general government. Those are developed in Para 2.74. We also mention them later in the 
text. 
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(Para. 2.74). The inclusion to S.1314 is furthermore subject to two conditions. 
Firstly, the personal contributions financing these funds must, to some extent, be 
mandatory. Besides, the amount of the contributions paid by each individual 
should not, in principle, be linked to the risk, to which he is exposed – the 
principle of distribution contrasting with the principle of capitalization. Secondly, 
the general government must be responsible for the settlement or approval of the 
contributions and benefits. 
As detailed as may seen this set of categorisation principles, when it comes to 
determine whether an economic entity belongs or not to S.13, the task can be 
tricky. In order to make the decision-making easier (and probably clearer), 
Eurostat (2013: 11-16), in its Manual on Government Deficit and Debt, points out 
the essential characteristics of a public sector entity and specifies the concepts 
behind those. In this manual of implementation, Eurostat extracts thus three main 
determinants from the above-mentioned rules. So, in order to belong the general 
government, an entity must be simultaneously: an institutional units, a public 
institutional unit, a non-market public institutional units. 
Following this methodological way, the determination of the affiliation to the 
public sector begins with the decision whether the concerned transactions are part 
of an institutional unit in the sense of the ESA 95. The concept of “institutional 
unit” is defined in Para. 2.12. It states that “the institutional unit is an elementary 
economic decision-making centre characterised by uniformity of behaviour and 
decision-making autonomy in the exercise of its principal function”. In order to 
fulfil these two criteria, the entity must: 
- be able to possess its own goods and assets, as well trading them with other 
units of the same nature; 
- be free of making economic decisions and undertaking economic activities; 
- be able to commit itself, i.e. incur liabilities, take on obligations; 
- and keep (or at least, could keep) a complete set of accounts. 
If these criteria are not met, the transactions of the entity must be allocated to the 
unit that controls it; so to say, its parent. 
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Then, the ESA 95 considers an institutional unit as “public” as long as the unit is 
under the control of the public sector. The notion of “control” is specified as the 
power of deciding the general, as well as corporate, policy of the unit. This is the 
case when the government owns more 50 per cent of the share of the corporation. 
Governmental control can also take the form of special legislations that empowers 
the government to determine corporate policy or to appoint the directors. Whereas 
the compliance with the former criterion is easy to verify, the latter may be 
subject to various interpretations. In order to clarify the notion of “control”, 
Eurostat illustrates its point with the example of two schools; one being under the 
control of the general government, the other one not. The general government 
controls the school if its approval is needed to create new classes, make 
significant investments, or borrow. On the contrary, the given school does not 
belong to S.13 if the general government just finances the school or supervises the 
general quality standards or the teaching programmes. 
Finally, the public institutional unit must satisfy the so-called “non-market rule” 
in order to belong to the general government. The respect of this criterion requires 
the assessment of the main function exercised by the entity. A public institutional 
unit can indeed perform different types of function, which ultimately determine its 
assignment to the to S.13. For instance, when the entity exercises the function of 
national income and wealth redistribution, which comprises levying taxes, paying 
grants or providing social benefits, the unit is to be classified in the general 
government sector. On the contrary, when a public entity performs mainly the 
function of financial intermediation, such as health insurers or some pension 
funds, the unit does not belong to the public sector since, in the sense of the ESA 
95, they are market oriented. If the function of the unit is nor the redistribution, 
neither the financial intermediation, it is then necessary to determine whether its 
output is aimed at being sold for economically significant prices. The border 
between market and non-market producer being potentially thin, Eurostat calls for 
the implementation of the so-called “50 per cent criterion”. In clear, it means that 
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the output is sold at economically significant prices when more than 50 per cent 
of the production costs are covered by the sales73. 
Without entering now into the details, we already notice the strong impact, which 
this rule may have on the scope of the public sector. Think, for instance, about the 
hospitals, the retirement and care homes, the wastewater treatment plants or the 
electricity power plants, whose sales may easily be superior to 50 per cent. 
According to the European sectoring rules, all those entities would belong to the 
sector of non-financial corporation (S.11). 
Figure 5-4: Decision tree for allocation to the general government sector. 
 
Source: FFA (2011: 22). 
Also subject to ESA 95 since the second series of bilateral agreements with the 
EU, Switzerland has been constrained to adapt its statistical delimitation criteria. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Eurostat (2013: 14) defines sales as “all payments linked to the volume of output are included, 
but payments to cover an overall deficit are excluded” and production cost as “the sum of 
intermediate consumption, compensation of employees, consumption of fixed capital and other 
taxes on production”. 
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In a recent report, the Swiss Federal Finance Administration (FFA) develops a 
decision tree (Figure 5-4), whose merit is to be extremely simple and, at the same 
time, in total accordance with the European standards. 
5.1.3 The notion of public deficit and public debt 
Analysing a fiscal constraint, which aims at controlling the levels of public deficit 
and public debt, requires clear definitions, firstly, of the term “public” and, 
secondly, of the accounting notions of “deficit” and “debt”. Following the latter 
logic, the previous subsection has presented the sectoring principles being in force 
in the EU. Through the description of these rules, we understand that the 
allocation to a particular sector ultimately depends on the type of activity and on 
who controls the unit (FFA, 2011: 21). Now that we are in a position to determine 
which economic activities belong to the general government, in the sense of the 
ESA 95, we turn to the second step and enter into the accounting construction of 
the public sector in order to clarify the European meaning of public deficit and 
debt. For doing so, we proceed in the same way as previously with the coverage 
of the public sector and provide a survey of the relevant legal bases. 
Likewise the specification of the sectoring rules, the economic sense to be given 
to the terms “government deficit” and “government debt” is mainly developed 
through several articles of the ESA 95. As for theirs, Protocol No. 12 and Council 
Regulation No. 479/2009 only outline the basic definitions of both terms, as well 
as of “government investment74”. More useful, the Regulation completes them 
with the reference codes of the ESA 95. Art. 1(3 to 5) of the latter legal base 
makes the following statement: 
(3) “Government deficit (surplus)” means the net borrowing (net lending) (EDP 
B.9) of the sector of “general government” (S.13), as defined in ESA 95. The 
interest comprised in the government deficit is the interest (EDP D.41), as defined 
in ESA 95. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Public investment is also specified since Art. 126(3) TFEU provides that, in case of non-
compliance of a member state with the criteria, the commission, in its report, should “take into 
account whether the government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure”. 
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(4) “Government investment” means the gross fixed capital formation (P.51) of 
the sector of “general government” (S.13), as defined in ESA 95. 
(5) “Government debt” means the total gross debt at nominal value outstanding 
at the end of the year of the sector of “general government” (S.13), with the 
exception of those liabilities the corresponding financial assets of which are held 
by the sector of “general government” (S.13). 
Government debt is constituted by liabilities of general government in the 
following categories: currency and deposits (AF.2); securities other than shares, 
excluding financial derivatives (AF.34) and loans (AF.4), as defined in ESA 95. 
Once again, in order to completely grasp the economic scope of these definitions, 
we obviously need to investigate further the ESA 95. This time, the attention is 
focused on the accounting principles prescribed in this system. Keep in mind that, 
rather than describing the methods for recording public bookkeeping entries, we 
try to highlight the relevant elements allowing the computation of the concerned 
aggregates. 
As stated in Para. 1.61 of the ESA 95, “the [accounting] system is built around a 
sequence of inter-connected accounts”, which is implemented for each 
institutional unit. This sequence of accounts is articulated into four main “blocs”, 
which concretely represent three kinds of accounts: the currents accounts (I and 
II), the accumulation accounts (III) and the balance sheet (IV). Moreover, each of 
these groups can be subdivided into further levels of detail. At three degrees of 
detail, the full sequence is the following: 
I. Production account 
II. Distribution and use of income accounts 
II.1. Primary distribution of income account 
II.2. Secondary distribution of income account 
II.3. Redistribution of income in kind account 
II.4. Use of income account 
III. Accumulation accounts 
III.1. Capital account 
III.2. Financial account 
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III.3. Other changes in assets accounts  
IV. Balance sheets 
IV.1. Opening balance sheet 
IV.2. Changes in balance sheet 
IV.3. Closing balance sheet 
On the basis of this accounting arrangement and on the above-mentioned law 
articles, we study firstly the notion of public deficit. As stated in the Council 
Regulation, the “government deficit” mentioned in the TFEU refers to the 
balancing item “net borrowing/net lending”, codified B.9. More than just pointing 
the bookkeeping line, we seek to understand the exact path that leads to it. In this 
attempt, it is necessary to present the sequence from the beginning.  
So, Figure 5-5 shows the European current account. Generally speaking, this first 
accounting document “deals with the production, generation, distribution and 
redistribution of income and the use of this income in the form of final 
consumption” (Para. 1.61 ESA 95). The current account can actually be divided 
into two sections. Whereas the production account leads to the balancing item 
B.1n, the net value added, the distribution and use of income accounts, starting 
from B.1n, ultimately provide the saving (if positive) or the overdraft (if 
negative). Besides, we note that, in accordance with the initial definition of 
“government deficit”, the payment of the interest (D.41) appears at the third level 
of the current account. 
More importantly, we observe that putting into perspective the current 
expenditures and the current revenues leads to the public saving or overdraft 
(B.8). In other words, it is relevant to underscore that the European definition of 
the public deficit does not entirely corresponds to the notion presented in 
Subsection 4.1.3 and developed on the basis of the revisited golden rule. In the 
latter public accounting plan, the deficit (or surplus) is obtained by balancing only 
the current account. In consequence, what is referred as the “government deficit” 
in the ESA 95 may not be directly compared with the notion exposed previously, 
since it does not convey the same economic sense. 
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Figure 5-5: The ESA 95 current accounts. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from information available on the ESA 95 website. 
In fact, the calculation of the public deficit, under the ESA 95, requires taking into 
account the capital account (Figure 5-6). This second document consists in a 
subdivision of the larger accumulation accounts, which “cover changes in assets 
and liabilities and changes in net worth” (Para. 1.61 ESA 95). Although, the 
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sequence of account in the ESA 95 marks a clear distinction between the current 
(numbered I and II) and the capital account (III.1), the latter begins with the 
balance item of the former (B.8). From a purely economic perspective, this certain 
continuity is not without raising some issues (see Chapter 4). Except from this 
link with the current account and the slightly different presentation, the capital 
account performs a quite similar function as in the FS model. According to the 
ESA 95, the final balance of this account provides however the “Net lending (+) / 
net borrowing (-)” item (B.9), which represents the central figure of public deficit 
in the context of the European fiscal constraint. 
Figure 5-6: The ESA 95 capital account. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from information available on the ESA 95 website. 
Let us now turn to the figure of public debt, which remains to be investigated. For 
that, the analysis of a third accounting document is necessary, namely the balance 
sheet (Figure 5-7). Strictly speaking, the full sequence of accounts of the ESA 95 
prescribes a division of the balance sheet into three steps: the opening, the yearly 
changes and the closing. Since our target consists simply in the extraction of the 
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measurement of public indebtedness, Figure 5-7 ignores the intermediate stage 
and rather presents the balance sheet in its opening (or closing) form. As far as the 
composition of this document is concerned, Para. 7.20 to 7.24 of the ESA 95 
define and list the types of assets and liabilities. In addition, Annex 7.1 provides 
deeper information for each category. 
Figure 5-7: The ESA 95 balance sheet. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from information available on the ESA 95 website. 
Regarding the calculation of government debt, we note that the ESA 95 does not 
provide any specific definition, as it does for the deficit (Annex V). Instead, The 
ESA 95 contains provisions on the valuation rules that govern financial liabilities. 
We learn for instance that “the stock of the assets and liabilities recorded in the 
balance sheet is valued at the market price prevailing on the date to which the 
balance sheet relates” (Para. 7.01). Looking exclusively at the ESA 95, the stock 
of government debt would be equal to the sum of all liabilities present in the 
general government balance sheet (AF.2 to AF.7, in the liabilities side of Figure 
5-7). However, taking into account the definition stated in the above-mentioned 
Council Regulation, we understand that the notion of public debt, which prevails 
in the context of the European fiscal constraint, differs slightly. In fact, the 
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specification of the relevant components (with their ESA 95 codes) made in the 
Regulation encompasses only the currency and deposits (AF.2), the securities 
other than shares (AF.3) and the loans (AF.4). Moreover, the financial derivatives 
(AF.34) are excluded from the calculation. 
5.1.4 The reporting and monitoring rules 
The TFEU designates the Commission as the institutional body in charge of the 
monitoring “of the development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of 
government debt” (Art. 126(2)). On the one hand, the achievement of this 
mandate goes through the respect of a certain number of reporting rules behoving 
to the member states and laid down in Chapter II of the Council Regulation No. 
479/2009 (already provided in Regulation No. 3605/93, yet amended in 2005 and 
2009). On the other hand, the monitoring power implies a regular qualitative 
assessment of the fiscal figures produced by the member states. The latter 
procedure of control is described in Chapter III of the same Regulation 
(introduced only in Regulation No. 2103/2005). 
Regarding firstly the reporting rules, the procedure requires the member states to 
communicate to the Commission, twice a year, “their planned and actual 
government deficits and levels of government debt” (Art. 3(1)). The first report is 
due to 1st April, the second to 1st October. These reports are transmitted under the 
form of the so-called “EDP notification tables”. Appendix B presents a sample of 
the French report of October 201275. In accordance with the Regulation, the EDP 
notification tables should contain specific data, not only for the current year, but 
also for the past four budget years. Moreover, Euostat prescribes the following 
format of presentation: 
- Table 1 provides a summary view including: the net borrowing (-) / net 
lending (+) for the general government and the sub-sectors, the detail of the 
general government debt, the general government investment expenditure, the 
interest payable by the general government (reported both with and without 
interest payments on swaps and financial derivates), and the GDP. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The EDP notification tables of each EU member states are made public and are available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/excessive_deficit
/edp_notification_tables. 
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- Tables 2 (2A, 2B, 2C and 2D) explain, for each sub-sector, the transition 
from its working balance to its recorded deficit or surplus. The working 
balances are, on the one hand, completed with operations that are off-budget, 
but that are considered in national accounts as part of government operations 
and, on the other hand, corrected for operations that impact them whilst are 
considered as financial transactions in national accounts without impact on 
the ESA deficit. 
- Tables 3 (3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, 3E) explain the link between the annual deficit or 
surplus and the variation in public indebtedness for the same year. For 
instance, these tables take into account the borrowing needs due to the 
acquisitions of financial assets. 
- Table 4 finally provides complementary data, such as: the stock in trade 
credit payable by government, the amount outstanding in the government 
debt from the financing of public undertakings, the extent and the reasons in 
case of substantial differences between the face value and the present value of 
government debt, and the Gross National Income (GNI). 
Besides monitoring, on the basis of the notification tables, the compliance with 
the fiscal criteria, the Commission is also entrust with the assessment of the 
quality of the data reported by the member states76. As specified in Art. 8(1) of the 
Council Regulation, the quality of the data means “the compliance with 
accounting rules, completeness, reliability, timeliness, and consistency of the 
statistical data”. In order to make this control possible, the member states have to 
provide the Commission with “the relevant statistical information” (Art. 8(2)), 
which refers to (1) data from national accounts, (2) inventories, (3) EDP 
notification tables, and (4) additional questionnaires and clarification related to 
the notifications. The results of these qualitative assessments should be regularly 
reported to the European Parliament and to the Council (Art. 8(3)). 
Also in the purpose of facilitating the dialogue between the Commission and the 
member states, and especially their statistical authorities, the former should 
undertake regular “dialogue visits” (Art. 11(1)). If it exists significant risks or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 With the introduction of the Six-Pack, the manipulation of statistics may lead to financial 
sanctions (see Section 5.4). 
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problems with the quality of the reported data77, the Commission can further carry 
out “methodological visits”, which consists in a deeper analysis of the accounts of 
all government units at each level and ultimately leads to a report to the Economic 
and Financial Committee. 
5.2 The original Stability and Growth Pact 
In the mid-1990s, with the concrete formation of the monetary union approaching, 
some EU member states started to question to ability of the Maastricht fiscal 
constraint – as described in the previous section – to maintain efficiently fiscal 
discipline within the EMU. Although the Treaty provided corrective and sanction 
mechanisms, it seems indeed that the risk of being excluded from the euro area 
constituted, at the convergence stage (1992-1998), the main threat for the 
candidate states (Schuknecht et al., 2011: 9). For this reason, it was feared that, 
once having joined the Eurozone, fiscal discipline would be relaxed and the effort 
consented by the governments since 1992 would be cancelled out. In order to 
avoid this scenario, it appeared that the original European budget constraint 
required additional provisions. As reported by Langenus (2005: 68), three issues 
were particularly debated. First of all, given the objective of safeguarding the 
functioning of the automatic stabilisers, “the deficit level of 3 per cent of GDP 
had to be presented much more explicitly as an upper limit […], rather than as an 
aim for fiscal policy”. Secondly, the deterrent effect of the sanctions should be 
reinforced and made less dependent on the Council’s decisions. In other words, on 
the one hand, the amount of the fines needed to be discussed and, on the other 
hand, the EDP needed to be triggered on a more automatic basis. Remember 
finally that the definition of the “exceptional circumstances”, in which the 
threshold of 3 per cent of deficit could be exceeded, was not specified nor in the 
TFEU, neither in the surrounding legal texts. This constituted the third main issue, 
which needed to be tackled. It is in this context that the German government 
submitted in 1995 the first proposals calling for several adjustments of the 
existing fiscal rule. After a long debate, a compromise, named the Stability and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Art. 11b(3) of the Regulation specifies what is considered as situations of “significant risks or 
problems”. 
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Growth Pact (SGP), was reached in December 1996 at the Dublin European 
Summit. 
Formally, the initial SGP consists in three legal acts: the Resolution of the 
European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, the Council Regulation No. 
1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies (entered into force on 1st July 
1998), and the Council Regulation No. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (entered into force on 1st 
January 1999). While the regulations constitute respectively the preventive and 
corrective arms of the Pact, the resolution provides the political guidelines for the 
implementation of the SGP and specifies the duties falling to the member states, 
the Commission and the Council. Similarly to the description provided by 
Langenus (2005: 68-70), our presentation of this second institutional arrangement, 
which overlaps the original Maastricht criteria, is divided into three subsections 
referring each to the above-mentioned main issues. To begin with, we describe the 
preventive mechanism (Subsection 5.2.1). Then, we expose the adjustments 
brought about the definition of the notion of excessive public deficit (Subsection 
5.2.2). Last but not least, Subsection 5.2.3 highlights the new components of the 
correction and sanction mechanisms. 
5.2.1 The preventive arm 
In order to avoid situations of excessive deficit, the SGP contains a so-called 
“preventive” mechanism. Laid down in the Council Regulation No. 1466/97, the 
latter institutional instrument provides that the participating member states 
submit, on an annual basis, individual “stability programmes”78 (Art. 3(1)), which 
consists in a sketch of the development of public finances for the forthcoming 
years. Formally, a stability programme must provide annual figures covering the 
preceding and current year, as well as the following three years (Art. 3(3)). While 
these documents are then subject to Commission’s assessment, the Council is 
ultimately in charge of controlling their content, as well as their actual 
implementation. Thereby, the stability programmes come within the framework of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 The non-participating member states must submit a slightly different document called 
“convergence programmes”, whose legal base is also the Council Regulation No. 1466/97. 
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the multilateral surveillance outlined in the Treaty (Art. 121 TFEU). Before 
looking in greater details at the surveillance procedure, the content of these 
programmes must be further studied since it introduces a key component: the 
medium-term objective for the budgetary position (MTO). 
As pointed out in introduction of the current section, one particularly important 
target of the SGP was to specify the interpretation of the 3 per cent deficit ceiling. 
Whereas the Maastricht criteria defined it as an aim per se, the SGP should 
present it as an upper limit, so as making the member states able to deal with 
economic fluctuations without breaching the tolerated threshold. The content of 
the stability programmes, prescribed in the Regulation, goes in that direction. The 
member states have indeed to set a medium-term budgetary objective, which 
should be “close to balance or in surplus”. If not achieved yet, the member state 
must describe its adjustment path towards it, as well as the expected path of its 
ratio of indebtedness79. Although the constraint seems more stringent since the 
fiscal target is, at least, approaching the balance – instead of 3 per cent of GDP – 
one must note a disturbing shortage in the definitions of both notions of “medium-
term” and of “close to balance”. In clear, such a lack of precision means that the 
member states enjoy a certain room for manoeuvre in the way they interpret the 
rule and, as developed in Chapter 4, this tends to weakens the constraint. 
The Council Regulation No. 1466/97 not only stipulates the content of the 
stability programmes, but also describes the monitoring procedure, which allows 
the control of the compliance of the member states with the rule and, if necessary, 
the correction of the misbehaviours in a timely manner. The procedure starts thus 
with the assessments of the Commission and EFC. Based on those, the Council 
particularly “examine[s] whether the medium-term budget objective in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Formally, Art. 3(2) states that the stability programmes should contain the following 
information: “(a) the medium-term objective for the budgetary position of close to balance or in 
surplus and the adjustment path towards this objective for the general government surplus/deficit 
and the expected path of the general government debt ratio; (b) the main assumptions about 
expected economic developments and important economic variables which are relevant to the 
realization of the stability programme such as government investment expenditure, real gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth, employment and inflation; (c) a description of budgetary and 
other economic policy measures being taken and/or proposed to achieve the objectives of the 
programme, and, in the case of the main budgetary measures, an assessment of their quantitative 
effects on the budget; (d) an analysis of how changes in the main economic assumptions would 
affect the budgetary and debt position”.
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stability programme provides for a safety margin to ensure the avoidance of an 
excessive deficit, whether the economic assumptions on which the programme is 
based are realistic and whether the measures being taken and/or proposed are 
sufficient to achieve the targeted adjustment path towards the medium-term 
budgetary objective” (Art. 5(1)). This examination leads, at the latest two months 
after the submission of the programme, to an opinion of the Council. Where the 
Council deems the programme unsatisfactory (for instance, because of unrealistic 
economic assumptions or insufficient policy measures), it “invite[s] the member 
state concerned to adjust its programme” (Art. 5(2)). In addition to the 
approbation of the programmes proposed by the member states, the Council also 
monitors their implementation. Assisted once again by the Commission and the 
EFC, the Council investigates the potential divergences between the budgetary 
position and the medium-term objective and, between the budgetary position and 
the adjustment path. In case of significant divergence, the Council formulates a 
recommendation to the concerned member states. Similarly to the initial 
correction procedure (Subsection 5.1.1), the Council may further make the 
recommendation public if the divergences are persisting. This mechanism, which 
does not encompass additional sanctions in case of persistent diverging MTO or 
adjustment path, is sometimes referred as the “early warning” procedure. 
5.2.2 The revised notion of excessive deficit 
As our description of the original Maastricht fiscal rule has revealed, the respect 
of the deficit and debt limit can be relaxed under certain conditions, which nor the 
TFEU, neither the surrounding legal texts, precisely define. So, a deficit ratio 
greater than 3 per cent can be tolerated as far as (1) it has “declined substantially” 
and is “close to the reference value” or (2) it is “exceptional and temporary”. 
Regarding the debt ratio, it must be “sufficiently diminishing and approaching the 
reference value at a satisfactory path” (see Subsection 5.1.1). This definitional 
looseness left ample scope for interpretation. Attempting to fulfil this deficiency, 
the Regulation No. 1467/97 specifies the definition of “exceptional and 
temporary”, which contributes to clarify the notion of “excessive deficit”. 
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Firstly, Art. 2(1) of the regulation stipulates that a public deficit, greater than 3 per 
cent of GDP, may be labelled “exceptional and temporary” when “resulting from 
an unusual event outside the control of the member state concerned and which has 
a major impact on the financial position of the general government, or when 
resulting from a severe economic downturn”. Far from removing all sources of 
potential confusion, the definition is further completed with a more detailed 
specification of the terms “temporary” and “exceptional”. Thereby, we learn that 
the excess is considered “temporary” in so far the budgetary forecasts show that 
the excess will be corrected as soon as the unusual event of the economic 
slowdown ends. Furthermore, if the excess is attributable to an “exceptional” 
economic situation, the latter should record, at least an annual fall of real GDP of 
2 per cent (Art. 2(2)). Nevertheless, the strictness of this limit is tempered by the 
following paragraph of the regulation. It indeed prescribes that the “abruptness of 
the downturn”, as well as the “accumulated loss of output relative to past trends”, 
shall be taken into account in Council’s decision (Art. 2(3)). However, according 
to the Resolution of the European Council, this escape clause can be only invoked 
in case of an annual fall of GDP of at least 0.75 per cent. In clear, the SGP 
stipulates that, in case of violation of the 3 per cent threshold, a member state 
must face an economic slowdown of at least 0.75 per cent of GDP for avoiding 
the excessive deficit procedure. 
5.2.3 The corrective arm 
As it was initially provided in the “first version” of the European fiscal constraint, 
the SGP reaffirms, in the Council Regulation No. 1467/97, the existence of a 
mechanism of correction and, ultimately, a procedure of sanction. In the context 
of the SGP, this institutional arrangement is referred as the corrective arm, 
supposed to follow the above-mentioned preventive arm, when a member state 
still records an excessive deficit. As far as the correction mechanism is concerned, 
the main contribution of the SGP lies in the setting of a clear time schedule 
regarding the successive correction steps provided in the TFEU. Whereas the 
initial Maastricht budget constraint defined the sequence, the SGP specifies its 
timing, so as to make the process leading to sanctions more automatic. Regarding 
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the sanctioning side of the corrective arm, the Regulation No. 1467/97 completes 
some of the practical holes left by the TFEU. 
Figure 5-8 illustrates graphically the process provided by the Council Regulation 
No. 1467/97 (Art. 1 to Art. 7). In accordance with the initial design of the 
European fiscal rule (see Subsection 5.1.1 and Figure 5-3), the procedure begins 
with the assessment of the excessive deficit, continues with a mechanism of 
correction, and may go until the imposition of sanctions. Although this whole 
sequence was already present in the TFEU, its exact timing remained undefined 
and, in consequence, opened to variations. Let us thus describe further this intake 
of the Pact. 
As presented in Figure 5-8, we assume that a member state records an excessive 
deficit in year n-1. Pursuant to the Regulation prescribing the reporting rules (see 
Subsection 5.1.4), the actual fiscal figures of the year n-1 have to be transmitted to 
the Commission by 1st October n80. Considering that a situation of excessive 
deficit exists, the Commission shall address an opinion, as well as a 
recommendation, to the Council. Before transferring the case, the Commission 
must wait on the opinion of the EFC. The EFC shall act within two weeks (Art. 
3(1)). At the earliest, the Council, whose role consists firstly in confirming the 
existence of the excessive deficit, starts the investigation in mid-October n and 
has three months (counted from the reporting dates) to make its decision (Art. 
3(3)). If it confirms the excessive deficit (at the latest, on 1st January), the Council 
shall simultaneously make recommendations to the concerned member state. 
From this moment, the member state must take “effective action” within four 
months at the most (Art. 3(4)). Moreover, the Council shall also establish a 
deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. The Regulation provides that 
the member state has up to one year to comply, “unless there are special 
circumstances” (Art. 3(4)). Put differently, the excessive deficit occurring in the 
fiscal year n-1 should be corrected by the end of n+1. We note however that the 
above-mentioned “special circumstances” are not specified, which involves, in 
consequence, that the one year deadline may lengthen considerably. Contrasting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 When the SGP entered into force, the actual government deficit for year n-1 had to be reported 
by the 1st September n (Art. 4(3) Council Regulation No. 3605/93). 
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with this institutional weakness, the SGP provides additional instruments 
designed to intensify the pressure on the concerned member state. Thereby, at the 
end of the four months period, the Council may decide to make its 
recommendation public, if no effective action has been undertaken. It has then 
one month to “give notice to the participating member state to take measures for 
the deficit reduction” (Art. 5). Finally, in cases where the member state still fails 
to take into consideration the successive decisions of the Council, the latter may 
decide, within two months, to impose sanctions (Art. 6). So, as summarized by 
Art. 7 of the regulation, the non-mitigation of excessive deficit leads to sanctions 
within ten months following the reporting date. Taking strictly into account the 
provisions of the SGP, we understand that a member state, who breaches the fiscal 
rule in fiscal year n-1 and ignores the successive decisions of the Council, risks to 
face sanctions in August n+1. Note however that the whole procedure may be 
held in abeyance (for an undetermined period of time) if (1) the concerned 
member state acts in compliance with the initial Council’s recommendation or if 
(2) it implements the measures dictated by the Council (Art. 9(1)). 
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Figure 5-8: Time schedule of the correction mechanism. 
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Besides setting the time schedule leading to correction mechanism, the SGP, in 
the same regulation, specifies the modalities of implementation of the arsenal of 
sanctions prescribed in the founding Treaty. Whereas the TFEU only provides the 
exhaustive list of the sanctioning measures that the Council may apply (see Art. 
126(11) TFEU and Subsection 5.1.1), the Council Regulation No. 1467/97 defines 
the implementation order. To begin with, the Regulation stipulates that the 
sanction consisting in a non-interest-bearing deposit shall be required, as a rule. 
From this point, the Council may freely add to this measure any of the other 
possible sanctions, except from the imposition of fines (Art. 11). Concretely, the 
member state can potentially be constraint to publish additional information 
before issuing bonds and securities and/or see the European Investment Bank 
reconsider its lending policy towards it.  
Finally, the Regulation lays down the rule defining the size of the non-
remunerated deposits when it results from non-compliance with the deficit 
criterion. The amount is the sum of a fixed and variable component. The fixed 
part shall correspond to 0.2 per cent of GDP. The variable one is equal to “one 
tenth of the difference between the deficit as percentage of GDP in the preceding 
year and the reference value of 3 per cent of GDP” (Art. 12(1)). For instance, if a 
member states records a deficit-to-GDP ratio of 4 per cent, the variable 
component would amount to 0.1 per cent of GDP (1/10 of 1 per cent). Each 
following year, the Council may intensify the “pressure” by imposing the 
payment of additional deposits. Those are calculated according to the rule of the 
variable component (Art. 12(2)). However, any single deposit cannot exceed 0.5 
per cent of GDP (Art. 12(3)). After two years, the Council shall decide to convert 
the deposit into a non-refundable fine (Art. 13), which shall be redistributed 
among the participating member states according to an allocation key defined in 
Art. 16. 
5.3 The revised Stability and Growth Pact 
A deep understanding of any institutional arrangement requires often placing its 
evolution into its context. The European construction and, more particularly, its 
instrument of fiscal discipline, are no exception. Thereby, it is meaningful to 
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recall that the initial budget constraint, laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, was 
designed in a purpose of fiscal convergence, while the introduction of the SGP 
accompanied the entrance into force of the monetary union. Similarly, the context 
in which the 2005 reform of the SGP took place is not only worth to have in mind, 
but also contributes to explain the rationale behind its content. 
Only a few years after its full implementation in 1999, the initial SGP started to 
be vehemently questioned. In parallel with the critics addressed by academic 
researchers81, several factors and events affected seriously the credibility of the 
Pact and led to its revision in 200582. Leaving aside for now the institutional 
shortages inherent to the initial SGP, we note that it is the combination of two 
phenomena that precipitated the original SGP to its failure, i.e. to its reform. On 
the one hand, it appeared that, soon after the introduction of the single currency, 
fiscal discipline was widely loosened. Looking at the evolution of the deficit-to-
GDP ratios of the member states, we notice indeed that, while the budgetary 
positions had improved considerably during the convergence stage (1992-1997), 
the fiscal behaviours within the EMU changed significantly in the following years 
(Schuknecht et al., 2011: 10). Given that, between 1997 and 2000, “more than 
half of the deficit reduction […] is attributable to the favourable economic 
environment” (Langenus, 2005: 72), Figure 5-9 illustrates the relaxation of the 
fiscal policies only partially. However, since 2001, when the economic cycle 
turned, the deterioration of fiscal balances became obvious. In 2003, the average 
deficit-to-GDP ratio in the euro area-12 (EA-12) reached a higher level than in 
1997. In consequence, the progress towards sound public finances, made between 
1992 and 1997, was not only dangerously compromised, but also turned out to be 
insufficient in the preceding high-growth years (Diebalek et al., 2006: 79). In 
passing, it is worth noting that the introduction of the SGP, which was supposed 
to strengthen the European fiscal rule, was nonetheless marked by a significant 
relaxation of the fiscal discipline. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 The scepticism of the academic world about the SPG actually dates back from the very entrance 
into force of the Pact. See for instance, Buti et al. (1998), Buti et al. (2003), Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz (1998) or Herzog (2004). 
82 Langenus (2005) emphasises four factors explaining the lack of success of the SGP: (1) a hiatus 
in the regulatory framework, (2) over-optimistic economic growth expectations, (3) the non-
compelling corrective arm and (4) the existence of assessment difficulties. 
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Figure 5-9: Average deficit-to-GDP ratio of euro area-12. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from data presented in Appendix C. 
Directly related to the above-mentioned evolution, the second phenomenon, 
which forced the European Commission to formulate a reform proposal in 2004, 
concerned the ineffectiveness of the corrective arm of the SPG. In fact, the 
economic turmoil that occurred in Europe at the turn of the century had soon an 
impact on the public deficits of the EMU participants and constituted a first 
delicate implementation test for the Pact. Since 2001 already, several countries 
breached indeed the reference value of 3 per cent. Among those, we find not only 
Greece and Portugal, but also Germany, France and Italy, the three largest EU 
economies in terms of GDP. Following strictly the provisions laid down in the 
Pact, these fiscal situations should have triggered the opening of excessive deficit 
procedures, leading potentially to imposing sanctions according to the time 
schedule presented in Figure 5-8. However, despite the initial will of the SGP 
designers to increase the automatic triggering of the sanction mechanism, one 
must realise that the formal decisions remained de facto in the hands of the 
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take the decisions, which would secure the support of their colleagues if 
necessary. Unfortunately for the credibility of the rule, the existence of these 
political incentives was quickly confirmed by several decisions of the Council that 
ignored the Commission’s recommendations. For instance, in February 2002, 
contrasting with Commission’s recommendation, the Council decided not to 
address any early warning to Germany and Portugal. Worst, in November 2003, 
while the Commission recommended moving to the next steps of the EDP for 
France and Germany by giving them notice to take measures, the Council failed 
again to act accordingly (Langenus, 2003: 76). Confronted with the clear 
unwillingness of the Council and some member states to implement properly the 
Pact, the Commission initiated the first revision of the SGP83. 
In short, this contextual sketching shows that, whereas the introduction of the 
initial SGP found its justification in the desire of guaranteeing fiscal discipline, 
the revised version of these Council Regulations has been mostly driven by purely 
political concerns. Indeed, under the pressure of some member states, in particular 
Germany and France, who considered that the SGP was lacking of flexibility and, 
for this reason, appeared to be unenforceable, the two Council Regulations were 
amended. 
Given that the latter amendment constitutes only an intermediary step in the 
evolution of the European fiscal constraint (the two legal text are further amended 
in 2011 with the implementation of the “Six-Pack”), we simply highlight the main 
features of this “new” Pact, without entering into greater details. Table 5-3 gives 
thus an overview of the key modifications introduced by the 2005 reform84. 
Generally speaking, we note that the reform tends to relax the fiscal rule under 
many aspects. The more flexible definition of the MTOs, the introduction of 
additional loopholes in the procedure, the absence of greater incentives for 
improving the enforceability, or the general extension of the deadlines contribute 
to make the fiscal constraint softer. Observing in retrospect this “step backward” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Diebalek et al. (2006: 79) points out that the conflict over the correct interpretation and 
implementation of the SGP opposed, not only the Commission to the Council (the EMU member 
states), but also the member states themselves, where the small countries had a stricter 
interpretation of fiscal discipline than large ones. 
84 Formally, the 2005 amendment consists in only one insertion (Art. 2a) and four modifications of 
previously existing articles (Art. 3(2), Art. 5, Art. 7(2), Art. 9). 
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in the achievement of fiscal discipline, Schuknecht et al. (2011: 10) characterize 
the first nine years of the euro (1999-2007) “as “wasted good times” during which 
the foundations were laid for the present crisis in EMU”. 
Table 5-3: Main changes brought by the first reform in 2005. 
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5.4 The “Six-Pack” 
Entered into force on 13th December 2011, the latest reform of the SGP, referred 
to as the “Six-Pack”, must be inserted in the context of the global financial crisis 
and the severe worldwide economic recession that has followed. 
Confronted, from September 2008, to the increasing liquidity problems incurred 
by their financial institutions, many governments, among them the Eurozone 
member states, had to take measures to ensure the stability of the financial sector, 
in a first step, and to support the economic activity, in a second step85. These 
several public emergency interventions, designed to mitigate the impact of the 
crisis and its propagation, came however at a considerable fiscal price. Summed 
with the fiscal consequences of the profound economic downturn, public finances 
suffered from a significant deterioration. In the euro area (EA-17), between 2007 
and 2010, the average deficit-to-GDP ratio increased by 5.5 percentage points. In 
same time period, the average debt-to-GDP ratio increased by 19.4 percentage 
points (Table 5-4). 
Table 5-4: The public deficit and debt ratios in the euro area, 2006-2011. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from data presented in Appendices C and D. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 For a deeper analysis of the range of measures adopted since 2008 by the governments, see 
Attinasi (2010: 12-21), who examines how the Euro area countries responded to the financial 
crisis, and Afonso et al. (2010: 22-34), who concentrate on the fiscal response to the economic 
crisis that followed. 
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Moreover, one must note that, apart from Estonia, Luxembourg and Finland, 
whose deficit ratios remained below the reference value, all other member states 
breached the threshold of 3 per cent. Besides showing the limit of the European 
mechanism of fiscal surveillance, this observation denotes clearly that “many euro 
area countries have exploited the maximum degree of flexibility offered by the 
Stability and Growth Pact in designing their national responses to the economic 
crisis and allowing for higher budget deficits” (van Riet, 2010: 9). In other words, 
this implies that “the agreed increase in deficits above the reference value 
represented a de facto suspension of the requirements laid down in the SGP” 
(Schuknecht et al., 2011: 12). In addition to the failure of the preventive arm of 
the SGP, the euro area general fiscal stance raised serious concerns regarding its 
long-term sustainability86. 
Aware of the malfunctioning of its fiscal discipline instrument, as well as of the 
risks related to the debt dynamics, the EU initiated, in March 2010, a process of 
reforms, whose first achievement consists in the implementation of the Six-Pack 
(Catania, 2011: 1). As its name suggests, this institutional arrangement is formed 
by six legislative acts: five Regulations and one Directive. Schematically, the 
institutional scope of the Six-Pack is quadruple. Firstly, the Six-Pack, succeeding 
to the 2005 reform, constitutes the third amendment of the SGP and endows the 
latter with a detailed system of sanction intended especially for the Eurogroup 
member states. Secondly, it introduces a set of rules for the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances. Thirdly, the Six-Pack, in its Directive, 
makes a first move towards a standardisation of the national fiscal frameworks 
and constraints. Last but not least, it marks the establishment of the EU policy-
making calendar, the so-called “European Semester”. 
Before looking closer at these several legal bases, on must highlight two major 
procedural reforms, which are omnipresent in all provisions implemented by the 
Six-Pack: the introduction of the reversed qualified majority as voting rule, and 
the greater implication of the European Parliament in the several procedures, 
referred to as the “economic dialogue”. As far as the reinforcement of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See for instance Attinasi et al. (2010). 
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cooperation between the European institutions is concerned, each Regulation of 
the Six-Pack contains one article dedicated to the issue87. Each of these articles 
are formulated in the following manner: 
In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions of the Union, in 
particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to 
ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the 
European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission 
and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President 
of the Eurogroup to appear before the committee to discuss decisions taken. 
The objects of these discussions are further specified in each Regulation but 
encompass all fundamental adoptions of positions, from the imposition of any 
type of sanctions, to the decisions taken in the framework of the mutual 
surveillance or the correction of macroeconomic imbalances. 
Since it changes deeply the way the Council approves (or rejects) the 
recommendations of the Commission, the new voting rule provided, under certain 
circumstances, by the Six-Pack, deserves also some additional explanations. 
Concerning mainly the decisions dealing with the imposition of sanctions, the 
system of “reversed qualified majority” has been imagined in order to increase the 
automaticity of the sanction and warning mechanisms. Whereas the Council used 
to decide, by the qualified majority whether to accept of not a Commission’ 
recommendation (see Subsection 5.1.1), the decisions are now deemed to be 
adopted by the Council, unless it decides, by a qualified majority, to reject the 
latter88. In addition, where the reversed qualified majority is not explicitly 
required, the Six-Pack specifies that the Council is expected, as a rule, to follow 
the Commission’s recommendations. Otherwise, the Council should expose 
publicly its diverging position (Art. 2-ab(2) Regulation No. 1175/2011 and Art. 
2a(1) Regulation No. 1177/2011). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Art. 3 in Regulation No. 1173/2011; Art. 6 Regulation No. 1174/2011; Art. 2-ab Regulation No. 
1175/2011; Art. 14 Regulation No. 1176/2011, and Art. 2a Regulation No. 1177/2011. 
88 As it was already the case before the introduction of the Six-Pack, the Council acts on measures 
of sanction without taking into account the vote of the concerned member state. 
 	  
123	  
Keeping in mind these two general reforms, let us develop in greater details the 
concrete content of the Six-Pack and point out the new features introduced by this 
set of legal acts. 
5.4.1 The European Semester 
Contrary to the other changes brought by the Six-Pack, the legal basis of the 
European Semester is not laid down in a distinct legal act, but is rather included in 
the Regulation No. 1175/2011 mainly dedicated to the fiscal preventive arm. Its 
role in the European set of fiscal instrument is not less relevant, since it marks the 
beginning of a EU fiscal policy-making calendar, which aims at introducing an ex 
ante control over member states’ macroeconomic situation, programmes of 
reforms and, stability and convergence programmes. 
Launched for the first time in January 2011 (before the adoption of the Six-Pack), 
The European Semester ran initially in the framework of the Europe 2020 
strategy. It consists in a cycle of economic governance, which shall include (Art. 
2-a(2)): 
- Board economic guidelines formulated by the Council, on a recommendation 
of the Commission; 
- Employment guidelines, formulated by the Council; 
- Member states’ Stability (or Convergence) Programmes; 
- Member states’ National Reform Programmes (NRPs) 
- Commission’s Alert mechanism report (see Subsection 5.4.3). 
Further defined in 2013 within “Two-Pack” reform and the introduction of 
budgetary timeline, the detailed schedule of the European Semester is presented in 
Section 5.5. 
5.4.2 The last formal reform of the SGP 
The second institutional aspect of the Six-Pack consists formally in a new reform 
of the SGP. Succeeding to the controversial 2005 amendment (see Section 5.3), 
the Six-Pack introduces a third version of both Council Regulations forming the 
Pact. The Regulation on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies is thus 
amended by Regulation No. 1175/2011, while the Regulation on speeding up and 
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clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure is replaced by 
Regulation No. 1177/2011. In addition to those acts, the 2011 reform adds another 
legal base to the institutional arrangement, which is directly related to the 
functioning of the SGP, but applied exclusively to member states whose currency 
is the euro. It is named: Regulation No. 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of 
budgetary surveillance in the euro area. The content of this new Regulation is 
especially interesting, since it specifies the sanctions to be imposed, not only in 
the context of the corrective arm, but also in the framework of the preventive arm, 
as well as in case of manipulation of statistics. 
The preventive arm 
To begin with, we focus on the preventive arm and concentrate our attention on 
the new characteristics brought by the Six-Pack to this instrument. 
Fundamentally, the fiscal preventive procedure described in the Six-Pack remains 
close to its old form. It consists indeed in the annual submission of “stability 
programmes” by the participating member states89 (due now not latter than 30th 
April). This documents, whose content shall cover a period of five years (the 
preceding and current years and the following three ones), serves at setting a 
country-specific medium-term objective (MTO) (revised every three years, 
instead of four previously) as well as, at defining an adjustment path towards the 
latter. Subject first to an external assessment, the programmes shall be then 
implemented. The implementation is finally monitored in order to identify the 
potential divergence of the budgetary positions from the MTO, or the adjustment 
path. 
Although the outline of the procedure is maintained, Regulation No. 1175/2011, 
combined with the provisions dedicated to the preventive arm and mentioned in 
Regulation No. 1173/2011, introduces interesting new features tending to improve 
to effectiveness of the instrument. 
First of all, the updated preventive mechanism comes now within the above-
mentioned European Semester, a larger framework of economic policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The non-participating member states shall submit “convergence programmes”. For a matter of 
simplicity, and since our interest lies on the fiscal constraint in force within the euro area, we 
analyse more particularly the rights and duties falling to the participating member states. 
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coordination. Besides, looking more precisely at the preventive arm described in 
Regulation No. 1175/2011, we note several changes regarding not only the 
content of the stability programmes, but also the assessment and monitoring 
procedure.  
Paragraphs 2 to 4 of the third article specify the required content of the stability 
programme that each participating member state shall submit to the Council and 
the Commission. While the MTO, its adjustment path and the expected path of the 
general government debt ratio had to be mentioned in the initial version, the last 
reform requires further elements such as the expenditure and revenue figures (the 
planned growth path of government expenditure and, of revenue at unchanged 
policy), information about public implicit liabilities (liabilities related to ageing, 
public guarantees) and data showing the consistency of the presented programme 
with the EU economic guidelines and the national reform plan. Regarding the 
above-mentioned content, the regulation stresses finally that these country-
specific programmes shall be based on the “most likely macrofiscal scenario or on 
a more prudent scenario”. In principle, the Commission forecasts serve as a 
benchmark.  
Largely amended in its 2011 version, Art. 5 defines the rules and the criteria, 
which allow the assessment of the stability programmes by the Commission, the 
EFC and, ultimately the Council. Whereas the former requirements remain 
(plausible economic assumptions, coherence between the measures being 
proposed and the adjustment path towards the MTO, an annual improvement of 
the budget balance of 0.5 per cent of GDP, etc.), the Six-Pack tends to give more 
weight to the indebtedness criteria, almost completely neglected in practice 
before. More than just stipulating that the path of debt-to-GDP must be more 
seriously considered in the assessment, the Regulation establishes a differentiated 
treatment in the requirement minimum annual fiscal improvement. It imposes 
indeed to member states, which breach the tolerated threshold of the debt ratio, to 
make greater fiscal efforts. In fact, their annual improvement of budget balance 
should be higher than 0.5 per cent of GDP. 
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Moreover, the progress towards the budgetary MTO is now subject to an 
additional criterion: the growth path of government expenditure (excluding 
interest expenditure and non-discretionary changes in unemployment benefit 
expenditure), put into perspective with the planed evolution of the revenue side. 
In order to be deemed satisfactory, the national stability programmes shall present 
expenditure and revenue figures that respect certain conditions. Those further 
depend on whether the member state has already achieved its MTO or not. If it is 
the case, the condition is the following:  
Annual expenditure growth does not exceed a reference medium term rate of 
potential GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary revenue 
measures. 
In contrast, for member states having not reached their MTO: 
Annual expenditure growth does not exceed a rate below a reference medium-
term rate of potential GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary 
revenue measures. The size of the shortfall of the growth rate of government 
expenditure compared to a reference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth 
is set in such a way as to ensure an appropriate adjustment towards the medium-
term budgetary objective. 
In addition, for these same member states:  
Discretionary reductions of government revenue items are matched either by 
expenditure reductions or by discretionary increases in other government revenue 
items or both. 
Considering this whole set of criteria, the Council, based on a recommendation of 
the Commission, may address an opinion to the member state presenting an 
unsatisfactory stability programme. As it was already the case before the Six-
Pack, no additional arrangement is provided to the assessment procedure of the 
country-specific stability programmes. Figure 5-10 summarizes this first sequence 
of the preventive arm. 
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Figure 5-10: The preventive arm to this day (1/2). 
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After the assessment of the three-year programmes, the Council and the 
Commission shall monitor their implementation. They shall pay a particular 
attention at the identification of actual or expected “significant” deviation of the 
budgetary situation from the MTO and the planed adjustment path towards it (Art. 
6(1)). Para. 3 specifies now the sense to be given to the term “significant” – nor 
the original SGP, neither the 2005 reform did it before. It defines thus that a 
deviation from the MTO or the appropriate adjustment path may be labelled 
“significant” on the basis of two criteria:  
- For the member states having yet not achieved their MTO, the deviation in 
budget balance is considered significant if it represents at least 0.5 percent of 
GDP in a single year or at least 0.25 per cent of GDP on average per year in 
two consecutive years. 
- Unless the member states concerned has “overachieved” its MTO, a 
divergence in the expenditure developments (net of discretionary revenue 
measures) that affects the budget balance of at least 0.5 per cent of GDP, or 
cumulatively in two consecutive years, is to be considered as significant. 
As it is usually the case, a significant deviation may be ignored if resulting from 
an “unusual event outside the control of the member state concerned”. 
Once the Commission has detected a significant deviation in the stability 
programme of a member state, a new procedure of correction is triggered. 
Whereas the old mechanism consisted only in a Council’s warning and, at worst, a 
eventual public recommendation addressed to the concerned member state, the 
Six-Pack sets a procedure, which involves clearer deadlines, more automaticity in 
the decision-making and, on the basis of Regulation 1173/2011, the imposition of 
financial sanction.  
The process, which should prevent the occurrence of excessive deficit within the 
euro area, starts with a warning of the Commission addressed to the concerned 
member state. One month from the adoption of the warning, the Council 
formulates a Recommendation with the necessary policy measures to be 
implemented. This document, based of Commission’s proposal, also sets a 
deadline for correcting the deviation (three months, in the most serious cases, 
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maximum five otherwise). If recommended by the Commission, the Council may 
make its recommendation public. Where the Commission observes that, after the 
end of the deadline, the member state failed to take concrete action, it must advise 
the Council to adopt a decision confirming the lack of response to the initial 
recommendation. In a first step, the decision requires to be adopted by the 
Council, by a qualified majority. However, in a second step, if the Council did not 
adopt the decision (which is, by experience, quite likely) and the member state did 
not take any effective action, the Commission (one month after its last 
recommendation) should recommend again the council to adopt the decision. The 
Council, now, automatically adopts the decision, unless a simple majority rejects 
the Commission’s recommendation (which is less likely to happen). In 
consequence, the adoption of the decision is made more automatic, i.e. less 
dependent on political considerations.  
As said before, the Six-Pack endows the preventive arm of the SGP with a proper 
sanction mechanism, which is triggered by the above-mentioned Council’s 
decision. Described in Art. 4 of the Regulation No. 1173/2011, the sanction, 
imposed to a member state that has failed to take the recommended action, 
consists in an interest-bearing deposit of, at most, 0.2 per cent of its GDP in the 
preceding year. Formally, the sanction has to be decided by the Council but is 
considered as adopted as far as it is not rejected by a qualified majority (Art. 
4(2)). The deposit with the interest shall be returned to the member state when the 
significant deviation from the MTO or its adjustment path no longer exists (Art. 
4(6)). Figure 5-11 presents the second part of the preventive, going from the 
monitoring to the potential imposition of sanction. 
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Figure 5-11: The preventive arm to this day (2/2). 
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The corrective arm 
As far as the evolution of the corrective arm is now concerned, the amendment 
brought by the Six-Pack, laid down in Regulation No. 1177/201190 as well as 
Regulation No. 1173/2011, is, generally speaking, twofold. On the one hand, 
similarly to the preventive arm, the corrective mechanism restores the debt 
criterion by giving it more weight in the procedure. On the other hand, the reform 
calls for an earlier implementation of the sanctions (at least for the participating 
member states), as well as for a smaller room for manoeuvre in the choice of the 
penalties to be imposed. In consequence, one must emphasise that, as it was for 
the preventive arm, the structure of the corrective arm of the European fiscal 
constraint remains mainly unchanged and, for its part, still leans on the procedure 
originally described in Art. 126 TFEU (see Subsection 5.1.1). Thereby, the input 
of the Six-Pack to the correction process of the excessive deficits consists only in 
an update of the enforcement rules. 
Looking at the Regulation No. 1177/2011 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure and focusing on its new features 
(apart from the above-mentioned elements, which are common to each legal text 
of the Six-Pack), we notice first the introduction of the definition of the phrase 
“sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory 
path”, stipulated in Art. 126(2) TFEU and concerning the indebtedness measure. 
Unclearly defined until now, we remember that this characteristic of the debt-to-
GDP ratio may justify a breaching in the threshold and, in consequence, allows 
avoiding the opening of a procedure of excessive deficit. For instance, in 1998, 
Belgium, whose level of public indebtedness amply overpassed the reference 
value, obviously put forward this argument in order to participate in the euro area. 
Nevertheless, nor the required adjustment path of the public debt, neither the 
necessary proximity to the reference value, was formally specified. From that, one 
may deduce that this phrase was de facto subject to Council’s interpretation. The 
insertion of Art. 2(1a) in the corrective arm contributes to clarify the situation. 
Henceforth, a debt-to-GDP ratio, which exceeds 60 per cent of GDP, may be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Regulation No. 1177/2011 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deficit procedure amends Regulation No. 1467/97 and, the more recent Regulation No. 1056/2005. 
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labelled as “sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a 
satisfactory path” as far as the differential with the reference value decreases at 
an annual average rate (over three years) of 5 per cent, as a benchmark. 
Furthermore, the condition should be considered as fulfilled if the benchmark is 
respected when taking into account the average rate obtained with the last fiscal 
year, for which data are available, and the two following budgeted years. Finally, 
the same article specifies that “the influence of the cycle on the pace of debt 
reduction” should be taken into account. 
Neglecting the influence of the economic cycle, Table 5-5 illustrates the result of 
the implementation of this new provision. Calculating the annual average growth 
rate of the Belgian public debt91 on the basis of the finalized fiscal figures 
(penultimate line), we observer that, between 2000 and 2008, the level of 
indebtedness should have been considered as excessive in 2001, 2002 and, more 
recently in 2008, in the sense of this criteria92. 
Table 5-5: Sample of the annual average growth rates of the Belgian Debt. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from data presented in Appendix D. 
Apart from the introduction of a benchmark for the level of public indebtedness, 
the Regulation No. 1177/2011 also updates the list of the “relevant factors”, 
which the Commission has to take into account when reporting the non-
compliance with the public finance criteria (Art. 126(3) TFEU). Since 2011, those 
factors encompass figures of the developments in the medium-term economic 
position (potential growth, cyclical development, private sector net savings 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Since the exact method of calculation is not provided, the annual average growth rate has been 
computed according to the following formula at the initiative of the author: 
€ 
Differentialn
Differentialn−3
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
13
−1 
92 Between 1995 and 2000, the condition was strictly fulfilled in 1998 only. 
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position), elements of the developments in the medium-term budgetary positions 
(the adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary objective, the level of the 
primary balance and developments in primary expenditure, the implementation of 
policies in the context of the prevention and correction of excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances, etc.) and the developments in the medium-term 
government debt position (the debt dynamics and sustainability, stock-flow 
adjustment, accumulated reserves, other financial assets, guarantees, in particular 
those linked with the financial sector, any implicit liabilities related to ageing and 
private debt). 
Now, the use of those factors is further subject to some conditions and their 
purpose is defined more precisely. Firstly, Art. 2(3) specifies that they should be 
deemed relevant “in so far they significantly affect the assessment of compliance 
with the deficit and debt criteria by the member state concerned”. Secondly, Art. 
2(4) prescribes that, when assessing the compliance with the deficit criterion of 
the member states, whose debt ratio exceeds 60 per cent, the factors should be 
taken into account only if the deficit “remains close to the reference value and its 
excess over the reference value is temporary”. As far as the assessment of the debt 
ratio is concerned, the above-mentioned factors should be taken into account 
without restriction. Finally, if the Council confirms the existence of an excessive 
deficit, Art. 2(6) stipulates that the Commission and the Council, in their 
subsequent actions provided by the procedure of correction, should take into 
account these factors, particularly in establishing the deadlines imposed to the 
member state for taking effective action and for correcting the situation. In 
contrast, the abrogation of the measures, designed to encourage the concerned 
member state to mitigate its excessive deficit (Art. 126(6) to (9) and (11) TFEU), 
should not be decided on the basis of the relevant factors. 
In addition to these new provisions regarding the principles of assessment, the 
procedure itself is slightly amended, not only by the several articles of Section 2 
of the Regulation No. 1177/2011, but also by the Regulation No. 1173/2011, 
which implements sanctions earlier in the procedure. Figure 5-12 integrates these 
modifications and gives an overview of the complete corrective arm procedure 
provided to this day. 
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Figure 5-12: The corrective arm to this day. 
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Comparing Figure 5-12 with Figure 5-8, which describes the original corrective 
mechanism of the SGP, we note several differences. In addition to the general 
extension of the deadlines, which were introduced by the 2005 reform and are 
maintained, the Six-Pack calls indeed for a greater involvement of the European 
Parliament and the European Council (the heads of state of government of each 
member state): both Union’s institutions being informed by the Council and the 
Commission about the advancement of the procedure. Probably more striking is 
however the implementation of special provisions addressed exclusively to the 
Eurozone member states. In a first step, a participating member state, whose non-
compliance with the criteria is confirmed by the Council, may now incur a 
sanction following directly the latter Council’s decision. Decided by the Council 
by a reversed qualified majority, this first sanction takes the form of non-interest-
bearing deposit of a maximal amount of 0.2 per cent of the preceding year GDP. 
Then, if the concerned member state did not take any effective action in order to 
correct its excessive deficit within four months, the Council, besides making 
public its initial recommendations, may now harden the sanction by converting 
the non-interest-bearing deposit into a fine. This decision is also made by a 
reversed qualified majority. 
Not directly related to the corrective arm, one must however note that the Six-
Pack, in Art. 8 of Regulation No. 1173/2011, finally provides new sanctions 
against the manipulation of statistics. In such cases, the Council, based on a 
recommendation of the Commission, may impose a fine of, at most, 0.2 per cent 
of GDP. 
5.4.3 Provisions against macroeconomic imbalances 
Contrary to the above-mentioned Regulations amending the SGP, the two legal 
bases concerning the detection and the correction of excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances constitute an additional instrument, which operates in parallel to the 
European fiscal constraint. Since this so-called macroeconomic imbalance 
procedure (MIP) is not directly related to the Maastricht fiscal criteria and their 
implementation, we wish to simply present the main principles and components of 
this “overlapping” new mechanism, without entering into its details. 
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To begin with, a good understanding of the MIP requires investigating the 
Regulation No. 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances, which applies to all EU member states. Figure 5-13 sketches the 
institutional design of this regulation, which is articulated into four steps, which 
are potentially triggered one after the other according to the result of the 
preceding one. 
The surveillance mechanism starts thus with the Commission’s annual “Alert 
Mechanism Report” (Art. 3). On the basis of a scoreboard, which consists in a set 
of macroeconomic and macrofinancial indicators chosen by the Commission93 
(Art. 4), this report serves as a filter allowing the identification of member states 
recording an alarming or suspicious macroeconomic development, and requiring, 
therefore, a deeper analysis. These so-called “in-depth reviews” provide thus a 
detailed analysis of the country-specific circumstances, in which existing or 
potential imbalances have been previously detected. By doing so, the Commission 
may evaluate the gravity of the issue. Where it estimates that the macroeconomic 
imbalance does not “jeopardise or risks jeopardising the proper functioning of the 
economic and monetary union” (Art. 2), the Commission only recommends the 
Council to “address the necessary recommendations to the member state 
concerned” (Art. 6(1)). The Council reviews its recommendation annually. This 
“branch” of the procedure is referred to as the “preventive action”. In contrast, if 
the imbalance is considered as excessive, i.e. it may endanger the EMU as a 
whole, the “Excessive Imbalance Procedure” – the corrective arm of the MIP – is 
triggered (Art. 7). In the latter case, the member state concerned has to define a 
corrective action plan and submit it to the Council and the Commission (Art. 
8(1)). After being assessed and deemed sufficient by the Council, the Commission 
monitors the implementation of the plan (Art. 9). Later, based on Commission’s 
report, the Council assesses whether the member state has stuck to the plan. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 In the 2012 Alert Mechanism Report (European Commission, 2012b: 3), the Commission 
defined ten indicators: the current account balance, the net international investment position, the 
real effective exchange rate, the export market shares, the nominal unit labour cost, the deflated 
house prices, the private sector credit flow, the private sector debt, the general government debt, 
the unemployment rate. Additionally, for each of the latter, indicative thresholds are specified. 
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Figure 5-13: The macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP). 
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For the eurozone countries, the enforcement of the mechanism is reinforced by the 
provision of potential sanctions, which are defined in another legal text: 
Regulation No. 1174/2011 on enforcement measures to correct macroeconomic 
imbalances in the euro area. Thereby, an interest-bearing deposit of at most 0.1 
per cent of GDP (voted by reversed qualified majority) is imposed by the Council, 
when the latter establishes that the corrective action plan has not been adequately 
followed (Art. 3(1)). Moreover, annual fines of the same maximal amount may be 
addressed to a member state if it has either submitted two successive insufficient 
corrective action plans (Art. 3(2a)), or it remains in situation of non-compliance 
regarding the implementation of the plan. In the latter case, the interest-bearing 
deposit is converted into a fine (Art. 3(2b)). 
5.4.4 Towards the standardisation of the national fiscal framework 
The Six-Pack encompasses one more legal document, which needs to be 
presented: Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of 
the member states. Contrasting with the others, this EU document is of a different 
nature, which implies slightly different modalities of implementation. In fact, as 
defined in Art. 288 TFEU, a Directive “shall be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each member states to which it is addressed, but shall leave 
national authorities the choice of form and methods”. Concretely, this implies that 
the member states have a certain period of time at their disposal for bringing into 
force the provisions necessary to comply with the Directive in their respective 
national legislation. So, in the present case, Directive 2011/85/EU entered into 
force in December 2011 (like the other legislative acts of the Six-Pack), but 
should be translated into national laws by 31st December 2013 (Art. 15(1)). 
Having in mind this practical consideration, let us have a look at the content of 
this Directive, which constitutes an important development towards a greater 
standardisation in the national budgetary frameworks (Catania, 2011: 4). 
With the implementation of this Directive, the European fiscal discipline 
instrument defines, for the first time, “detailed rules concerning the characteristics 
of the budgetary frameworks of the member states” (Art. 1). For the purposes of 
 	  
139	  
the Directive, the term “budgetary framework” is taken in its large sense and 
covers particularly (Art. 2): 
- the systems of budgetary accounting and statistical reporting, 
- the rules and procedures governing the preparation of forecasts for 
budgetary planning, 
- the country-specific numerical fiscal rules (expressed in terms of a summary 
indication of budgetary performance), 
- the budgetary procedures comprising procedural rules to underpin the 
budget process at all stages, 
- the medium-term budgetary frameworks, 
- the arrangement for independent monitoring and analysis, 
- the mechanisms and rules that regulate fiscal relationships between public 
authorities across sub-sectors of general government. 
Before even investigating the exact degree of standardisation desired by the 
Directive, one must note that the above-mentioned list of fields concerned by this 
national methodological “reconciliation”, itself, translates an unprecedented will 
for a greater fiscal unification. Quoting Catania (2011: 7), “the member states are 
not willing to go for a full fiscal union, but we are now closer than ever to this 
stage”. 
In order to present more precisely, and in a comprehensible way, the content of 
this Directive, we divide the description into the several chapters forming this 
legal act. Accordingly, we shortly expose the provisions of the Directive 
concerning (1) the accounting and statistics, (2) the forecasts, (3) the numerical 
fiscal rules and, (4) the medium-term budgetary frameworks. Covering all those 
fields, Art. 12 to 14 specify that all new provisions should be consistent across all 
sub-sectors of public sector (as defined by the ESA 95) and implemented through 
“appropriate mechanisms of coordination”.  
Firstly, Art. 3 imposes the member states to implement, for all sub-sectors of 
general government, national systems of public accounting consistent with the 
standards described by the ESA 95. Theses systems must furthermore be subject 
to internal control, as well as independent audit (Art. 3(1)). The second paragraph 
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of the same article also impresses the member states to publish not only cash-
based fiscal data (monthly for the central government, state governments, social 
security and quarterly for the local governments), but also a so-called 
reconciliation table explaining the transition between cash-based data and data 
based on the ESA 95 (Art. 3(2)). 
Secondly, Art. 4 of the Directive calls for more transparency and realism in the 
member states’ forecasts. The article starts by reiterating the need for member 
states to ensure that national fiscal planning relies on “realistic macroeconomic 
and budgetary forecasts using the most up-to-date information”. Moreover, it 
states that the budgetary planning should be built on the most likely, or more 
prudent, macrofiscal scenario (Art. 4(1)). On the transparency side, Art. 4(5) 
stipulates that the member states should determine which national institution is in 
charge of producing such forecasts and make public “the official macroeconomic 
and budgetary forecasts prepared for fiscal planning, including the methodologies, 
assumptions and relevant parameters underpinning those forecasts”. Besides, 
these forecasts are regularly subject to ex post assessments, so that, in case of 
persistent divergences with the reality, the member state concerned may adapt its 
methods (Art. 4(6)). The directive finally calls for more regular publications of 
the member states’ debt and deficit levels. It makes thus the Commission – via 
Eurostat – responsible for publishing these national figures every three months 
(Art. 4(7)). 
Thirdly, the Directive builds a first “bridge” between the European fiscal 
constraint, set at the Union’s level, and the national instruments of fiscal 
discipline (see the link between the upper and bottom part of Figure 5-2). From 
this viewpoint, Art. 5 constitutes indeed a interesting advancement towards a 
closer connection between the supranational constraint and its transposition into 
national legislations. Concretely, the Directive demands that each member state 
(except the United Kingdom (Art. 8)) puts in place “numerical fiscal rules” 
promoting compliance with the budgetary provision of the TFEU, i.e. the debt and 
deficit reference values, as well as the MTO. Without specifying in details the 
exact form to be taken by these rules, the Directive sets however some minimal 
requirements. Thereby, the national numerical fiscal rules should contain: “the 
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target definition and scope of the rules, the effective and timely monitoring of 
compliance with the rules, based on reliable and independent analysis and carried 
out by independent bodies and the consequences in the event of non-compliance” 
(Art. 6). In addition, if a given fiscal rule defines “exit doors”, such special 
circumstances should be limited and consistent with the ones specified in the 
European fiscal constraint (Art. 6(2)). Finally, the national fiscal constraints 
should be taken into account in the annual budget legislation (Art. 7). 
Lastly, the Directive of the Six-Pack specifies that the Union’s member states 
establish a national medium-term budgetary framework, providing a fiscal 
horizon of, at least three years (Art. 9(1)). Such framework should be designed in 
a way that facilitates the computation of the following items: comprehensive and 
transparent multiannual budgetary objectives, projections of each major 
expenditure and revenue item of the general government, a description of 
medium-term policies envisaged with an impact on general government finances, 
and an assessment of the long-term impact of the policies envisaged on the public 
finances sustainability (Art. 9(2)). 
5.5 The Treaty on stability, coordination and governance (TSCG) 
The forth “institutional layer” of the European fiscal constraint slightly differs 
from the others in two ways. Firstly, contrary to the revised SGP (Section 5.3) 
and, partly the Six-Pack (Section 5.4), the TSCG is formally not a reform of the 
initial SGP (Section 5.2) but rather “overlaps” the existing European fiscal 
discipline instrument. It runs thus in parallel with the existing European fiscal 
legislations and completes, under several aspects, the Maastricht criteria and the 
more recent Six-Pack. Put differently, it may be seen as a further step forward in 
the reform process initiated by the EU in reaction to the crisis. The second 
difference relies on the legal nature of the document. Contrasting with the legal 
bases studied until now, the TSCG is formally not a EU law, but rather an 
intergovernmental agreement (which does not mean that its provisions are not 
binding). However, Art. 16 of the latter specifies that the substance of the text 
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should be incorporated into the legal framework of the EU within five years 
following its entrance into force94. 
Commonly referred to as the “Fiscal Compact”, this Treaty has been imagined in 
early 2012 in response to a double request from Germany and the ECB. On the 
one hand, the German Chancellor defended conditioned financial helps to 
struggling countries, depending on the improvement of their respective fiscal 
discipline. On the other hand, the President of the ECB suggested at the end-2011 
that the implementation of a new “fiscal pact” would encourage his institution to 
increase its support to the euro area (Guélaud et al., 2012: 1). It is in this context 
that the UE member states (except from the United Kingdom and the Czech 
Republic) agreed on the TSCG in March 2012. Entered into force on 1st January 
201395, the Treaty applies in full to the contracting parties whose currency is the 
euro (as far as the text has been ratified at the national level) (Art. 1(2) and Art. 
14(3)). For other contracting parties, the Treaty will be binding as soon as they 
adopt the common currency, unless they declare their “intention to be bound at an 
earlier date” (Art. 14 (5)). 
Schematically, the provisions described in the TSCG covers three distinctive 
fields. It contains indeed fiscal provisions (Art. 3 to 8), policy coordination 
principles (Art. 8 to 9) and governance rules (Art 12 and 13). Although some of 
those provisions are concepts coming directly form the Six-Pack, the Treaty 
brings some innovations that are worth noting. As far as the policy coordination 
and governance rules are concerned, one must nevertheless acknowledge that the 
TSCG introduces only a few new features, whose ins and outs are minimally 
described. Regarding the improvement of the policy coordination, the Treaty just 
states that “all major economic policy reforms that [the contracting parties] plan 
to undertake will be discussed ex ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among 
themselves” (Art. 11). The details about the transposition of this objective into 
practice are however missing. Concerning the governance issue, the contracting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 For instance, some of these principles have already been integrated in the Two-Pack regulation. 
95 The entrance into force of the Treaty was conditioned. Art. 14(2) states indeed that it shall be 
implemented on 1st January 2013, “provided that twelve contracting parties whose currency in the 
euro have deposited their instrument of ratification”. The ratification of Finland on 21st December 
2012 marked thus the fulfilment of the latter condition and allowed the entrance into force on 
schedule. 
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parties agreed only on the organisation, at least twice a year, of “Euro Summit” 
meetings, which would gather the Heads of States of the Eurozone participants 
(Art. 12). This new platform would allow the members of the monetary union to 
discuss specific questions related to the Eurozone. 
Fortunately, looking now at the fiscal part of the TSCG, the text becomes more 
consistent in terms of content, although it reaffirms some principles already 
present in the Six-Pack. Moreover, these fiscal provisions, when published, have 
known wide media coverage, since they have been perceived (and described by 
their authors) as an introduction of a “golden rule” to be applied nationally by the 
member states. But how does the Fiscal Compact define this concept and what are 
the other fiscal components of this intergovernmental Treaty? 
Art. 3(1) of the Fiscal Compact prescribes that “the budgetary position of the 
general government of a contracting party shall be balance or in surplus” with the 
indirect specification that the term “budgetary position” refers to the “annual 
structural balance” or, more precisely, the “annual cyclically-adjusted balance net 
of one-off and temporary measures” (Art. 3(3)). In addition, the phrase “balance 
or in surplus” should be tempered since the Treaty says that it would admit a 
structural deficit 0.5 per cent of GDP, at most. Likewise, under the condition that 
the debt-to-GDP ratio of the concerned member state is “significantly below 60 
per cent”96, the structural deficit may reach 1 per cent of GDP. Finally, we find 
the traditional escape clause. Accordingly, a member state may deviate from the 
above-mentioned fiscal target, as far as the deviation remains temporary or due to 
exceptional circumstances97. At that point, except from the differentiation made 
between heavily and low indebted countries and, a slightly stricter deficit limit for 
the member states whose currency is the euro, these provisions correspond quite 
closely to the ones prescribed in the Six-Pack. The innovation lies however on 
enforcement of these principles. Art. 3(2) stipulates indeed that these rules “take 
effect in the national law of the contracting parties”, and preferably in their 
respective constitutions. While the Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for 
budgetary frameworks of the member states (see Subsection 5.4.3) called for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 The adjective “significant” is not specified. 
97 The escape clause is defined in accordance with the related provisions set in the Six-Pack. 
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implementation of national numerical fiscal rules in the EU member states, the 
TSCG specifies, for the euro area participants, the sense to be given to the 
constraint. These national fiscal rules should also provide a “correction 
mechanism [that] shall be triggered automatically”. The contracting parties have 
until 1st January 2014 to transpose this European “golden rule” into their national 
legislation (the provisions of the above-mentioned directive should be 
implemented by 31st December 2013). If a contracting party fails in properly 
implement the fiscal rules in its national legislation, it risks “a lump sum or a 
penalty payment” of 0.1 per cent GDP. The sanction is here imposed by the Court 
of Justice (Art. 8) and not the Council, as it is usually the case.  
Looking back at the definition of the “golden rule” that we formalize in 
Subsection 4.1.2, we observe that the European concept is quite different. To 
mention only one of these dissimilarities, the existence of the escape clause offers 
an opportunity for the Eurozone member states to “dilute” the essence of the 
concept. For this reason, one may consider that the term “golden rule” is actually 
misused with regard to its strict economic meaning. 
The Fiscal Compact is not limited to the introduction of the European “golden 
rule”. Besides reaffirming the minimal required adjustment path of the public debt 
(Art. 4) that is set in the Six-Pack (see Subsection 5.4.1), the Treaty introduces 
three new elements. Firstly, Art. 5 specifies that, when a contracting party faces 
an excessive deficit procedure, in addition to the opening of a corrective 
procedure (Figure 5-12), it must put in place a “budgetary and economic 
partnership programme”. This document consists in the formulation of a 
“detailed description of the structural reforms” that the concerned country plans to 
undertake. The assessment and monitoring of such programme should be inserted 
into the surveillance procedure described in the Six-Pack. Secondly, from now on, 
the public debt issuance plans of the euro area member states should be reported 
ex ante to the Council and the Commission in order to improve the coordination 
among participating countries (Art. 6). Finally, after the introduction in the Six-
Pack of the system of reversed qualified majority to some of the Council’s 
decision-making process, the Treaty makes a further step towards more 
automaticity and better enforcement of the Pact. Art. 7 indeed provides that the 
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contracting parties commit to supporting the proposals and recommendations of 
the Commission concerning the existence of excessive deficit, unless a qualified 
majority of is against the decision. Concretely, this provision means the 
implementation of the reverse qualified majority voting to the whole corrective 
arm of the Pact, as far as it concerns euro area member states. 
5.6 The “Two-Pack” 
Recently published in the Official Journal of the European Union (27th May 2013) 
and entered into force shortly after (31st May 2013), the so-called “Two-Pack” 
regulation constitutes, today, the last institutional piece of the European fiscal 
constraint. As its name indicates, the Two-Pack encompasses two Regulations: 
Regulation No. 472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary 
surveillance of member states in the euro area experiencing or threatened with 
serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability and Regulation No. 
473/2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary 
plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the member states in the 
euro area. Applicable to the Eurozone member states only, these two legal acts 
aim at strengthening the several surveillance mechanisms in the euro area in order 
to avoid potential contagion effects within the monetary union. While Regulation 
No. 473/2013 applies to all euro area participants and sets common budgetary 
provisions and closer monitoring in the excessive deficit procedure, the 
Regulation No. 472/2013 is particularly designed for enhanced surveillance 
intended for the ones in financial distress only. Besides, both regulations attempt 
to simplify the coordination between the different mechanisms that we have 
presented in the previous sections. 
In order to understand more precisely what brings this last instrument, we 
articulate our description of these legal bases by simply analysing one after the 
other. 
5.6.1 Regulation No. 472/2013 
Applied to the EU member states whose currency is the euro, the provisions 
described in Regulation No. 472/2013 introduces two main instruments designed 
for countries in financial difficulties. On the one hand, Art. 2 to 4 of the text 
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introduce a gradual surveillance system, which aims at differentiating the fiscal 
monitoring imposed to the member states according to their financial situation. 
On the other hand, Art. 5 to 14 describe a set of additional conditions intended for 
the countries in receipt or requesting external financial assistance. Among these 
requirements, we find, for instance, the compulsory submission of 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes. 
The enhanced surveillance 
In order to reinforce the preventive arm of the European fiscal constraint, the 
Regulation No. 472/2013 puts in place an extra surveillance mechanism referred 
to as the “enhanced surveillance”. Especially designed for the euro member 
states who present special circumstances98, this preventive tool implies that the 
concerned countries are subject, on the one hand, to regular closer monitoring 
and, on the other hand, to additional obligations. 
For a member state, two situations may lead to an enhanced surveillance: (1) 
experiencing or being threatened with serious financial difficulties (Art. 2(1)) 
and, (2) being in receipt of precautionary financial assistance (Art. 2(3)). The 
Regulation further specifies this classification. Thereby, the threat “with serious 
difficulties with respect to financial stability” of a given member state should be 
estimated by the Commission on the basis of: its alert mechanism and in-depth 
review (if available) (see Subsection 5.4.3), its borrowing conditions, the 
repayment profile of its debt obligations, the robustness of its budgetary 
framework, the long-term sustainability of its public finances, the importance of 
its debt burden and the risk of contagion from severe tensions in its financial 
sector on its budgetary situation or on the financial sector of other member states. 
If the Commission finds out the existence of a threat, it should repeat the 
assessment every six months and decide whether to prolong the enhanced 
surveillance or not. Similarly the “receipt of financial assistance” is limited to 
assistance programmes received “from one or several other member states or third 
countries, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The others remain subject to the “standard” surveillance mechanism laid down in Regulation 
No. 1175/2011. 
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another relevant international financial institution such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)”. The financial assistance received in the form of a credit 
line, unconditioned by the adoption of specific policy measures, is excluded by 
the definition and, consequently, does not lead to an enhanced surveillance (Art. 
2(4)). 
The third article of the regulation describes then the ins and outs this enhanced 
surveillance. First of all, when subject to enhanced surveillance, the concerned 
member state shall undertake measures “aimed at addressing the sources or 
potential sources of difficulties” (Art. 3(1)). The latter should be discussed with 
the Commission99 and, afterwards, transmitted to the European Parliament, the 
EFC, the Eurogroup Working Group and the national parliament. As far as the 
monitoring is concerned, the enhanced surveillance follows the procedure laid 
down in the second regulation of the Two-Pack under the Art. 10(2), (3) and (6). 
It is thus provided that the concerned member state carry out assessment of in-
year budgetary execution for the general government and its subsectors, covering 
in particular the contingent liabilities with potential large impacts on public 
budgets. Moreover, the Commission and the EFC shall be regularly informed of 
the in-year budgetary execution, the nature, as well as the budgetary impacts, of 
the measures taken or envisaged. Finally, the member state is constrained, on 
request from the Commission, to further carry out independent audit of the public 
accounts and provide additional information. 
Besides the general monitoring procedure, the Commission may, in the 
framework of the enhanced surveillance, impose further obligations to the 
concerned member state (Art. 3(3) and Art. 3(4)). The latter may be asked (1) to 
communicate to the ECB (and eventually to the relevant ESAs) disaggregate 
information on developments in its financial system, (2) to undertake stress test 
exercises or sensitivity analyses of its financial sector, (3) to submit regular 
assessments of its ability to supervise its financial sector, (4) to transfer to the 
Commission any information required for the monitoring of the macroeconomic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 In this context, the Commission should act in liaison with the ECB, the relevant European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and, where 
appropriate, the IMF. 
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imbalances. In view of these elements and of its regular review missions (Art. 
3(5)), the Commission informs the relevant committee of the European Parliament 
and the EFC of the progress made by the member state, on a quarterly basis. In 
case of insufficient result, the Commission may recommend, through a Council’s 
Recommendation (acting by a qualified majority), the adoption of precautionary 
corrective measures. Where appropriate, the member state may be constrained to 
prepare a macroeconomic adjustment programme (see the following paragraph). 
Requirements of the financial assistance 
The second important facet of this Regulation consists in providing special 
requirements to the member state requesting or benefiting from external financial 
assistance (as defined previously). 
To begin with, in the requesting phase, the concerned member state shall now 
inform the President of the Eurogroup Working Group, the person in charge of the 
economic and financial affairs within the Commission, and the President of the 
ECB (Art. 5). That way, the Eurogroup Working Group may discuss the existing 
possibilities to respond positively to the request, using one or the other Union or 
euro area financial instruments. In parallel, the Commission should carry out an 
assessment of the sustainability of the member state’s public debt (taking into 
account the impact of potential macroeconomic and financial shocks), as well as 
an evaluation of the financing needs of the latter (Art. 6). 
For its part, the concerned member state, collaborating with the Commission100 
and taking into account the view of its social partners (Art. 8), prepares a draft 
“macroeconomic adjustment programme”101. The document should be drawn up 
with the purpose of “rapidly re-establishing a sound and sustainable economic and 
financial situation and restoring the member state’s capacity to finance itself fully 
on the financial markets” (Art. 7(1)). A particular attention should be paid to the 
reinforcement of “the efficiency and effectiveness of revenue collection capacity 
and the fight against tax fraud and evasion” (Art. 9). The Council (acting by a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Here again, the Commission should act in liaison with the ECB, the relevant ESAs, the ESRB 
and, where appropriate, the IMF. 
101 Such programme may substitute, if it already exists, the Economic Partnership Programme. 
This kind of documents is prepared by the member states when they are in situation of excessive 
deficit (see Subsection 5.6.2.). 
 	  
149	  
qualified majority) should then approve the programme (Art. 7(2)). When subject 
to such programme, the member state should undertake an audit of its public 
finances in order to reveal, firstly, the reasons of the excessive public 
indebtedness and, secondly, the potential accounting irregularities (Art. 7(9)). 
In charge of the monitoring, the Commission informs the EFC of the member 
states’ progress, every three months (Art. 7(4)). According to the updated 
macroeconomic forecasts, it may also address a recommendation to the Council, 
calling for an adjustment of the programme (Art. 7(5)). 
Where the monitoring highlights significant deviations for the agreed programme, 
the Council (by a qualified majority) may confirm the non-compliance and 
impose the member state to take measures. Those ones should allow “stabilising 
the markets and preserving the good functioning of the financial sector” (Art. 
7(7)). If appropriate, the Commission may provide administrative and technical 
assistance to the country in distress (Art. 7(8)). 
As long as a minimum of 75 per cent of the financial help received from the 
above-mentioned lenders has not been repaid, the member state is placed under a 
“post-programme surveillance” (Art. 14(1)). Looking alike an enhanced 
surveillance under many aspects, this procedure involves especially regular 
review missions, which may trigger (in case of unsatisfactory results) the adoption 
of corrective measures. The Council, acting by reversed qualified majority, would 
decide those (Art. 14(4)). 
Finally, one must note the desire expressed by the European legislator to secure 
the consistency of the macroeconomic adjustment programme with the other 
obligations already imposed on the member states. Thereby, Art. 10 sets that, if 
subject to macroeconomic adjustment programmes, a member state is exempt 
from the submission of stability programme and eventually, from the regular 
reports required under the corrective arm (Art. 126(9) TFEU). Similarly, the 
macroeconomic imbalance procedure, the monitoring implied in the European 
Semester, and the risk of being place under an economic partnership programme, 
shall be put in abeyance (Art. 10 to 13). 
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5.6.2 Regulation No. 473/2013 
Also applied exclusively to the member states whose currency is the euro, the 
second regulation of the Two-Pack enriches both the fiscal preventive and 
corrective arm, as amended by the Six-Pack. While control over the formulation 
of the national budgets is integrated into the former, the latter is completed by a 
system of gradual monitoring fostering the timely and durable correction of the 
excessive deficits. 
Common budgetary provisions 
Whereas the first milestones of a common budgetary and economic coordination 
calendar were initially introduced by the SGP with the submission of the national 
stability programmes in spring, the mechanism has been further developed over 
the years and the successive reforms. More recently, the European Semester 
enhanced the policy-making coordination within the EU by setting an annual 
governance cycle. The implementation of the common budgetary provisions 
described in the Two-Pack comes within this framework and constitutes an 
additional step toward a closer monitoring of the national budgetary plans. 
Firstly, Art. 4 of Regulation No. 473/2012 determines the common budgetary 
timeline, which rhythms now the European Semester and, more particularly, the 
formulation of the national budgets. In accordance with the provisions laid down 
in the Six-Pack, Para. 1 of this article begins with reaffirmation that the country-
specific stability programmes, as well as the national reform programme, shall be 
submitted annually by the member states “preferably by 15th April but no later 
than 30th April”. Art. 4(2) and (3) specifies respectively the two other major 
deadlines imposed on the member states: their “draft budget for the forthcoming 
year of the central government and the main parameters of the draft budgets for 
all the other subsectors” should be published no later than 15th October; their 
budget for the central government should be adopted and made public no later 
than 31st December. 
Secondly, the Regulation makes clear that the stability programme, the national 
reform programme and the draft budget shall be based on independent 
macroeconomic forecasts (Art. 4(4)), i.e. produced by an independent body. 
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Moreover, such “agencies” should also be responsible for the monitoring of the 
compliance with the national fiscal rules introduced by the Directive of the Six-
Pack (see Subsection 5.4.4). 
Thirdly, the Two-Pack provides now that the draft national budgetary plans, 
submitted in October, shall be assessed and approved by the competent EU 
institution before their adoption in December. The required content of these 
documents is therefore precisely defined and should include (Art. 6(3)): 
- the targeted budget balance for the general government (with the measure for 
each subsector) as a percentage of GDP; 
- several measures of expenditure and revenue of the general government as 
percentage of GDP (projections at unchanged policies, targeted figures given 
the conditions of expenditure growth path, according to a functional 
classification, broken down by subsector); 
- the assumptions and the methodology underlying the macroeconomic 
forecasts; 
- elements showing the consistency of the draft budgetary plan with the 
Union’s strategy for growth and employment. 
The draft budget should be then submitted to the Commission – the controlling 
institution – and to the Eurogroup by the due date (Art. 6(1)). Besides controlling 
the compliance of the budgetary plan in terms of content, the Commission should 
also investigated the consistence of the document with the recommendations 
issued in the context of the Six-Pack. Based on this assessment, the Commission 
should adopt an opinion on the document no later than 30th November (Art. 7(1)). 
Where the Commission identifies, in the budget draft, serious non-compliance, it 
shall adopt its opinion earlier and no later than two weeks after the submission. In 
this case, the concerned member state should revised its budgetary document 
within three weeks. The Commission should discuss and adopt a new opinion on 
the revised text within three weeks following the submission of the second draft. 
Ultimately, the Commission’s opinion shall be made public (Art. 7(3)). 
Finally, on the basis of all national budgetary plans, the Commission provides an 
overall analysis of the euro area budgetary situation. At that occasion, the 
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Commission shall point out “the risks to public finance sustainability in the event 
of adverse economic and financial or budgetary developments” (Art. 7(4)). This 
overall study shall further serve as the discussion paper, on which the 
Commission should base its annual general guidance to member states. 
Closer monitoring in the EDP 
As noted previously, the Regulation No. 473/2013 exposes also additional 
provisions regarding the fiscal corrective procedure. Its major feature consists in 
the requirement, for member states in situation of excessive deficit, of presenting 
an economic partnership programme102. This document should precisely describe 
“the policy measures and structural reforms that are needed to ensure effective 
and lasting correction of the excessive deficit” (Art. 9(1)). It should particularly 
help the concerned member state to determine its priorities, which would allow 
reinforcing its competitiveness, as well as its long-term sustainable growth. Its 
submission to the Commission and the Council comes within the schedule of the 
corrective arm and should be simultaneous with the report on the effective action 
taken in response to the first Council’s recommendation (Art. 3(4a) Regulation 
No. 1177/2011). The monitoring of the programme is under the responsibility of 
the Council and the Commission (Art. 9(6)). In a purpose in limiting the 
multiplication of procedure, Art. 9(5) allows that the economic partnership 
programme could be replaced by a corrective action plan103 – if amended 
accordingly. 
Besides the formulation of an economic partnership programme, a member state, 
in situation of excessive deficit, is also forced to comply with additional 
conditions. These conditions consist mainly in supplementary reporting 
requirements on a regular basis until the abrogation of the EDP (Art. 10). The 
member states shall, for instance, report to the Commission and the EFC 
assessments of the in-year budgetary execution (every six months) for its general 
government and its subsectors. They particularly highlight the financial risks 
associated with its contingent liabilities, as well as the impact of those on their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 The TSCG mentioned already such programme (see Section 5.5). It is now formally 
incorporated into the EU law. 
103 Document to be submitted under the corrective mechanism of the MIP. See Subsection 5.4.3. 
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excessive deficit. On a request from the Commission, the member state may be 
asked to undertake an independent audit of its public accounts and provide further 
information helping in the monitoring of the correction of the excessive deficit 
(Art. 10(6)). 
The above-mentioned regular reports submitted by the concerned member state 
serve then as the basis for the monitoring of the Commission. This EU institution 
shall particularly assess whether the member states follows the correction 
calendar or, on the contrary, presents a risk of breaching the deadlines. In the 
latter case, the Commission addresses to the member state a recommendation 
either encouraging it to fully implement the measures already proposed, or 
mentioning the adopting of new ones (Art. 10(2)). This recommendation should 
also be followed by a report of the concerned country (Art. 10(3)). 
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6 Institutional assessment and review of Maastricht criteria 
The last chapter of Part II concludes our study and attempts finally to provide 
some responses to our central question: to what extent is the European instrument 
for fiscal discipline an adequate fiscal constraint? In order to do so, we confront 
our institutional reading of the European legislation (Chapter 5) with the criteria, 
based on the economic meaning of fiscal discipline and developed in Chapter 4. 
As a reminder, Chapter 5 provides a chronological description of the construction 
of the European fiscal discipline instrument. Rather than assessing each 
successive development step of the constraint (the Maastricht criteria, the SGP, 
the revised SGP, etc.) and evaluate their individual contribution to the whole 
arrangement, our analysis concentrates on the fiscal rules in force to date (June 
2013). Whereas many authors published qualitative assessments of the European 
fiscal rules at different periods, and thus, covering the several stages of 
construction104, the present study is, to our knowledge, the first one to encompass 
a sequence going until 2013. 
Besides, we also recall that Chapter 4 identified the different features and 
principles that a fiscal rule should ideally contain and respect. Based on these 
relevant characteristics, we exposed two sets of criteria. Proposed initially by 
Kopits and Symansky (1998: 18-19), the first one consists in a set of general 
properties, which should ideally be respected (Subsection 4.2.1). The second set 
of criteria is articulated in a sequence of key questions pointing out the main 
aspects of a fiscal constraint and ultimately allowing ranking the instrument 
according to its degree of strictness (Subsection 4.2.2). Designed by Dafflon 
(1996: 240-243) and replicated several times afterwards, always in a comparative 
purpose – for instance, for the comparison of the degree of fiscal discipline in 
force among the Swiss cantons (Novaresi, 2001) – the method is here somehow 
diverted from its original aim. Instead of using it as a benchmark, it serves us to 
bring out some elements of interest and concentrate our analysis on them. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 For studies dealing with the initial Maastricht criteria, see for instance Buiter et al. (1993) or 
Holzmann et al. (1996); with the SGP, Artus et al. (2004) or Fatás et al. (2003); with its revised 
version, Diebalek et al. (2006); and with the Six-Pack, Schuknecht et al. (2011). 
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Taking into account both preceding chapters and following the logical flow of this 
second part, we articulate the present chapter into two sections. While Section 6.1 
analyses the European fiscal constraint in the light of the first set of criteria, 
Section 6.2 confronts the latter with some of Dafflon’s key issues. Together, this 
chapter not only provides a global assessment of the institutional design of the EU 
fiscal rule, but also tries to underscore some shortages implied in the legislative 
arrangement in force nowadays. 
6.1 The EU fiscal constraint in light of the optimal criteria 
As pointed out in Subsection 4.2.1, the criteria allowing the assessment of any 
fiscal constraint should cover two properties: the efficiency of the concerned rule 
and its enforceability. In order to investigate deeper each of these aspects, we 
have exposed a set of criteria, related more specifically to the one or the other. 
Table 6-1 recaps those criteria and sums up their respective scope. 
Table 6-1: The criteria of an optimal fiscal rule. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the criteria of Kopits and Symansky (1998: 18-19). 
Before analysing the EU fiscal rule in the light of those criteria, one must keep in 
mind two elements. Firstly, quoting Creel (2003: 6), “the eight features might not 
be fulfilled at the same time by any set of fiscal rules all over the world; some 
“trade-offs” among them are likely, indeed “inevitable””. However, it does not 
mean that all possible trade-offs turn out to be equivalently effective, but rather 
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that the choice of emphasising one or the other criterion exists and is a matter of 
political will. More importantly, we wish to draw the reader’s attention on the fact 
that the forthcoming qualitative assessment expresses our own viewpoint. 
Similarly, the decision of stressing in particular some aspects of the concerned 
fiscal rule is our own. Therefore, we do not pretend to provide an unquestionable 
opinion but, we try, nonetheless, to present a picture as objective as possible. 
6.1.1 Criteria of efficiency 
Consistency 
Analysing the consistency of the European fiscal constraint with its stated goals 
requires logically a clear understanding of those. However, this task appears to be 
more difficult as it seems at the first glance. 
In fact, the target(s) pursued by the fiscal discipline instrument has (have) slightly 
changed over the years and the successive reforms, so that, in June 2013, a careful 
reading of the legal acts in force may reveal several distinctive goals. Next to the 
initial objective of “sound public finances” (interpreted as the avoidance of 
excessive levels of deficit and debt), we find now the will of avoiding 
macroeconomic imbalances, as well as of coordinating the national fiscal 
procedures and policies. Besides the fact that “it is very unlikely that one rule can 
achieve more than one objective” (Fatás et al., 2003: 66), we wish to underscore 
one fundamental inconsistency, which has been widely documented since the first 
publication of the Maastricht criteria: the choice in the reference values. 
The setting of the central reference values for deficit and debt at 3 and 60 per cent 
of GDP raises indeed some problems. As highlighted by de Grauwe (2009: 148), 
these thresholds have been derived from a well-known formula determining the 
maximal deficit required to stabilise the indebtedness level. Thereby, the 
calculation shows that a deficit of 3 per cent of GDP would stabilise the public 
debt at 60 per cent of GDP “if and only if the nominal growth rate of GDP is 5 
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per cent”105. As far as the consistency with the objective of sound public finances 
is concerned, this implies two incoherencies. 
On the one hand, the assumption of a uniform growth rate within the EMU is 
questionable, if not simply wrong. For instance, in 2011, whereas France recorded 
an annual GDP growth rate of 2 per cent, the same figure grew at a rate of 8.3 per 
cent in Estonia (ec.europa.eu/eurostat) In clear, and without taking into account 
their respective initial level of public debt, if the objective consists in the 
sustainability of the public debt, the deficit of a slow-growing country like France 
should be largely closer to balance than the one of Estonia. The introduction of 
country-specific MTO and, more recently, of thresholds of structural deficit 
differentiated according to the level of debt (0.5 per cent of GDP, or 1 per cent of 
GDP under the condition that the debt ratio is “significantly” below 60 per cent) 
may be seen as an attempt to correct this inconsistency. 
On the other hand, the choice of 60 per cent as the optimal level of debt appears to 
be quite arbitrary. The economic theory provides indeed no foundation justifying 
such threshold. In consequence, one may wonder why 3 and 60 and not 3.5 and 70 
or 2.5 and 50; both combinations satisfying the formula. The answer to that 
question is to be found in the statistical series of Debt-to-GDP ratios exposed in 
Appendix D. The 60 per cent reference value corresponds actually to the average 
level of public indebtedness in the EA-12 in the early-1990s. 
Although the role played by these reference values has evolved over the 
successive reforms, they are still at the heart of the European definition of fiscal 
discipline. Therefore, the fact that they lie upon the 1991 average public finance 
stance is quite disturbing in terms of signal. In our opinion, this constitutes a 
major inconsistency with the stated goal of “sound public finance”. 
Credibility 
As far as the credibility of the European fiscal rules is concerned, we must 
emphasise the significant improvement realised with the introduction of the Six-
Pack. The reversed qualified majority voting system, the commitment made by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 The formula is the following: d = gb, where d is the public deficit (as a percentage of GDP), g 
is the annual growth rate of nominal GDP and b is the public debt (as a percentage of GDP). 
Accordingly, 0.03 = 0.05 x 0.6. For the development of the formula, see de Grauwe (2009:148).  
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the member states to respect the Commission’s recommendations, or the 
specification of the different procedures of sanction (in the preventive arm, in the 
corrective arm, in the macroeconomic imbalances procedure, in the national 
implementation of numerical fiscal rules) contribute to restore the credibility that 
has been lost previously. Naturally, the rules in force provide many escape clauses 
and the effectiveness of the sanction has not been proved yet. In addition, these 
new legal acts still lie upon the same institutional foundation (for instance the 
provisions contained in the TFEU or the accounting standards of the ESA 95), 
which have been vehemently criticised106. Nonetheless, it seems that the EU 
legislator is now on the right path. 
Although the last reforms go in the right direction and besides they were built on a 
questionable institutional ground, the credibility of a fiscal constraint also depends 
on what happened in the past and, in this case, the past does obviously not operate 
in favour of the EU fiscal instrument, which has showed little success until now. 
Caution is thus required, particularly since many provisions described in the last 
legal acts have still to be implemented. 
Adaptability - Flexibility 
The will of letting enough room for manoeuvre to fiscal policies to play their 
stabilisation role has always been present in the EU fiscal legislation. On paper, 
the existence of escape clauses, the setting of an acceptable deficit threshold, or 
the acknowledgement of the influence of economic good and bad times on the 
fiscal outcomes offer “sufficient margins for automatic stabilisers to be fully 
effective” (Creel, 2003: 10). Maybe due to the definitional ambiguities of some of 
those principles or the initial public finances stance – which never was “close to 
balance” – the experience shows a certain abusive use of these “exit doors”. So 
that, when required, the flexibility margins were already spent (van Riet, 2010: 9). 
One may thus argue that, for too long, the fiscal room for manoeuvre has been 
interpreted as “the standard”, rather than as “the upper limit” to be also respected 
in economic turmoil. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See for instance, Dafflon and Rossi (1999). 
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Transparency - Simplicity 
According to some authors107, it is its simplicity that makes the strength of the 
European fiscal rule. Quoting Creel (2003: 7), who analyses the rule in force at 
that time, “the SGP is the simplest rule, since it is related to a symbolic figure as 
well as to the most understandable public finance concept – the overall public 
deficit”. Besides the fact that the SGP did not operate any differentiation among 
the member states in the implementation of the criteria, which surely made it 
simpler and more transparent, we estimate that this enthusiasm should be slightly 
tempered. 
Although the main outline of the rule seems quite simple and transparent at the 
first glance, our detailed description provided in Chapter 5 tends to show quite the 
opposite. The many definitional ambiguities, the long list of escape clauses, or the 
numerous – sometimes overlapping – procedures are far from making the 
functioning of the fiscal constraint straightforward. The attempt, made in the 
Two-Pack, of standardizing the national budgetary calendars and, more 
particularly, of removing the overlapping procedures may be interpreted as a 
proof of our argument and confirms the need for simplification. 
6.1.2 Criteria of enforceability 
Looking back at the past fiscal outcomes of the EU member states, it becomes 
obvious that there have been serious issues when it came to enforce the rules. As 
we have already mentioned, the last cycle of reforms, which began with the Six-
Pack, addresses many shortcomings contained in the institutional arrangement in 
so far. Since the enforcement phase of these amendments has not been reached 
yet, we draw the reader’s attention on the fact that it is too soon to completely 
grasp their impact. 
Well-defined constraint 
Since the launching of the second stage towards the creation of the EMU, the 
design of the EU fiscal discipline instrument has always been surrounded by 
definitional ambiguities. For instance, while the TFEU already provided escape 
clauses (“exceptional and temporary”, “sufficiently diminishing”, taking into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 See for instance Creel (2003), or Buti et al. (2003). 
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account “all other relevant factors”, etc.), none of those were strictly specified. 
Similarly, the Treaty set the exhaustive list of potential sanctions in case of non-
compliance without addressing the question of their implementation. Although 
improvements have been made over the years and the amendments (“exceptional 
and temporary” has been lastly defined in the revised SGP, the Six-Pack specified 
the term “sufficiently diminishing” as well as the functioning of the sanction 
mechanism), some aspects remains unclear. Moreover, we estimate that the 
multiplication of the different procedures is not without making the whole 
constraint more complicated. 
"Bindingness" to the rule 
If the “bindingness” to the EU fiscal rule has to be assessed in the light of the 
number of its successive amendments, we understand easily that the result risks to 
be quite negative. Taking only into account the provisions of the SGP, their legal 
basis have been amended no less that three times between 1997 and 2011. 
Nevertheless, the closer link between the supranational European constraint and 
the national systems, initiated in the TSCG and reaffirmed in the Two-Pack, has 
good chances to make the whole arrangement more binding and, more 
importantly, less amendable. 
Timing of the monitoring compliance 
Originally the compliance with the Maastricht criteria was monitored exclusively 
ex post. The entrance into force of the SGP marked later the introduction of an ex 
ante mechanism, i.e. the preventive arm. Both preventive and corrective arms 
have been developed over the years. For instance, the former has been enriched 
with a procedure of sanction (Six-Pack), a process of national budgetary 
coordination, or a system of enhanced surveillance (Two-Pack). For its part, the 
fiscal corrective arm follows clear deadlines (SGP, and revised SGP) and provides 
earlier sanctions (Six-Pack). This issue is further addressed in forthcoming 
Subsection 6.2.3. 
Independence of the bodies in charge of the monitoring compliance 
Looking back at the failures of the SGP and its revised version, it seems that one 
of the main explanatory factors lies on the decision-making system. Although the 
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several monitoring procedures involved always the European Commission, the 
role of the latter was limited to an advisory function. The ultimate decision-
making was reserved to the Council of the European Union, i.e. the member 
states. In that configuration, the agents subject to the constraint are simultaneously 
the guardians of the rule. This situation not only makes the imposition of 
sanctions very unlikely but it also weakens significantly the credibility of the 
whole instrument. 
In order to remediate to this major shortcoming, the EU legislator had to find a 
way to suppress (in the best case, or, at least, reduce) the influence of the Council 
to the benefit of more automatic decision-making system. Among the measures 
going to that direction, we find for instance the introduction of the so-called 
system of reversed majority voting (Six-Pack), the involvement of the EU Court 
of Justice in the control over the integration at the national level of the EU fiscal 
provision (TSCG), or the reinforced position of the Commission in the new 
monitoring procedures (Two-Pack). 
6.2 The degree of strictness of the EU fiscal constraint 
Whereas the previous set of criteria investigated more particularly the general 
features of the EU fiscal rule, the second analytical grid allows us to tackle in 
greater details some crucial and more “technical” issues. 
As noted previously, our use of this analytical grid is slightly diverted from its 
original purpose, which consists in providing a uniform logical framework for 
comparing different fiscal rules within the same environment (for example the 
instrument of fiscal discipline in force in the Swiss cantons). Strictly implemented 
in the EU case, it would for instance allow comparing the translation of the 
European fiscal constraint within the different member states. We would thus 
confront the member states’ national fiscal rules with the sequence of questions. 
Ultimately, we would be able to estimate which national transpositions are the 
strictest in terms of fiscal discipline. In our case – the assessment of the EU 
supranational institutional framework – we find ourselves upstream. In other 
words, we do not have a benchmark, against which we could confront the EU 
fiscal constraint. Nevertheless, since this assessment method points out the crucial 
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issues that a fiscal rule should tackle, it remains meaningful to apply it to our case. 
Consequently, we do not entirely follow the sequence of questions presented in 
Subsection 4.4.2 and illustrated in Figure 4-3, but we rather concentrate on the 
issues, which are relevant to the EU situation. 
6.2.1 Is the fiscal discipline requirement prescribed by the law? 
The fundamental design of the EU instrument for fiscal discipline is laid down in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and its related Protocols. 
Although it is formally a Treaty, the TFEU, as well as its annexed Protocols, is 
part of the EU primary law, whose content may be materially considered as of 
constitutional nature (Dutheil de la Rochère, 2010: 86). 
In addition to these primary law principles, several legislative acts of derived law 
complete the fiscal discipline requirement. We find indeed many EU regulations 
and one directive. As already mentioned in Chapter 5, the former legislative acts 
are binding and directly applicable in all member states. Also binding, “as to the 
result to be achieved”, the directive leaves however to the member states “the 
choice of form and methods” (Art. 288 TFEU). 
Moreover, as required by the TSCG, the Eurozone member states should 
introduce by January 2014 a numerical fiscal rule, similar to the one prescribed at 
the EU level, into their national laws and preferably into their constitutions. 
Finally, the functioning of the EU fiscal constraint provides that the EU 
institutions, mostly the Council and the Commission, formulate regular 
recommendations, opinions, or decisions. One must therefore be aware that, 
among these acts, only the decisions have binding force. 
6.2.2 What is the definition of the fiscal discipline? 
Our institutional description of the EU fiscal instrument shows quite clearly that 
the European definition of fiscal discipline differs from the concepts, inspired by 
the economic theory and exposed in Section 4.1. Likewise the institutional 
arrangement, the European interpretation of fiscal discipline has evolved over the 
years. While, in the 1990s, fiscal discipline was associated to the respect of the 
deficit and debt thresholds, the concept involves now numerous other figures, as 
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well as further requirements. Thereby, in 2013, the assessment of the fiscal 
discipline of a member state depends on many aspects. Let us thus try to 
summarize shortly the criteria of fiscal discipline. 
At the national level firstly, the entrance into force of the TSCG marked the 
commitment of the member states to introduce in their own legislation a 
numerical fiscal rule. The latter should require that the annual structural deficit 
does not breach 0.5 per cent of GDP (1 per cent of GDP, if the debt-to-GDP ratio 
is significantly below 60 per cent). 
In parallel, the provisions of the TFEU and the Six-Pack remain. According to 
these texts, a deficit is considered as “excessive” when the deficit-to-GDP ratio108 
and/or the debt-to-GDP ratio exceed respectively 3 and 60 per cent (TFEU). As 
far as the indebtedness measure is concerned, a breaching of the threshold is 
acceptable, as long as it records a sufficient annual decrease (Six-Pack). 
Moreover, in order to minimize the chances to face such fiscal situation, the 
member states have to comply with “preventive requirements”. First of all, the 
structural deficit of a member state should be ideally below 1 per cent of GDP. If 
it is not the case, this target should be noted down as a “medium-term objective” 
(MTO), which implies that the concerned member states plan minimal annual 
adjustments measures. Accordingly, the MTO should schedule an annual 
improvement of the budget balance of at least 0.5 per cent of GDP (or higher, if 
their indebtedness level breaches the threshold). Secondly, the expenditure and 
revenue figures of the member states must also fulfil some conditions. Basically, 
the rule is that the annual expenditure growth does not exceed a reference medium 
term rate of potential GDP growth. The eventual excess of the expenditure growth 
should be matched by a revenue increase. 
One last aspect of the European definition of the notion of fiscal discipline should 
be emphasised. One must indeed keep in mind that all above-mentioned principles 
provide potential escape clauses. Generally speaking, those are founded on the 
occurrence of “exceptional and temporary situations” or “special circumstances”. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Contrasting with the provision of the TSCG, here, the deficit figure does not refer to the annual 
cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, but to the accounting item B.9 
in ESA 95 accounting plan: “net lending (+)/net borrowing (-)”. 
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In the same vein, their compliance monitoring involves, most of the time, the 
consideration of other parameters, indirectly related to fiscal policy. For instance, 
when investigating the existence of excessive deficit, the TFEU (Art. 126(3)) 
stipulates that, apart from the deficit and debt level, the Commission should take 
into account “all other relevant factors”. Updated in the Six-Pack reform, these 
factors encompass non-exhaustively the potential economic growth, the private 
sector net saving and debt position, the level of primary balance, the financial 
guarantees link with the financial sector, or the implicit liabilities related to ageing 
population. Together, the existence of these “exit doors” tends to dilute the 
definition given to fiscal discipline and, in consequence, exposes it to partisan 
interpretations. 
6.2.3 What does the fiscal discipline requirement concern? 
As expected in view of the European “multifaceted” definition of the concept of 
fiscal discipline, the object of the constraint is not unique. Besides the two types 
of requirement presented in Subsection 4.2.2, namely the distinction between ex 
ante and ex post requirements, the EU fiscal rules concern different figures. 
As far as the “timing” of the constraint is concerned, the implementation of the 
Maastricht criteria is endowed with ex ante, as well as ex post requirements. 
Looking first at the ex ante mechanism, Chapter 5 showed that two processes of 
control coexist: partly the so-called preventive arm (last reviewed in the Six-Pack) 
and the assessment of the national budgetary drafts (introduced by the Two-Pack). 
Whereas the former instrument consists in the general assessment by the Council 
of the country-specific stability programmes for the three forthcoming years, the 
latter requires the Commission’s approval of the national budgets before their 
adoptions by the parliaments. Regarding now the ex post procedure, we find, on 
the one hand, the monitoring of the implementation of the above-mentioned 
stability programmes (the “ex post side” of the preventive arm) and, on the other 
hand, the corrective arm, which is triggered in case of excessive deficit. 
In addition to these procedural distinctions, the aggregates or set of figures, 
subject to the successive controls, are also differentiated. Table 6-2 illustrates this 
situation and reviews which factors and aspects are examined at each step. 
 	  
165	  
Table 6-2: The fiscal procedures and their focus. 
 
6.2.4 In case of violation, does the rule provide sanction mechanism? 
Although the first draft of the Maastricht criteria already assigned to the Council 
the power of imposing a range of sanction measures (Art. 126(11) TFEU), the 
significant incompleteness in the definition of those penalties, as well as in their 
modalities of implementation, has been quickly perceived. Aware of these limits, 
the European legislators amended the system of sanction in 1997 and in 2011. 
Schematically, the initial SGP specified firstly the timing of the imposition of 
sanctions. The same legal act set secondly a certain hierarchy in the use of the 
possible measures. For instance, it says that the Council should start, as a rule, 
with the non-interest bearing deposit. Observing the inefficient enforceability of 
the sanctions, the Six-Pack introduced later interesting new features, which do not 
really change the types of sanctions, but innovates in terms implementation. 
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Thereby, putting side the additional sanction mechanism provided by the TSCG109 
and the closer monitoring imposed on member states incurring financial 
difficulties by the Two-Pack legislation, it is the Six-Pack that constitutes today 
the main legal base for the procedure of sanctions. Let us thus summarize shortly 
the mechanism in force in 2013. 
The Six-Pack defines four different situations leading to three types of sanctions. 
First of all, the ex post monitoring phase of the preventive arm may now lead to a 
sanction. Indeed, where a member states records a significant deviation with its 
stability programme and does not take the adequate measures to correct the 
situation, it risks an interest-bearing deposit of 0.2 per cent of GDP. Secondly, 
within the corrective arm, the sanction mechanism is articulated into two steps. To 
begin with, the confirmation of the existence of an excessive deficit by the 
Council triggers the imposition on the concerned member state of a non-interest 
bearing deposit of 0.2 per cent of GDP. Then, if no effective action has been 
undertaken within six months, the latter deposit should be converted into a fine. 
The last potential reason justifying to sanction a member state consists in 
manipulation of its statistics. In this case, the punishment provided by the Six-
Pack is a fine of 0.2 per cent of GDP at most. 
As mentioned previously, it is not in the form of the sanctions, but rather in the 
modalities of enforcement that the Six-Pack innovates. In fact, apart from the fine 
in case of falsification of public statistics, all other sanctions are now decided by 
reversed qualified majority. In other words, these measures should be 
implemented unless a qualified majority of the Council (without the concerned 
member state) rejects them. Sometimes referred to as a “semi-automatic” sanction 
mechanism, this system must still prove its effectiveness since the ultimate 
decision-making remains in the hands of the member states, which are 
simultaneously subject to the rules. 
Finally, let us shortly tackle a further issue related to sanction mechanisms. 
Assuming that the enforcement of the penalties for non-compliant member states 
is ensured, one may then wonder if those are the most prone either to discourage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 In the TSCG, it is stipulated that the Court of Justice could impose a penalty payment on the 
member states that have not introduced numerical fiscal into their national legislation. 
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the member states to break the rules, or to rectify their non-compliant position 
with one or another above-mentioned principle. In other words, in the EU case, 
the remaining question is the following: do the deposits and fines create the 
desired incentives? For instance, whereas a financial fine may be justified for 
punishing the manipulation of statistics, is such measure adequate in order to 
encourage a member state to promptly correct an excessive deficit? The same 
questioning makes also sense regarding the sanctions consisting in interest-
bearing and non-bearing deposits. Acknowledging that they may dissuade to 
breach the rules, these types of penalties do not contribute in fixing the problems. 
On the contrary, they are likely to make the situation worse, which is more 
disturbing. In that sense, the implicit sanction in force during the convergence 
period – the participation in the EMU was conditioned to the soundness of the 
member states’ public finances – was an instructive experience: on the one hand, 
the exclusion of the EMU was seen as a serious threat (like a fine) and, on the 
other hand, if the member state was able to comply with the requirement, the 
qualification to the monetary union constituted a reward. 
Without entering into greater details, we would like though to point out that, 
besides their modalities of implementation, the choice of the sanctions might have 
an impact on the outcome of the fiscal discipline instrument. Therefore, it would 
be surely interesting to investigate to what extent the past failures of the European 
fiscal rules were due to the types of sanction provided, instead of the lack of 
enforceability. 
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CONCLUSION 
The fundamental purpose of the present Master’s Thesis consisted in the 
description and the assessment of the fiscal constraint in force nowadays at the 
European level. In order to reach this ambitious target, we investigated not only 
the institutional design of the EU instrument of fiscal discipline, but also the 
economic theoretical foundations related to our matter. Thereby, we have been 
able to confront the lessons learned from the theory with the existing mechanism. 
Moreover, since the EU fiscal arrangement results from a twenty-year 
construction, we opted for a dynamic description of the EU fiscal environment. 
Instead of simply studying the legal bases in force at the time of writing, we tried 
to track as precisely as possible their evolution, pointing out the successive 
changes. 
Organised in two parts and six chapters, our study has covered a wide range of 
fiscal issues and questions. As a conclusion, let us thus briefly sum up our main 
results, expose some of the challenges that the EMU will have to take up in a 
foreseeable future, and sketch a potential further research agenda. 
After having contextualised the role of national fiscal policies in a supranational 
monetary union through Mundell’s OCA model and acknowledged the relevance 
of the institutional environment in the functioning of any fiscal restriction, Part I 
developed, from a theoretical perspective, three aspects related to the concept of 
fiscal discipline: the debate on the interpretation of the concept of fiscal 
discipline, the ins and outs of imposing fiscal discipline with legally binding rules, 
and an overview of the different types of fiscal institutions.  
To begin with, Chapter 1 reviewed the fundamental theoretical debate between 
the defenders of a strict fiscal control and the partisans of a more relaxed 
interpretation of fiscal discipline. Structuring the presentation according to 
Musgrave’s public sector functions – resource allocation, income redistribution, 
macroeconomic stabilisation – we put in parallel the arguments of both opinions. 
Without leading to a clear-cut specification of the concept of fiscal discipline, this 
survey of the economic literature allowed us highlighting the advantages and 
disadvantages linked to the implementation of a certain degree of control over 
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fiscal policies. Besides the few drawbacks that such fiscal restriction may imply – 
especially regarding the limit it sets on the macroeconomic stabilisation     
function – the discussion showed that, in terms of resource allocation and income 
redistribution, fiscal discipline brings valuable benefits. In addition, we argued 
that the use of fiscal measures for stabilisation was questionable for practical 
reasons (low and shared investment capacities among government layers, low 
political incentives for contra-cyclical fiscal policies in period of economic 
prosperity, etc.). In consequence, we deemed that, on the basis of the economic 
theory, a certain degree of fiscal discipline was desirable; the precise “strictness” 
of the latter being however left undefined. 
Whereas Chapter 1 dealt with the problem of controlling or not fiscal behaviours, 
Chapter 2 tackled the issue of the enforcement of this control. Put differently, this 
second chapter investigated to what extent legally binding rules represent 
adequate measures in order to ensure the respect of the concept of fiscal discipline 
adopted by, or imposed on a jurisdiction. Maybe redundant in appearance with the 
previous debate, the question of introducing or not legal commitments finds its 
justification from the fact that it requires taking into account another line of 
reasoning, including for instance public choice considerations. Moreover, since 
binding fiscal rules, taken in their broad sense, can be defined as institutional 
modifications of the environment framing the decision-making processes, we 
needed to understand more precisely the nature and the impact of these changes. 
Thereby, our analysis of the binding rules allowed us, not only to grasp their 
advantages (limitation of the deficit bias and the moral hazard phenomena, 
reinforcement of the budgetary pressure through the sanctions, etc.), but also to 
point out some weaknesses inherent to such instruments. We argued for instance 
that imposing legally binding requirements might potentially induce 
nontransparent behaviours, such as “creative accounting”, or that their 
enforceability (especially of the sanction mechanisms) may be difficult. Without 
leading to a total rejection of this kind of constraining measures, this chapter 
contributed to highlight the risks related to rule-based fiscal restrictions, as well as 
the aspects that require a particular attention when analysing fiscal rules. 
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The last chapter of Part I provided finally an overview of what the economic 
literature refers to as “fiscal institutions”. Accordingly, we dedicated the three 
first sections of Chapter 3 to the different kinds of “institutions” usually studied 
by the authors. We distinguished thus: the electoral rules, the budgetary 
institutions encompassing the several steps going from the formulation of a 
budget proposal to its concrete implementation, and the so-called numerical fiscal 
rules, which prescribe specific targets on the public budgets/accounts. More than 
just describing these institutions, we tried to determine, for each of them, their 
expected theoretical impact on fiscal outcome. Last but not least, this third chapter 
briefly portrayed some specificities of the Swiss institutional environment. 
Indeed, similarly to the above-mentioned institutions, the systems of referendums 
and of popular initiatives may be seen as additional “rules of the game”, which are 
likely to have an impact on the institutional environment and, in fine, on the fiscal 
outcomes. 
Following the presentation of the theoretical background, Part II got into the 
substance of our matter, namely the description of the EU instrument of fiscal 
discipline. However, before investigating the European fiscal legislations, Chapter 
4 served us as a transition between the lessons learned from the economic theory 
and the concrete analysis of the European concept of fiscal discipline. In fact, the 
fourth chapter of our study tackled successively two main issues. Given the 
relative definitional ambiguities, we needed indeed to specify some central fiscal 
notions (deficit, debt, investment, amortisation, etc.). Moreover, the second 
prerequisite for assessing a fiscal constraint consisted in defining an analytical 
grid gathering the relevant criteria. 
As far as the clarification of the fiscal notions was concerned, we articulated our 
development in three steps. Firstly, we presented the theorem of balanced budget. 
Based on theoretical arguments, the four principles that this theorem counts give 
the guidelines for reaching an adequate fiscal equilibrium. From these guidelines, 
we formalized the so-called revisited “golden rule” of public finances. At once 
elegant and simple, this “golden rule” illustrates the principles that should govern 
the investment and borrowing decisions. Translated into practice, the respect of 
those requires a well-defined public accounting plan. Therefore, the last step 
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consisted in the presentation of a standard accounting framework. Rather than 
focusing on the bookkeeping methods, we focused, on the one hand, on the 
features specific to the public sector and, on the other hand, on the calculation of 
the deficit and debt aggregates. 
Having specified the concept of fiscal discipline, as well as developed a set of 
criteria allowing the assessment of any fiscal constraint, we could finally expose 
our study of the European case in a fifth chapter. So, starting from the initial 
convergence criteria laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, the six sections of 
Chapter 5 described and dissected in details the successive reforms and 
adaptations that the EU fiscal rules have known over the years. More than just 
gathering all related legal acts and transcribing their provisions chronologically, 
we tried to carry a deeper analysis and provide a complete institutional reading of 
this supranational fiscal constraint. Accordingly, we examined not only the 
organisation of the several procedures prescribed by the legislations (EDP, 
preventive arm, corrective arm, MIP, etc.), but we also investigated the economic 
meaning and content of the targeted fiscal aggregates (size of the public sector, 
EU accounting plan, etc.). Besides, aware of the relevance of the public choice 
approach in the assessment of any institutional arrangement, we regularly 
emphasised some central aspects, such as the political backgrounds of the 
reforms, the decision-making rules governing the procedures, or the various 
incentives faced by the member states. 
Last but not least, Chapter 6 reviewed and assessed the EU instrument of fiscal 
discipline that is in force nowadays. As a first step, we provided an assessment 
based on the eight criteria defined in Chapter 4. Covering two fundamental 
properties – the efficiency and the enforceability – our evaluation tackled 
successively the consistency, the credibility, the adaptability, the transparency, the 
definitional clarity, the bindingness, the timing of the control and the 
independence of the monitoring bodies. Following this first review, we addressed 
four more questions inspired from Dafflon’s assessment method110. On this 
occasion, we investigated further the concept of fiscal discipline, which is actually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See Subsection 4.2.2. 
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implemented at the European level. We also reviewed the several aggregates 
targeted in each procedure. Finally, we summed up the different potential 
sanctions, as well as their enforcement mechanism. 
Generally speaking and without restating each conclusion and remark formulated 
along the final assessment, we wish to emphasise that our research indicates that a 
general improvement of the European fiscal constraint occurred these last years. 
Initiated with the publication of the Six-Pack, the last reforms showed a clear will 
for erasing past flaws. For instance, the introduction of the reversed qualified 
majority voting system in many decision-making processes illustrates perfectly 
our point. However, this optimism should be slightly tempered in view of some 
remaining uncertainties and problems. First of all, one must note that the fiscal 
requirements in force nowadays is nothing less than the result of an overlapping 
institutional construction, whose foundations contain a certain number of 
inconsistencies. Secondly, many of the new provisions, deemed promising, are 
still in their implementation phase. Furthermore, their success will strongly 
depend on the member states’ willingness to integrate them adequately in their 
respective legislations. Symbolizing our reserves, the national numerical fiscal 
rules prescribed by the TSCG and the Two-Pack have to be implemented by the 
Eurozone participants by the end of 2013/beginning of 2014. Therefore, this next 
step should be attentively followed and will, for sure, condition the success of the 
most recent reforms. 
We would like finally to draw the reader’s attention on the fact that the present 
Master’s Thesis reviewed and assessed the EU supranational institutional 
environment, in which national fiscal policies are designed. Consequently, further 
investigations regarding the national fiscal rules would be required in order to 
obtain a full image of the fiscal constraint in force in the European Union. Besides 
completing our study, this exercise would allow a comparison of the different 
national fiscal discipline instruments. We could thereby measure the “strictness” 
of the national interpretations of fiscal discipline, as well as confront the different 
system with their respective fiscal outcomes. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Investment expenditures in Switzerland by layer of 
government 
Investment expenditures, in 1'000 CHF 
Year 
Confederation Cantons  Municipalities Public sector 
Total 
expenditure 
of the public 
sector,  
in 1’000 CHF 
Public sector 
investment / 
total 
expenditures 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (= 5/6) 
1990 3'500'434 6'625'022 5'822'881 12'425'650 105'118'888 11.82% 
1991 4'383'969 7'001'116 6'106'651 13'535'306 117'006'922 11.57% 
1992 4'165'566 7'103'845 6'379'687 14'068'469 127'281'198 11.05% 
1993 7'162'597 9'670'103 5'870'762 18'908'598 139'891'798 13.52% 
1994 5'692'742 8'686'967 5'975'204 16'473'754 140'603'608 11.72% 
1995 4'539'752 7'308'684 5'872'503 13'819'176 139'873'305 9.88% 
1996 5'432'562 7'929'515 5'498'494 15'221'875 145'496'495 10.46% 
1997 6'582'739 8'690'571 5'306'312 17'051'506 149'994'297 11.37% 
1998 6'289'453 8'152'338 5'633'922 16'436'040 151'390'909 10.86% 
1999 5'616'577 7'302'339 5'274'839 14'398'060 148'940'137 9.67% 
2000 6'550'596 7'506'021 5'235'336 15'809'157 151'836'715 10.41% 
2001 8'106'891 7'670'698 5'243'838 17'633'313 160'553'803 10.98% 
2002 7'729'345 8'017'873 5'257'007 17'606'898 166'501'874 10.57% 
2003 6'732'780 7'034'366 5'642'358 16'072'856 169'862'602 9.46% 
2004 6'669'284 6'745'374 5'435'846 15'755'063 173'089'360 9.10% 
2005 6'721'387 6'628'453 5'274'570 15'795'167 176'235'767 8.96% 
2006 6'011'441 6'770'184 5'276'093 15'473'702 176'973'488 8.74% 
2007 6'557'720 7'203'505 5'375'718 15'786'403 183'706'306 8.59% 
2008 13'152'724 6'601'601 6'551'737 23'969'370 187'890'993 12.76% 
2009 7'647'245 6'737'520 6'995'459 19'214'741 185'536'151 10.36% 
2010 7'539'014 7'193'265 6'877'047 19'390'733 189'407'520 10.24% 
Source: col. 2: F11.7.4_Ausgaben_Bund (refresh: 20.08.2012); col.3: 
F40.7.4_Ausgaben_Kantone_KK_insg (refresh 20.08.2012); col.4: F23.7.4_Ausgaben_G_insg 
(20.08.2012); col. 5 and 6: F80.7.4_Ausgaben_Staat_21.08.2012 (refresh 21.08.2012); Documents 
available at: http://www.efv.admin.ch/f/dokumentation/finanzstatistik/berichterstattung.php.  
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Appendix B: Sample of the EDP notification tables111 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 The bi-annual full documents of each EU member states are available on: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/excessive_deficit
/edp_notification_tables. 
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Appendix C: Deficit-to-GDP ratios of the EMU member states. 
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Appendix D: Debt-to-GDP ratios of the EMU member states. 
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